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UNITED STATES FARM POLICY IN A WORLD DIMENSION 
A short title for the statewide seminar held on the University of Missouri-Columbia campus 
November 10-11, 1983 might have been, "What Comes After PIK? 
Something different from PIK is a certainty. Ma ny of the issues involved in choosing a 
post-PIK farm policy are old and familiar. What is new is the sharply increased emphasis on the 
international dimension, and attention given it. The place of the United States in world trade 
and the terms of trade, received much attention from the speakers at the seminar, and from the 12S 
persons attending. 
The seminar was eleventh in a series devoted to Agricultural Marketing and Policy, sponsored 
by the College of Agriculture and Extension Division of UMC. The seminar, including this 
publication, was funded from the Agricultural Marketing and Policy Forum Fund, a part of the UMC 
Development Fund. 
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U.S. FARM POLICY IN A WORLD DIMENSION: 
fHE SETTING IN 1983 
Harold F. Breimyer 
Professor of Agricultural Economics, UMC 
Years ago (1945) I was privileged under duress to study the principles of naval strategy at 
the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. I learned there that the first step to be taken 
in devising a strategy for defeating an enemy at sea is to develop an "estimate of the situation." 
Persons studying strategy for farm policy at a College of Agriculture should likewise begin 
by making an estimate of agriculture's situation. 
My assignment is to do that, and it is an awesome one. How indeed can the state of affairs 
in U.S. agriculture, both internally and in its connections worldwide, be "estimated" in a way 
that will help toward forming a wise farm policy for the future? 
Permit me two opening dogmatic statements. The first is that how the situation is estimated 
or defined makes a difference. The sea dogs at Newport knew the importance of an initial naval 
estimate. A mistake in reading the situation could lead to disaster at sea. Likewise, I suggest 
that our sharpness of insight in defining agriculture's situation today will have much to do with 
how we can design a policy for the nation's farm and food system. 
The second dogmatism is to reject any notion that a governmental role is about to end. Total 
abandonment of farm price and income supports is simply not a viable option. We should waste no 
time in even considering it. In my judgment, when Secretary Block's chief economist William 
Lesher, the Secretary himself, or a few dream-world economists go around the country saying there 
are three choices of which the third is to stop everything, they are muddying the water. They are 
confusing the issue, not clarifying it. In reality, choices are numerous but not a single one is 
to abandon everything. 
Why am I so positive? During my 50 years of involvement in agricultural programs I have 
heard the no-program refrain fifty times, a hundred, maybe five hundred. Yet the legislative 
process has never come close to total abandonment. I foresee nothing different in the near 
future. 
A second reason for disavowing the no-program option is that so many parts of our economy now 
depend on farm programs. A majority of farmers want some degree of price and income protection. 
Consumers beg for food reserves as safeguard against a 1983-style drouth. . But the clinching 
argument is that farm products now play an instrumental role in our international affairs. Not 
only do we distribute surplus foodstuffs worldwide as food relief and diplomatic lubricant. Nor 
is it only that the foreign exchange earned from exports of farm products is so treasured these 
days. It is also that we are moving toward transnational negotiation of trade relationships, 
including using government to back up bilateral trade treaties. The 1983 grain agreement with the 
Soviet Union calls for a major effort to make nine million tons of grain always available. The 
agreement virtually amounts to state trading. It is ludicrous to propose total disinvolvement of 
government from agriculture when government is committing itself to backstop foreign trading. 
1983 as Background 
Always, in projecting into the future we start from where we are. The year 1983 was 
tumultous. I need not recite the details. Devastating drouth in much of the country; a PIK 
program so costly as to invite a backlash of resistance to all programs; scene three of act four 
in the continuing drama of trade relations with the Soviet Union. The setting carries both good 
news and bad news. The bad news first: that the adverse circumstances of 1983 could be allowed to 
dominate our thinking about the future. No mistake has been made more often than to administer 
programs to fit the conditions of the moment. Apparently it is assumed that the future will be an 
extension of the present. It never is. The rest of the 1980s will not be a repetition of 1983. 
The good news, almost what we used to call Pollyanna good news, is that the anguishing 
experiences of 1983 may jolt us into taking a responsible, long-run, even generous view of ag-
ricultural policy. Maybe agriculture can rise above narrow commodity and regional loyalties. 
When things are truly tough there's at least a chance that common interests of the whole will 
supersede selfish aggressions of the constituent parts. We dare to hope that will prove true now. 
I offer my "estimate" of agriculture's situation in the expectation that at least for a while 
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we all are going to be statesmen. 
Rationale for Farm Programs 
It hardly seems necessary, after 50 years of programs, to repeat the basic reasons why the 
federal government engages in price, income, acreage, and storage programs for farm commodities. 
I remind of them briefly. The reasons are two. Significantly, only the first is 
pro-agricultural. That first reason is the vulnerability of the proprietary farmer to agricul-
ture1s inherent instability, itself explained as variable weather leads to variable crop harvests, 
which in turn interact with highly inelastic demand for farm products. In the absence of farm 
programs, variations in supply convert to sharp ups and downs in farmers 1 prices and to major 
fluctuations in income also. In addition, demand for farm products is far from stable. Export 
demand is notoriously undependable but in the last five years domestic demand has not been a 
bastion of strength either. All this mercurial behavior is a disturbing fact of life for farm 
business units whose financial reserves are modest at best. 
I stress agriculture 1s instability as cause for programs more than I do the average level of 
farmers 1 returns. It is hard to show that in the last decade or so agriculture as a whole has 
fared notably worse than other parts of the economy. The income picture in agriculture is now 
characterized less by disparity with other sectors than by sharp differences within agriculture 
itself. This feature of today 1s agriculture complicates the making of agricultural policy. 
Moreover, events of recent years have accentuated the internal income differences. I will comment 
on income issues again later. 
I said above that in principle farm programs are designed with the proprietary farmer in 
mind. For 50 years farm policy has been intended to succor the traditional unit in agriculture, a 
unit with limited shock-absorbing capacity. Something close to the family farm has been en-
visaged. Forget the hypocrisy and limited applicability of the programs themselves; it remains 
true that if agriculture were to become exclusively the tax-write-off plaything of urban inves-
tors, or a mere division of conglomerate corporations, today 1s farm policies would vanish into 
thin air. Even now, it is often said that farming is made up, on the one hand, of small farmers 
who are only rural residents and not helped by commodity programs, and on the other hand, of very 
large farm units that do not need program aid. So why have programs? The question is asked. 
What I am saying is that issues revolving around what we economists call the organizational 
structure of agriculture are intrinsically a part of national farm policy. No one should beguile 
himself into believing otherwise. 
I said above that there is a second origin of support for farm programs. Two nonfarm groups 
have an interest in the stability and dependability of the supply of farm products and food. One 
is the consuming pub 1 i c. The second is everyone concerned for export trade, even the federa 1 
government in its eagerness to earn foreign exchange. 
Farmers are not alone in their interest in farm programs, nor do they have an exclusive role 
in making farm policy. 
The First Y in the Policy Road 
I am still setting the framework for describing agriculture 1s situation today. I suggest the 
first big decision in making farm policy, the first Y in the road, is whether we design policy to 
fit the most likely pattern of events in, say, the rest of the 1980s or whether instead we draft a 
highly flexible, maneuverable policy that can be adapted to changing situations as they evolve. 
Something is to be said for each. We all wonder whether the prospect is for chronic surpluses. 
Will export markets revive? Wi ll high interest rates and costly inputs restrain our production 
capacity? I will offer a few speculations at the end of this paper. Other papers, including Dr. 
Tweeten 1s, present more information. 
My preference, though, is to take the right hand fork. I think the most certain statement to 
be made about the remaining years of the 1980s is that they will be uncertain. They will almost 
surely be variable, with ups and downs. Therefore we ought not design a program for a hypothet-
ical situation but stay loose, flexible, ready for whatever may come. One 1s guess about the rest 
of the 1980s, though relevant and useful, is not crucial to program design. 
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Income Support vs Commodity Stabilization 
in a World Dimension 
My choice of a right hand Y calls less for statistical analysis than for philosophy. It particularly opens up the philosophical question I raised earlier, the choice of emphasis between income support versus commodity stabilization. 
This has been the nexus of disputes in policy-making from 1933 to this day. The first New Deal farm programs were enacted for one simple reason. Farmers were poor. Many were desperately poor. For a decade farm programs had been campaigned for in the name of farm relief, to give 
relief from low incomes and even poverty. 
Secretary Wallace's men saw the farm problem more broadly. They thought it involved more than handing out money as "relief." I remember how hard they struggled to convert the language from "farm relief" to "agricultural adjustment." The first law, it will be remembered, was called 
an "Agricultural Adjustment Act." I insist there is deep meaning to the choice among idioms. To this day many farm leaders look on farm programs as only temporary expedients to be drawn on at times of distress. Surely that is Secretary Block's attitude. The opposite concept is sharply different. For it the language has now been updated from agricultural adjustment to "supply 
management." 
The idea underlying supply management is to reconcile the conflict between the variability 
and unpredictability that go with unmanaged supply of farm products, and the demands of buyers 
worldwide for a steady, dependable flow into trade and commerce. In a sense the interests of farm producers are subsidiary, not primary. In 1938 I helped my Chief, O.V. Wells, draft the first farm law that provided for a degree of supply management. It was the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
of 1938, which remains the prototype for much of the law of today. 
For 45 years since, we have vacillated between income relief on the one hand, and commodity 
stabilization via supply management on the other, as goals for farm programs. Generally, when times are good we are willing to bail out a few unfortunate farmers but want no part of supply 
management. When times turn tough we beg for it. My next moral ism can be anticipated. Supply 
management cannot be an in and out affair. Either we decide to make the federal government a gyrostabilizer for grains, cotton, and tobacco, or we do not. And we stay with the decision. 
Lest I be misunderstood, I do not say that income objectives are omitted when supply manage-
ment is carried out for purpose of commodity stabilization. I do say that (a) stabilization can itself be a goal separate and apart from income level; (b) other goals enter in such as having 
reserve stocks on hand and developing foreign markets; and further that (c) the division of 
emphasis between income objective and stabilization as such is a major and difficult consideration in the design and administration of farm programs. 
Most of the remarks that follow build around this theme. As an aid in understanding them I 
call attention to the chart on the next page. Clearly, a commodity management program interlinks price policy and production control with sales volume. Buffer stocks are in an intermediate position. Worth noting in the chart is that price policy bears on both commodity management and farmers' incomes. Incidentally, I extended the income effect out to deficiency payments, which 
are the makeweight in fulfilling the income objectives of programs. 
Also a feature of the chart is the satellite position of market development. Secretary Block, like some of his predecessors, has believed we can merchandise our farm products abroad so 
successfully that the need for production control is minimized. That was his thinking prior to the 1982 program. The Secretary can't do it, nor can anyone else, and we should promise ourselves 
never to smoke that opium pipe again. Oh, surely, there is a place for market development, including making sure our grain is clean, but it is not a magic instrument, a panacea. 
Price Policy and Export Trade 
One of the most difficult, tricky parts of the whole farm policy issue is the relation between price policy for our commodities and our export trading. I add fast that for the feedstuffs --corn and sorghums --we ought also to consider the effect on our own livestock and poultry producers. Their interests have virtually been scorned in recent years. But I confine these remarks to price policy for export trade. 
I also confess that I am as confused as anyone. I am sure that a couple of ideas or images 
which circulate freely are not correct. World trade in wheat or soybeans is not a "market" in the 
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sense of an oriental bazaar or board of trade. I'm not sure we should even use the term, "world 
market," for there really isn't any such thing. Least of all are trading relationships so poised 
that if we reduce our price 25 cents we will be able to sell all we want to. Heavens, if we 
reduce ours a quarter France will go down 30 cents. When the world is surfeited with surplus 
there is no meaningful equilibrium price. 
World trade is dominated nowadays by state trading, marketing boards, bilateral agreements; 
and it is shaped by countless variable levies, selective exchange rates, and so on ad infini t um. 
We hear it said that the United States is a poor old weak residual supplier in world trade. Hokum! World trade is not an empty barrel to be filled in some pecking order. Trade is a 
continuous flow, and no one contributes to it residually. There is no such thing as a residua 1 
supplier. 
Furthermore, the United States, far from being a timid pusillanimous Mr. Milquetoast in world 
trade, is the dominant supplier of grains and soybeans. We set the tone. To be sure, when trade is slow it's painful to play that role. By the same token, when trade picks up no one profits as 
much as the giant in the picture, namely, the USA. I ask anyone, which of the world's grain 
exporters reaped the biggest bonanza in 1973-74? 
Thus, we face several problems, it seems to me. Our style of conducting export trade does 
not mesh with the state trading done in much of the world. We are groping for a solution. As 
another problem, how ought a giant in world trade behave? How can we gracefully accept the burdens of that status even as we reap the occasional benefits? 
But the biggest question is how we interconnect our price support policy and whatever may be 
our goals in export trade. Obviously, price support policy has a bearing on what we are able to do in our export trading. Many critics say we have not been very sensitive to that relationship. Some declare that price supports have been the dog and exports only a tail that is wagged. 
let me put it another way, reintroducing the word, "residual." 
create pressure to base price support policy mainly on income goals. 
be high enough to provide the income they think they should have. 
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Our grain and cotton farmers 
They want support levels to 
Insofar as their wishes are 
met, foreign trade consequences become a residual. In a sense, there is no trade policy at all. 
Yet just about everyone says we need a trade policy, including a price policy for foreign trade. 
The most extreme position would be to choose price support levels primarily so as to 
accommodate our goals in foreign trade. Export trade would be the dog, and price supports the 
tail. 
Another course of action is clearly different. It would be a sharp break with our past. It 
is to set up a separate export trading corporation. The corporation would manage foreign trade 
independently of domestic programs. As of now, not many people want to go that route. But the 
idea will stay alive. 
Price Policy, Supply Management, and Farmers' Income 
Although foreign trade partisans would like price support policy to be slanted strongly in 
their direction, in reality support levels will be established as a blend among several 
considerations and objectives. It is always that way in pol icy-making. Individual groups want 
policy to be made solely for their benefit. Invariably, policy must be a compromise and not 
single-purpose. 
At this point I call attention once more to the Program Components chart and especially the 
box for support and release prices. Price policy bears separately on income goals and the several 
components of commodity management. The level of prices affects commodity flow, including flow 
into and out of stocks, and sales volume. But price policy also interacts with production 
control. If price supports are relatively high, production control must have a bite to it-- it 
must be effective. If supports are lower, control can be looser. 
Even so, I stress most the actual or potential conflict between income objectives of programs 
and the particulars of commodity management. That conflict is troublesome but it absolutely must 
be dealt with. As I said above, many farmers want price supports to be high enough to give them a 
satisfactory income. Most program administrators, including Secretaries of Agriculture, argue for 
more modest price objectives of programs, so as to make their commodity management task easier. 
Economists point one way out. It is to keep support and release prices fairly low and use 
Treasury payments to make up any shortfall below income objectives. We have in fact done that for 
20 years. Farmers have never been entirely happy with the arrangement. They prefer to get their 
returns from commodities rather than Secretary Regan's checkbook. Moreover, they are afraid David 
Stockman will succeed one of these days in taking away the farm program checkbook. That is to 
say, the income supplement device is at the mercy of annual appropriations as engineered by the 
Executive Office of the President and by Congress. 
The income-commodity management connection has yet another angle to it. As soon as we talk 
about income objectives for farm programs we shift the focus from commodities to people. 
Commodities do not get income; people do. When income from programs is mentioned questions are 
asked about who gets it and how much. So another shouting contest begins. Critics scream that if 
commodity price supports are pushed high enough to provide a good income for moderate sized 
farmers, not only will supply management be jeopardized but the biggest farmers will be enriched 
so much as to invite public disapproval. 
But that's not all of it. If deficiency payments are relied on heavily as income supplement, 
their size also is on public display and leads to even greater public objection. Hence, for 
reasons of political expediency if not equity, deficiency payments cannot be made proportional to 
volume of a farmer's sales. The technique used to date has been to put a size limit on payments. 
I have preferred instead to scale payments by formula. I have won few converts. To repeat, what 
all this amounts to is that the innocent box on the chart in which support and release prices 
subdivide into farm income and commodity flow is the focal point of very difficult problems in 
design and execution of farm programs. And the deficiency payments that compensate for inadequacy 
of commodity price present complications of their own. 
Production Control Methods 
Methods for controlling production are a separate topic. On other occasions I have set forth 
a stair step sequence of control methods from the loosest voluntary devices to the tightest. At 
the time a farm law is written it is impossible to foresee what control method might be needed. 
Therefore I have long advocated giving the Secretary of Agriculture a range of methods, a 
repertory or shopping list. Some tools of control must be sharp. They must include authority for 
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cross compliance, not excepting cotton, and for mandatory acreage allotments and marketing quotas. 
We all hope the harshest methods will rarely be needed but there is no point in calling for supply 
management unless the Secretary is equipped for the task. 
The State of Affairs, 1983 
I now sketch briefly a few relevant data on farm production, income, and foreign trade. 
Farm Income 
To the consternation of farmers who had virtually no income in 1983, at mid-fall the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture reported net farm income for the year as appreciably better than that of 
1982. Specifically, the 1983 figure has been estimated as a range between $25 and $29 billion, up 
from $22 billion in 1982. Data follow: 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 Forecast 
Current Do 11 a rs 
32.3 
21.5 
30.1 
22.1 
25-29 
Net Farm Income1 
(billions) 
1972 Dollars 
19.7 
12.0 
15.4 
10.6 
11-13 
Income in 1983 quite possibiy varied more widely among individual farmers than in any other 
recent year. Drouth always is viciously inequitable, as crop failure in drouth areas boosts 
prices and enriches farmers who are fortunate in harvesting a crop. In 1983, though, PIK added a 
new dimension. It amplified the effect of drouth while creating a new beneficiary of the higher 
prices, namely, the recipients of PIK grain and cotton. So incomes of individual farmers were 
extremely uneven in 1983. 
Farm Output 
The chart below on annual gross farm output is presented for information. The reduction of 
15 percent in 1983 -- 26 percent for crops -- is shown clearly. Perhaps the principal observation 
is that output advanced rather slowly in the early years of the 1970s. But the late 1970s saw a 
surge in farm output, culminating in the bountiful harvests of 1982. The only observation I offer 
is that the erratic pattern shown should make us cautious in projecting what lies ahead. 
120 
110 
U. S. FARM OUTPUT 
Index, 1977=100 
Livestock.J. 
_.,.~--· ... -~ ... ~--, .,--
... ,~ "" 
... , "' 
"""' 
1oata are from Agricultural Outlook, Aug. 1983, Economic Research Service, USDA, p. 12. 
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The Domestic Economy 
I turn now to a gloomy chart that reveals what has happened in the U.S. economy the last 10 years or so. In our preoccupation with export trade the 1 ast few years we have forgotten that 
three-fourths of the products of our agriculture go to our own consumers. Only one-fourth is 
exported. We may also have failed to remember that the state of employment and income inf luences demand for our farm products, particularly demand for the high value livestock products. Surely beef cattle producers have seen their markets shrink the last five years. 
DEFLATED GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT PER 
PERSON OF CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE 
1972 dollars 
1400 
130 
120 
110 
100 
o~~--~--~~--~~--~~--~--~~~~~ 70 74 78 
The chart presents data since 1970 on deflated gross national product per person in the 
civilian labor force. Twice in the period a cyclical improvement failed to be sustained. Little gain is to be seen for the period as a whole. In a nation accustomed to steady economic growth, 
the absence of growth the last decade is shocking. 
Furthermore, if an increasing proportion of consumers 1 incomes is precommitted (as often alleged)~ cons~mers 1 discretionary incom:s have2been progressively reduced. Food buying comes out 
of the d1scret1onary part of consumers 1 1ncome. 
VALUE OF U. S. AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS 
bil. dols. 
501~-----------------------------------, 
2GNP per person of the population would show a somewhat brighter picture. In many respects, 
though, production relative to the number of persons in the labor force is a more significant datum. 
11 
Farm Product Exports 
The last chart shows data for value of exports of farm products, 1970-71 to date. The high 
mark was the $43.8 billion in 1980-81. Preliminary estimates are that sales the past year (year 
ending September 1983) were only $34.5 billion. 
Where next? I forbear from predicting. 
Three years ago, at this same seminar, Dr. Womack and I were prophets of a continued export 
boom. He demonstrated conclusively that the world's food needs were growing steadily and we in 
the United States were best positioned of all exporters to supply those needs. Our forecasts went 
awry, even though the analysis was sound. 
Explanations for the downturn in exports are legion. Embargoes of past years are the most 
popular scapegoat. For my part, I put first emphasis on worldwide economic recession and the 
overvalued U.S. dollar. Professors Bredahl and Green, writing in the October 1983 Economic and 
Marketing Information letter, point out that the most rapidly developing ~tions contributed much 
to our export boom in the 1970s and have also cut back most in the 1980s. A slowdown in their 
economies, complicated by stringency in international credit, accounts for their reduced buying. 
Prospects for early turnaround are not bright. 
I remain convinced that in the longer future the export capability of our nation will be 
drawn on heavily. Somehow, in some way, we are going to supply large quantities of foodstuffs to 
the world's peoples that need them. But how is that "1 onger future" to be dated? As of what 
years? I do not know. 
Summary 
Probably the only summary remark to be made is so obvious as to be redundant. Without being 
morbid about what the future holds, there are no grounds for assuming that sudden bursts of new 
demand at home and abroad, or worldwide crop failures, will relieve us in the United States from 
considering once again the desired role of government relative to the financial stability of its 
agriculture. To us veterans it's all a re-run from earlier years. It is not an attractive 
re-run. But as the man said, "Who promised a rose garden?" 
3Maury Bredahl and Leonardo Green, Economic and Marketing Information for Missouri 
Agriculture, October 1983. 
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ECONOMIC AND POLICY OUTLOOK FOR 
U.S. AGRICULTURE 
Luther Tweeten 
Professor of Agricultural Economics, Oklahoma State University 
Is the basic framework of farm commodity programs devised a half century ago appropriate for today•s agriculture? Our political representatives will have to answer that question when 
enacting new commodity legislation in 1985. The answer to the question is partly economic and partly political. History has taught us that substantive pol icy changes come rarely--mostly in times of crisis such as the Great Depression, World War II, and the seemingly uncontrollable 
surpluses of the early 1960s. Will a crisis motivate new directions for farm policy in 1985? 
History also has taught us that events dominate political philosophy in determining the 
course of farm policy. Secretary of Agriculture Ear.l Butz, from a presumably stable ideology, presided over the most massive and later the least government support of farm income in his decade. Secretary of Agriculture John Block entered office with claims that demand expansion was the way for government to restore farm economic vitality, only to see demand plummet in his first years of office. 
The purpose of this paper is two-fold: (1) to review the economic environment and structural 
circumstances likely to influence agriculture and farm policy, and (2) to examine the policy 
options in light of the prospective economic environment and structural circumstances. 
The Economic Environment 
Economic conditions in agriculture will have a strong bearing on commodity legislation in 1985. The case for a market orientation will be stronger if agriculture is prospering than if it is depressed. Economic recovery in agriculture depends on several factors including: (1) worldwide economic recovery and attendant revival of export markets; (2) reduced real interest rates and a lower value of the dollar in international markets, 
and 
(3) no better than normal weather. 
U.S. economic recovery was well underway in the fall of 1983, with gross national product growing at an annual rate of eight percent in the third quarter. Such a high rate of growth is 
not sustainable but the recovery is likely to continue through 1984. Recovery in other countries is lagging but will be enhanced by rapid economic growth in the United States. As we import more from other countries, they will import more from us. 
Some troublesome problems remain. High real interest rates (nominal interest rate less the inflation rate) and an unusually strong dollar are causing real hardship for American farmers. A 
root cause of these difficulties is seemingly uncontrollable federal deficits. Economists are largely in agreement that deficits are appropriate during recession and that a balanced budget is 
appropriate following recovery. Large full-employment deficits require huge federal borrowing in 
national financial markets, driving up interest rates and driving out private investment needed to 
sustain employment. 
The economic response to federal borrowing depends strongly on the reactions of the Federal Reserve Board, which could be of two kinds. If the Board increases the supply of money to 
accommodate the demand for funds, the result will be high nominal interest rates and inflation. Financial investors fear that the Board will in fact expand the money supply to accommodate federal borrowing needs at lower interest rates. Those investors try to 
establish--demand--interest rates consistent with expectations of revived inflation. On the other hand, if the Federal Reserve Board restrains the money supply to hold down inflation, fhe result 
will be high real interest rates--rates high not only "nominally" but in real terms. Neither 
option helps farmers. 
1Interest rates in the fall of 1983 were high in real terms. That is, they were farther 
above the inflation rate than is usual. 
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Not only are high real interest rates (averaging two to three times normal levels) of special 
burden on farms directly. THey also impinge through international 1 inkages. High real interest 
rates attract investment from abroad, providing the United States with foreign exchange that 
ordinarily we would earn by exporting our farm and other products. When the demand for dollars 
abroad is strong relative to supply, the value of the dollar is bid up in international markets. 
U.S. products then become relatively less attractive to buyers compared with products of competing 
exporters. A dramatic and substantive move by the federal government towards a balanced budget is 
the single most important action necessary to create a healthy and sustained economic recovery, 
that would benefit not only farmers but the nation as a whole. The prognosis for such a policy is 
not favorable. 
In 1983 widespread drouth coupled with the payment-in-kind (PIK) program massively reduced 
stocks of major farm commodities. Only wheat and dairy stocks are now well in excess of normal 
carryover requirements. The 1984 wheat program does not offer promise of reducing stocks next 
year. One of the reasons is the lack of attractiveness of the PIK program offered in wheat. 
At issue is whether PIK for wheat should be made more attractive -- or even if it should 
exist. Despite its help in reducing production and burdensome stocks, the PIK program has come 
under fire by critics. The program has been faulted for trying to do too much in one year, for 
being poorly administered, for making large payments to big producers, and for being too 
expensive. To be sure, it would be desirable to avoid PIK by reducing production through lower 
support prices or by paying farmers in cash not to produce before huge stocks accumulate. But 
given the price support parameters and highly excessive stocks in the case of wheat, PIK is 
attractive. The reason is that the expected cost of holding excessive stocks exceeds potential 
salvage value. Thus the opportunity cost of PIK payments is near zero to the federal government. 
Furthermore, if the goal is to reduce production, the large farmers who account for most farm 
output need to be included despite the large payments to them. Payments have not been generous 
relative to minimum requirements to obtain compliance -- in fact, a case can be made for raising 
the payment rate from 75 percent to 80 or 85 percent of normal production in the case of wheat to 
obtain participation. Many farmers owe their economic life to PIK. 
Although stocks of other major crops are below normal levels and need to be replenished, the 
outlook for prices of these commodities in a year or two is not favorable. The reason is that 
current economic incentives will induce more production than can be absorbed by a market depressed 
by worldwide recession. Thus, the policy environment for 1985 legislation is likely to be 
characterized by falling prices and growing production and stocks, if weather is normal. 
Structural Environment for Policy 
A recent report of the Council for Agricultural Science and Technology as well as other 
sources lists several characteristics of agriculture that bear on farm commodity legislation. 
(1) The demand for farm output is becoming more responsive to price. Hence, if this nation 
is to retain and expand its international markets, it must do so at a competitive price in export 
markets. 
(2) The supply of farm output in the aggregate is becoming more responsive to the prices 
farmers receive for their products and pay for their inputs. Farmers in the aggregate now have 
more capacity to adjust production than they had in the past. Productive inputs such as 
. fertilizers and pesticides purchased from the nonfarm sector are responsive to price, and they 
comprise a higher proportion of farm inputs than formerly. Recent studies show that at least 
large farmers exercise considerable control over expenses by cutting back inputs when product 
prices are low. 
(3) Advances in productivity have enhanced the capability of U.S. agriculture to compete in 
world markets. A recent study I made (see references below) led to estimates that larger farmers 
who account for only 5 percent of all farms but for half of all farm output cover all resource 
costs of production at just over 50 percent of 1910-14 parity. Many of these farmers can compete 
in international markets without price supports. Instead, the nation has sheltered them from 
competition by supporting farm prices. 
(4) The principal economic problems of agriculture are instability and cash flow. Prices 
held above competitive market-clearing levels over extended periods do not increase net farm 
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income because long-term demand for farm output is elastic, because benefits are bid into land 
values, and because farmers increase output in response to favorable incentives . Furthermore, prices held artificially above long-term equilibrium levels contribute to cash-flow problems of farmers by inflating land values. This creates barriers to entry for would-be farm operators. Addressing the cash-flow problem in agriculture requires monetary-fiscal pol icy to reduce real interest rates, avoid inflation, and restore a more normal value of the dollar. Commodity programs only alleviate short-term cash-flow problems. 
(5) Excess labor in agri culture is no longer a serious problem due in pa rt to the integration of farm and nonfarm input markets. Fully 90 percent of all farmers have at least one, 
source of off-farm job. Despite relatively unfavorable farm prices in 1981, disposable income per 
capita of farmers averaged 89 percent that of nonfarmers. Small farmers no longer tend to be low income farms (low income to families), due to growth of off-farm income. 
(6) Commodity programs emphasizing voluntary production controls are becoming more costly 
and less capable of reducing farm input. Irrespective of which party controls the Wh i te House and Congress after the 1984 election, pressures will be intense to reduce the federal budget. Options include reducing price support levels or focusing payments more narrowly on the small and 
moderate-size farms that are most at economic risk. 
(7) The farming industry is evolving into a dual economy. One sector is composed of a few large commercial farms accounting for most farm output. The other sector is composed of a la rge 
number of small farms, many of them part-time operations, accounting for a small portion of total 
output. Many large farms can cope with risk and cash-flow problems by astute use of marketing and 
management tools including diversification of income and capital sources; they can produce 
efficiently enough to compete in international markets at world prices; and they are not a proper focus for government assistance based on need -- as viewed by many Americans. 
Many small farmers cope with risk and cash-flow problems with off-farm income. They do not benefit much from commodity programs. Hence they a 1 so are not of centra 1 concern for commodity program policy. 
Caught between are traditional middle-size family farms which do not have sufficient size to 
achieve the economies of large farms and, unlike part-time small farms, l ack off-farm income to 
cope with cash-flow and instability problems. One option for public policy is to cut federal budget outlays by more narrowly focusing on the small and mid-s i ze farmers mos t at risk. 
(8) Based on a number of projections reviewed by Tweeten in Ma rch 1983 (see references), 
supply and demand for farm output are expected to grow at similar rates, approximately 1.5 percent per year, in the 1980s and 1990s. Real farm prices are expected to show no strong upward or downward trend. There will be considerable instability around that trend, and the farm economy 
will continue to be characterized by periods of excess supply and low prices alternating with periods of excess demand and favorable prices. With capital gains included, rates of return on farming resources are likely to average near those realized in the nonfarm sector. Best estimates 
are that productivity gains will continue about as in the past, because emerging technologies such 
as improved enzymes, vaccines, varieties, and breeds (made possible through bioengineering) offer 
substantial promise. However, exports will need to increase only approximately 3 percent a year 
to help demand keep pace with a productivity gain of 1.5 percent per year. That rate of export growth seems feasible, as it is much less than the annual real growth of 8 percent in the 1970s. 
Prices are unlikely to average much above 50 percent of parity -- the resource cost of product ion 
on efficient and adequate-size farms. 
Outlook for Legislation 
Given this policy environment, what commodity legislati on is likely to emerge in 1985? A 
number of innovative programs have been proposed but few are likely to win legislative approval . 
Programs to Reduce Federal Cost--With Little 
Chance of Enactment 
Programs to serve the needs of farmers and consumers at lower government costs include demand 
expansion, a supplemented private market price system, mandatory controls, and a two-price system. 
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Demand expansion through promotion and subsidies offers some opportunities to increase farm 
income at favorable benefit-cost ratios, but is primarily a long-term rather than short-term 
option. Demand expansion does not deal adequately with instability and cash-flow problems in 
agriculture. 
Several options have been proposed to supplement the private market and eliminate supply 
control and price supports. One is 11 put options 11 or hedging in futures markets, with the 
government serving as speculator of last resort. Farmers would pass their price risk on to 
speculators. Another variant is income insurance. Farmers would pay premiums to insure 50, 60, 
or 75 percent of their historic revenue base. Because these programs would entail greater cost 
and less protection to farmers than current commodity programs, they are unlikely to be favored by 
farmers. They stand little chance of legislative acceptance. 
Many farmers voice strong support for mandatory controls. Mandatory controls might, in time, 
lose 50 percent or more of our export markets for grains. To maintain farm income, consumers 
would have to pay much higher prices for food. Low-income consumers would bear a special burden 
because they spend a sizable portion of their income for food. The internationalization of 
American agriculture virtually rules out mandatory controls. There is little chance of serious 
consideration of the proposal in Washington. 
A two-price plan might retain some features of mandatory controls along with market-clearing 
export prices. The procedure could be to issue certificates to farmers requiring domestic 
purchasers to pay, say, 75 percent of 1910-14 parity prices for farm output. Additional output 
would be sold in the export market at whatever price the market would bear. The low world price 
that farmers would receive for their additional output would restrain production. Shortcomings of 
the program include very serious problems in administration, including difficulties in policing 
domestic prices, and rigidities and inequities in providing certificates to farmers. The program 
would bring charges of dumping in export markets. The proposal probably does not have much 
support in Congress. It would generate inflationary pressures throughout the economy and high 
social costs among low-income consumers. 
Commodity ProArams with Greater Chance 
of Political cceptability 
I see two scenarios as most likely for 1985 farm legislation. 
Scenario 1 is modification of existing programs. Because no crisis looms to warrant entirely 
new directions for farm policy, the best guess is that existing programs will only be modified --
to reduce government costs and to be more responsive to world market conditions. Candidates for 
modification include using a moving average of market prices to set loan rates and target prices 
-- if target prices are retained. A variant would be to adjust target prices according to a 
moving average of market prices, while giving the Secretary of Agriculture flexibility to set loan 
rates. He would be constrained from setting loan rates too high by the high cost of excess 
production and of the stocks thereby generated. He would be constrained from setting loan rates 
too low by the high deficiency payments that would result. 
This scenario would require retaining acreage diversion program authority to control the 
excess output likely to be generated. Because large farmers who account for most farm output must 
be included to make acreage control programs effective, this scenario would not place much 
emphasis on payment limitations. The Farmer Owned Reserve (FOR) would be retained. A cap on FOR 
would serve little purpose because it would cause surplus commodities to fall into the hands of 
the Commodity Credit Corporation when loan rates exceed market prices. FOR stocks are preferred 
to government owned stocks. 
Scenario 2: commodity programs to serve a structure policy. A win by Democratic candidates 
in 1984 would bring pressures for a 11 Structure 11 policy to influence farm size, numbers, tenure, 
and organization of family farms. Such a structure policy could be fostered by stringent payment 
limitations to focus payments on small and middle-sized farmers. Payments could be made to farm 
operators. Thus efforts by large landowners to avoid payment limitations of, say, $20,000 per 
operator would cause a break-up of large farms into several units. Such efforts to establish more 
day-to-day farm operators serve family farm objectives. Low and stringent payment 1 imitations 
virtually preclude supply control because such controls would need to idle much of the cropland on 
small and middle-sized farms to obtain sufficient production cutback. Hence, production controls 
and loan rates might be terminated under this scenario. The Farmer Owned Reserve would be 
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retained to provide stability in food supplies and prices but with a cap. The Farmer Owned 
Reserve could have acquisition prices adjusted by the Secretary of Agriculture to obtain adequate 
target buffer stocks but with any unfi 11 ed capacity in FOR a 11 ocated to producers based on 
historic production bases. Because this scenario is a more radical departure from current 
programs than Scenario 1, it has less likelihood of acceptance. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Restoring vigor to the farm economy will require worldwide economic recovery, a more nearly 
balanced federal budget with lower real interest rates and lower value of the dollar in 
international markets, and no better than normal weather. 
The outlook for the farm economy is for continued instability and cash-flow problems. The 
government will valiantly attempt to address these problems at lower cost to the Treasury. There 
is likely to be an emphasis on holding support prices low enough to restrain production and to be 
competitive in foreign markets. Voluntary supply control program options are likely to be 
retained for use by the- Secretary of Agriculture. But the desire to focus a higher proportion of 
benefits on middle-size and small farmers most at risk, and to foster market-clearing prices 
competitive in international markets, might motivate a serious look at direct payments without 
production controls. 
The internationalization of American agriculture has indeed created a new economic 
environment but is unlikely to be viewed as of crisis dimension. It is unlikely to motivate major 
new policy directions in 1985. The best guess is that existing programs will be modified. 
Irrespective of which political party occupies the White House and Congress after 1984, a 
program will likely be adopted to reduce production through long-term diversion of erosion-prone 
soils. The program is likely to be modest under any circumstances. It will be more a political 
move appealing to those with environmental concerns than a serious effort at supply control. The 
form of the program could be crop easement under long-term contract to allow haying and grazing 
but not cropping of diverted acres. Another variant could be government purchase of whole farms 
in areas subject to high erosion rates, and combining those farms into wildlife areas, hunting and 
fishing preserves, or other recreational uses. 
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UNITED STATES AGRICULTURAL POLICY IN A 1 MANAGED TRADE• WORLD 
Barbara Chattin, Agricultural Economist 
and John E. Lee, Jr., Administrator 
Economic Research Service, USDA 
On several occasions in the history of the United States, expanding world markets have seemed 
to offer a partial solution to domestic farm problems. That prospect seemed more real than ever 
in the 1970s. Now, as in the past, there is some disillusionment with that prospect. 
The sharp slowdown in exports in the early 1980s has caused farm policy positions or 11 Camps 11 
to form, ranging from all-out 11 trade war 11 for regaining our market shares, to the opposite extreme 
of selling in world markets only if prices are high enough to guarantee high returns to producers. 
Many farmers are understandably confused about which camp they should be in. Their confusion 
arises in part from an increased awareness that the United States has operated its farm policy so 
that in effect we have been somewhat of a free trader in a world market not characterized by free 
trade. As a result, the United States has become the residual supplier to the rest of the world, 
and U.S. farmers and taxpayers have absorbed the costs of adjusting to volatile world trade 
balances. 
The object of my remarks is to say that neither extreme--neither expansion of trade at any 
cost, nor turning our backs on world markets--is realistic. A strong case can be made that an 
intelligent and expanding involvement in world agricultural markets is in the enlightened economic 
and political self-interest of U.S. farmers and citizenry generally. Expanded trade involvement 
offers many potentia 1 benefits to us and to the rest of the world. But rea 1 i zati on of those 
potential benefits requires: 
domestic agricultural, trade, and economic policies consistent with realities of today•s 
complex world markets; and 
demonstration of economic and political discipline in the management of these policies. 
Before we turn to the specific implications for U.S. policy, it is essential to review what 
we know about the policy setting. 
The Economic and Political Setting for Agricultural Trade Policy 
Formulation of rational and intelligent agricultural trade policy requires understanding of a 
myriad of complex and interrelated economic, technological, political, and social forces. Five 
especially significant aspects of the trade policy setting are highlighted here: 
World demand for U.S. farm products is not likely to grow fast enough to take the slack 
out of our farm sector without adjustments in farm programs. 
Nevertheless, world markets are our only potential source of significant growth in 
demand. 
Macroeconomic policies, here and abroad, are now critical to U.S. exports. 
A changed U.S. farm sector offers new flexibility for competing in global markets and 
raises questions about the efficacy of traditional commodity programs. 
Global markets are unlike domestic markets and pose major challenges for our domestic 
and trade policies. 
Revised Global Demand Prospects 
The experience of the 1970s led many of us to believe there would be continued strong growth 
in world demand for U.S. farm products. We knew there would be occasional, unpredictable shocks 
from weather and economic and political sources. But the underlying trends suggested consumption 
would grow faster than production in the rest of the world, leaving the world increasingly 
dependent on the United States for food supplies. The possibility seemed strong that our exports 
could rise faster than yields were increasing, meaning both expanded acreages and rising commodity 
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prices. Parenthetically, we did warn that the potential for price instability was great and that 
many highly-leveraged producers were vulnerable to the cash flow problems associated with 
instability. 
A number of forces were at play in the seventies that led us to these conclusions. Incomes 
were high and rising in the developed world. In the OPEC and middle income .. countries also, incomes 
were rising rapidly, translating into demand for upgraded diets. While there were problems in the 
poorer countries of the world, their food imports too were rising. Over the decade of the 
seventies there was a gradual decline in the value of the dollar, making our goods even more 
attractive to foreign buyers. There were large credit flows, public and private, to Eastern, 
European countries and to the middle income countries, financed in part by the huge surpluses of 
OPEC money flowing to financial institutions in developed countries. These credit flows enhanced 
demand for U.S. farm products directly by financing food purchases, and indirectly through the 
economic growth they stimulated. 
On the supply side, it appeared that a number of factors would mitigate against rapid 
increases in production in the United States as well as in other countries: most of the good land 
was in production; the easily developed irrigation had been developed; energy prices were rising 
rapidly, hence fertilizer and irrigation costs were being driven up; and no new major 
technological breakthroughs were imminent. 
Today, trade prospects are considerably less promising, at least for the next several years. 
What happened? The major unseen development has been the deep and prolonged global recession. A 
number of factors contributed to it. In the seventies the whole world was on an inflationary fast 
track, a kind of economic pyramiding that had to keep growing at an increasing rate, or collapse. 
The U.S. recession, deepened by our attempts to get inflation under control, may have punctured 
the balloon. In an integrated world economy, the slowing of growth in a major nation such as the 
United States has a domino effect, first on our major trading partners, and then on the rest of 
the world. Slowed growth in the developed world meant sharp reductions in OPEC oil exports, which 
not only reduced the countries• ability to import but also eliminated a major source of credit for 
financing development in the rest of the world. 
The slowdown in the global economy concurrent with slowed credit flows left many East 
European and Latin American countries in untenable debt positions. The debt payment defaults 
which resulted further discouraged both private credit and credit from governments and 
institutions such as the World Bank. Countries short of foreign exchange for meeting debt 
payments curtailed all but essential imports. These logical actions and reactions caused the 
global recession to feed on itself. 
To complicate matters, the slowed rate of U.S. inflation, relative to the rest of the world, 
stopped the erosion in the value of the dollar. Our high interest rates, which trace to large 
budget deficits, combined with the relative economic security of the United States, made the 
dollar very attractive. As a result the dollar has appreciated sharply since 1980, making our 
farm products much less attractive in other countries. Over the last two years, the real value of 
the dollar has appreciated just over 25 percent (on a trade weighted basis) for importers of U.S. 
corn and 16 percent for importers of U.S. wheat. Our analysts estimate that over the last two 
years, the United States has lost up to $6 billion in farm export sales due to the strong dollar. 
We also have learned that the production capability of the world is greater than we thought. 
Some of the higher incomes and large credit flows in the seventies were invested in productive 
capacity here and abroad. It began to come on stream in the late seventies and early eighties. 
Energy prices and production costs rose less rapidly than anticipated. And we learned that 
farmers the world over can and do respond to economic incentives by increasing output. 
Prospects for the remainder of the eighties, while highly uncertain, look something 1 ike 
this: recovery from global recession will be slow and gradual, hence incomes and demand will 
increase slowly; creditors who have been burned will be much more cautious over the next several 
years, thus reducing a major source of potential growth; petroleum sales and prices are likely to 
show more modest growth than in the seventies, thus holding down costs but also reducing a major 
source of income and credit that once financed world trade in farm products; and the value of the 
dollar is not likely to decline substantially so long as we have large federal deficits and high 
interest rates. As a result of these and other factors, most analysts now expect U.S. farm 
exports to grow at trend rates, over the rest "of this decade. Exports will remain. substantially 
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below earlier expectations. If the forecasts are correct, and if yields and productivity increase 
at rates similar to the past 15 years, the marketplace will not likely generate commodity prices 
in the neighborhood of the target prices contained in the 1981 farm bill. 
World Markets: The Major Source of Demand Growth 
Despite prospects for slow growth in world demand, foreign markets offer potential for 
growth--in fact, the only potential of significant size. 
Food consumption and fiber use in the United States are relatively stable and change little 
in total as prices and income change. True, consumption of some meats is somewhat price 
responsive. Food expenditures of some unemployed people are 1 ikely to rise when they are once 
again employed. But overall, these represent small changes at the margin. Generally, use of farm 
products in the United States can be expected to grow only slightly faster than population growth. 
Yields could grow faster, meaning that fewer and fewer acres will be required to meet domestic 
needs. Cropland harvested to supply domestic needs has declined from 315 million acres in 1950 to 
228 million acres in 1981. By the end of the century, not far away, only about half the cropland 
acres in production in 1981-82 will be needed to meet needs of our domestic consumers. Cropland 
needed for domestic consumption will be even less if some of the recent developments in 
biogenetics produce productivity breakthroughs. 
It is possible that we could develop major industrial uses of agricultural commodities and 
significantly increase demand. The best-known example is biomass for alcohol fuels, but the 
economics of that are not promising. Not enough is known about other prospects to speculate at 
this time. 
In contrast to flat domestic demand, global demand for food is growing, and that demand is 
price responsive, especially over the longer term. This means that if a country is consistently 
price competitive, other countries that have a comparative disadvantage in food production will 
adjust their internal policies and import more food. 
Just how responsive world agricultural markets are to prices is a subject of some 
controversy. In all honesty no economist can predict exactly the price elasticity of export 
demand. But there is little argument that, over time, export markets are more price responsive 
than domestic markets. If that responsiveness is as great as some think (i.e., if the price 
elasticity is greater than -1.0) rising productivity in the United States could translate into 
rising revenues rather than more adjustment problems. 
Moreover, global demand for food is income responsive. This is especially true in the 
developing and middle-income nations. Economic recovery worldwide and economic development in the 
poorer countries would expand food trade and the United States would share in the increase. 
In a nutshell, despite current problems, exports to the rest of the world are our 
greatest--perhaps our only--source of market growth. Whether U.S. agriculture ever sees the 
benefit of that potential growth depends heavily on economic progress in the rest of the world, 
and on U.S. domestic economic and farm policies. 
Macroeconomic Policies Critical to Exports 
Events of recent years have shown U.S. farmers just how much stake they have in macro- or 
general economic policy (fiscal and monetary). This is a complicated subject that cannot be 
treated in detail here. Let me deal briefly with a few points. 
First, one cannot ·treat the components of monetary and fiscal policy separately; they are 
.interrelated. For example, one cannot focus concern on interest rates alone, because interest 
rates link to money supplies, budget deficits, inflation, tax policy, dollar strength, and a host 
of other factors. Without dealing with these linkages, farmers could push for actions, say lower 
interest rates, that appear to be in their best interest, but which lead to negative indirect 
effects that more than offset the direct gains. 
The pain of high interest rates and the distortions of rapid inflation are known all too 
well. We are now experiencing the withdrawal pains of trying to come off our inflation 11 high. 11 
Let me walk quickly through some key linkages. 
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The federal budget deficit is large. As a nation we have not yet come to grips with whether 
we will close that deficit by reducing expenditures or increasing taxes or some combination of the 
two. We seem to be in a state of political paralysis over this issue. But the future of our 
economy depends on resolving it. 
A federal deficit can be financed by monetizing it (printing more money) or by borrowi ng from 
private capital markets. Printing more money creates artificial demand and is a primary source of 
inflation. To minimize the danger of refueling inflation, especially after going through so much 
pain to get it under control, the Federal Reserve (the monetary pol icy authority) has chosen to 
hold down the growth in money supply. Hence the deficit is being financed by the government •s 
going into the money markets and borrowing in competition with private borrowers. If federal 
borrowing continues throughout 1983 at the pace established during the first six months of the 
year, it will require $230 billion out of about $500 billion loanable capital available . By 
comparison, corporations will only issue about $21 billion in new bonds. A large Federal deficit 
financed by borrowing leads to fierce competition for money and drives up the price of money (interest rate). Inflation is kept in check but farmers are impacted in several ways. High 
interest rates--
increase the cost of doing business and add to cash flow problems for heavily 
debt-leveraged farmers; 
discourage domestic investment, slow economic growth, and slow income growth, hence 
reduce farmers• domestic sales; 
make it attractive for other nations to hold dollars; the competition for dolla rs in 
world markets then drives up the value of the dollar, makes our exports more expensive 
to others, and reduces farm export sales; 
attract foreign capital, and although this may appear beneficial to the United States, 
it means that U.S. farm exports are reduced because fewer funds are available in foreign 
countries to pay for imports and less capital is available for internal investments and 
growth; 
worsen the credit problems of debt-ridden countries and make i t more difficult for other 
countries to borrow for internal investment; in both cases the net result i s a reduced 
ability to import U.S. farm products. 
Again, we could lower the interest rates and reduce the above problems by printing more 
money, running the risk of rekindling inflation. Clearly, we are riding a tiger, and i ntelligent 
policies combined with political will are required to dismount without bei ng eaten. The point for 
this conference is that how all this is resolved (or not resolved) could mean more for American 
farmers in the long run than the 1985 farm bill (although that, too, is terribly important). 
One other point. Because of the size of our economy, a U.S. recovery is important to lead 
recovery overseas. It is necessary that we be strong and that we import if others are to recover 
and thus be able to import from us. 
The Changing Reality of U.S. Agriculture 
In formulating policy for the future, we must recognize the major transformation in American 
agriculture since the 1930s and 1940s. The conditions that led to policies in the Great 
Depression and following World War II are no longer the dominant characteristics of the farm 
sector. The commercial farming sector today is high technology, capital intensive, and 
large-scale, albeit still family dominated. 
As a recently published CAST report puts it: 
In 1981, agricultural production units were comprised of 112,000 large farms, which produced 
49 percent of the U.S. farm output; 582,000 medium-size farms, which produced 39 percent of 
the output; and 1,742,000 small farms, which produced 13 percent of the output. Many of the 
operators of small farms are engaged in part-time farming by choice to follow a valued way of 
life paid for out of off-farm income .•. Most part-time operators of small farms do not have 
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low income. 1 [Their total income from all sources averaged above the U.S. median family 
income.] 
The CAST report goes on to note that the "changes in the size-structu2e of the farming 
industry have made the industry more able to compete in intern13tional markets". Large farms, in 
particular, "usually can compete effectively in world markets". 
Continuing to quote: 
A case can be made that [traditional] commodity programs either are unneeded for many large 
farms or inhibit them from competing in world markets. For small farms, commodity programs 
provide few benefits and are not needed if off-farm income is substantial. Existing 
commodity programs retai~ed because they serve medium-size farms do not address the needs of 
these farms efficiently. 
Several points about the reality of American agriculture are pertinent to the trade issue: a 
preponderance of our commercial farms are big, technologically advanced, and efficient, and can 
respond competitively in world markets. Although, at recent market prices, a majority of our 
producers produced at a 1 oss, a majority of commodity production was produced at a profit. Our 
trade policy for agriculture no longer needs to be constrained by the requirement that our 
domestic farm policy address a welfare issue. 
Characteristics of Global Agricultural Markets 
The import, export, and domestic policies of the 100-plus individual trading nations of the 
world determine trading behavior in international markets. Thus, the world marketplace can be 
likened to a giant game of Chinese checkers, where each of the many players plays by a unique set 
of rules and objectives, and where other players have only vague insight into them. 
What countries buy and sell on international markets results from their strategy for 
deve 1 oping their i nterna 1 economy and from their foreign exchange needs. Some countries use 
scarce foreign exchange for food imports while others promote agricultural self-sufficiency and 
save foreign exchange for industrial development. Developing countries, in particular, must make 
these kinds of choices. Exporters who compete with us also come to the international market with 
the objective of seeking relief for problems generated by their domestic policies. Like the 
European Common Market, the United States is not immune from this temptation~ 
For example, to keep their wheat farmers' incomes high, the EC countries guarantee very high 
prices with little constraint on production. The not-surprising response of EC farmers has 
generated a large and growing surplus of wheat. The most cost-effective disposal is just enough 
subsidy to slightly underprice their competitors. As a result, the EC increases its share of the 
world wheat market but at an enormous cost to itself and others. The cost is as subsidy and high 
food prices. The cost to the United States and other exporters is loss of market share and a 
world wheat price lower than otherwise would prevail. 
Nowhere is this tendency to dump problems created by domestic policies more evident than in 
the world dairy market. Many major dairy producing countries of the world (including the United 
States and the EC countries) support prices at leve·ls above those that would equate supply and 
demand. 
1The Emerging Economics of Agriculture: Review and Policy Options, Council for Agricultural 
Science and Technology, Report No. 98, Ames, Iowa, pp. 1, 8. 
2P. 7. 
3p. 8. 
4 p. 1. 
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As consequences: surpluses are growing; the percentage of milk consumed as fresh milk has 
declined sharply; and the percentage left over that has to be processed into cheese, butter, and 
dry milk products has risen far faster than domestic demands. Two kinds of actions (temptations) 
logically follow: to impose import barriers to keep out other peoples ' surplus; and to l ook for 
ways to dump one's expensive surplus on the world market. Our analysts estimate that by the end 
of 1983 the EC and the United States will have the equivalent of 28 million tons of milk (fat 
solids basis) in storage. This equals 30 percent of their annual domestic and export uses. An 
economist would say there are wasted resources in the world dairy industrY'. 
There are essentially no totally free trading countries in the world. 
including the United States, have policies that in some way restrict or discourage 
and underwrite or subsidize certain exports. The differences among countries 
degree, although some of these differences are large and significant. 
All countries, 
certain import~ 
are matters of 
Consider the case of wheat. The bulk of wheat purchased in 1980 went to state traders. Only 
about 3 percent of the wheat imported in 1980 was purchased by free trading countries, while 84 
percent was imported by countries with central purchasing agents (state traders). The sellers of 
wheat present a different picture. The United States provided most of the 49 percent of wheat 
exports freely traded. State traders, principally Canada and Australia, supplied 29 percent of 
the wheat exports in 1980. The EC accounted for almost 22 percent of the wheat exports in 1980, 
up from the 17 percent the EC supplied in 1970 and 7 percent in 1960. In contrast, 25 percent of 
corn imports and nearly 89 percent of corn exports occurred among countries with relatively free 
trade policies (primarily the United States). Free trading countries also account for over 92 
percent of soybean imports and exports. 
Country policies, weather, and episodic political events make global (export) markets 
volatile. The instability arises from the thinness of trade relative to total world production 
and consumption. Hence, small percentage changes in world production translate into large 
percentage changes in the residuals traded. The outcome is that U.S. farmers, indeed any 
agricultural producers in the world who are residual suppliers to the world market, are whiplashed 
by these ups and downs in demand. Producers' fortunes and misfortunes then reverberate through 
the surrounding agricultural industries. This instability is a price countries must pay to trade 
in world markets, and they must be prepared to use domestic policies for any cushioning of 
internal impacts. 
Global markets are highly competitive (albeit not purely) and there is a substantial 
probability that competition will become more intense in the years immediately ahead. A growing 
number of countries are agricultural exporters; their production capacity is growing faster than 
domestic demand, and all are looking for a place in this shrinking globe to sell their goods. EC 
surpluses are likely to continue and pressures within the EC will be great to unload those 
surpluses to ease budget problems. Argentina needs foreign exchange. Canada and Australia, like 
the United States, will try to maintain market shares. And importing nations in the developing 
world will continue to try to improve their own agriculture to reduce the drain on their foreign 
currencies. 
What does this mean for the future? We can safely say that the probability is greater than 
zero that competition in international agricultural markets will be fierce at times. Fierce 
competition will put pressure on domestic policies and institutions in both exporting and 
importing countries. Countries will react by making internal adjustments, adopting protectionist 
measures, or increasing subsidization of exports. However, such response could be balanced by 
some overriding considerations that all nations have in common. 
One way or other, every nation has to deal with the issue of food security. 
No nation has unlimited resources. 
No nation is totally immune to market forces, especially over long periods of time. 
It is around these considerations that we may be able to identify some common ground with 
other nations and develop a trade strategy to everyone's ultimate best interest. 
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How Does the United States Respond? 
Farmers and policymakers in our country face some difficult choices. Domestic markets 
require less productive capacity, while foreign markets are fiercely competitive, unstable, 
unpredictable, and unfamiliar. There are no easy solutions that assure prosperity to farmers and 
serve the best interests of this nation and the world. 
Withdrawing from export markets has been shown to be an unrealistic option. It would mean a 
dramatic and costly scaledown of the U.S. farm plant. It would be costly in terms of 
disinvestment by farmers, taxpayer costs of adjustment assistance, loss of sales in farm input and 
product marketing, and loss of net export earnings to the U.S. economy. 
It is clear that we need export markets. But how much should we try to export? My 
colleagues in the Economic Research Service tell me that an annual export growth rate of about 3 
percent over the rest of the decade would be required to keep the slack out of the farm sector 
(i.e., to utilize current cropland without sharply lower prices). Export growth rates below 2 
percent would require significant downward adjustment of our farm sector capacity and continued 
downward pressure on land prices. Export growth rates of more than 5 percent annually (highly 
unlikely) could bring pressure on our land and water base and a mix of concerns different from 
those of the low-export scenario. 
An important challenge for the research community is that of sorting out the criteria and 
conceptual framework for determining the optimum level of exports, the level which best serves our 
overall national interests. 
Despite the situation in which we find ourselves, there are some things we can and must do as 
traders in a "managed-trade" world. 
Domestic Farm Policies Have to be Strategically and Economically Consistent with Realities of 
World Markets 
In 1985, our current farm legislation expires. The new legislation will be critically 
important to our future competitive position in world markets. We cannot separate our 
agricultural trade policy from domestic farm policy. The subject is too complex to treat in 
detail here, but the following points are pertinent. 
Our domestic farm programs must be flexible and responsive to global market 
developments. The 1981 farm bill assumed a continuation of the export growth trends and 
inflation rates of the seventies, and called for higher loan rates and rising target 
prices. There is strong evidence that these support levels provided an umbrella under 
which our competitors expanded their share of world agricultural markets. No one is 
suggesting totally "free" markets or abandoning support for farmers. What is important 
if we are to be efficient and competitive is that our programs not insulate farmers from 
the realities of the marketplace. Any industry that remains healthy over the long run 
must be responsive to the forces of supply and demand. 
We must be a dependable supplier at competitive prices. This means that our programs 
should encourage our most efficient producers without unduly sheltering the high cost, 
inefficient producers. This will assure that our competitive position is based on an 
industry of low cost producers who can withstand periods of low prices. Providing price 
guarantees that get capitalized into higher asset values (hence costs) undermines our 
competitive position. 
Farm policy should provide for an equitable sharing between farmers and the public of 
the risks inherent in expanded involvement in world markets. The entire economy 
benefits from expanded trade, so it is reasonable that the related risks be shared. 
Likewise a case can be made that there are both private (farmers') and social costs to 
excessive instability of prices. Hence there are benefits to be gained from having 
stabilization programs which help 1 imit price variability to ranges within which farmers 
can respond in an orderly and efficient manner. 
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A commodity reserve program can be an effective tool for price stabilization and for 
helping assure our dependability as a supplier. Reserves get farmers and taxpayers in 
trouble when politicians and program managers, in the face of heat from their farm 
constituency, yield to the temptation to use reserves to try to raise farm prices and 
incomes. This is usually done by raising reserve loan rates that signal farmers to 
produce for the reserve at times when the markets may be sending signals to reduce 
production. 
Fiscal and Monetary Policies Have to be Consistent with Trade Objectives 
It has already been demonstrated that farmers' well-being is affected as much today by budget 
deficits, interest rates, money supplies, and other aspects of general economic policy as by 
traditional farm programs. Management of economic policy is difficult enough in a closed economy. 
That difficulty is compounded in an open economy when it turns out that domestic policy actions 
have international consequences that ultimately feed back, in sometimes perverse ways, into the 
domestic economy. 
Nevertheless, there must be increased recognition of the linkages between our general 
economic policies and trade. Informed voters and citizens must seek improved understanding of 
those linkages. 
Our Overall National Trade Policy Must be Consistent and Enlightened 
We will not be credible in our efforts to promote free trade and expand our exports if our 
trade policies are not consistent across all sectors of the economy and, indeed, for all 
agricultural commodities. In other words, we cannot be free traders for one product or industry 
and protectionist for others. If other countries are to have the foreign exchange to import, they 
have to export to earn that money. 
In times of economic recession and of high unemployment and keen foreign competition, the 
temptation is great to erect barriers to imports and to subsidize exports. There may be times and 
reasons for legitimate use of those tools. But any industry that continuously seeks and obtains 
shelter from the forces of competition is contributing to inefficient use of our nation's 
resources and is often failing to deal with more fundamental problems. Farmers do have a stake in 
so-called "domestic content" legislation and in other attempts to avoid competitive forces rather 
than adjust to them. The pressures to erect trade barriers will likely increase during early 
stages of economic recovery. When we lead a global recovery, our improved incomes cause imports 
to rise faster than exports until the recovery catches on in other countries. 
Agriculture itself does not speak with one voice on trade policy. Grain, soybean, and cotton 
interests oppose other countries' barriers to imports. But our cattlemen often have sought to 
tighten the quotas that limit our imports of beef. Our domestic sugar producers are likewise 
protected by import restrictions. And our dairymen worry about imports of milk products. 
A Commitment to Expanded Trade Means We Must be Prepared to Make Tough Internal Adjustments 
Economic theory suggests that if each nation produces and exports that in which it has a 
comparative advantage, and purchases (imports) what other nations have a comparative advantage in 
producing, the world's resources will be used more efficiently. Citizens of all countries will 
realize a higher level of well-being. Despite imperfections in world markets, mostly man-made, 
experience and history have more or less validated this concept. 
But since we start from a history of 1 imited trade, we likely have some industries and 
perhaps commodities that are not competitive and will shrink or succumb under free trade 
pressures. Again, if we are at a national disadvantage in producing wi dgets, economics tells us 
we would be better off to stop producing widgets and import them from countries that can produce 
them cheaper. Our citizens would be better off because they get more widgets for the same money 
or the same widgets for less money. In addition, the resources we once used to produce widgets 
can be used to produce the more valuable products in which we have the competitive edge. 
That ' s where the rub comes in. Shifting resources from one sector of the economy to another 
is often slow and painful. Capital has been sunk into wi dget factories; many widget factory 
workers know no other skills; and the more competitive industries that would get these resources 
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are in other states or regions. Thus, the widget factory owners face loss of capital; workers 
face loss of jobs or major retraining and relocation; unions face loss of members and power; 
localities lose economic base; and, above all, politicians lose constituents. Is it any wonder, 
then, that all the widget interests seek to halt imports? 
Thus, a commitment to expanded trade requ i res both the political wil l to face up to tough 
internal adjustments, and intelligent programs for sharing t he benef its and cos t s of t hose 
adjustments. If, for example, the public on the whole benefits from importing widgets, some of 
those benefits could be used (perhaps via the tax system) to assist widget companies and workers 
through the adjustment process. 
Not all the "widgets" may be outside agriculture. If we can afford to produce some 
commodities only .by limiting imports and subsidizing producers, a free trade posture may require 
some adjustments in that commodity sector. 
The point is this: if we are to see our agriculture grow we have to expand exports. If we 
are to expand exports, we must be prepared to import what others produce cheaper (in relative 
terms). We thwart those trade prospects if we seek to avoid our own economic and pol itical 
adjustment pains. 
We Must be More Astute Traders 
Producers and marketers in the United States have long enjoyed the luxury of a large domestic 
market. As a consequence, we have not had to be experts on wor ld markets, or know the nuances of 
successful trading in various countries of the world. Conversely, the Europeans, for example, 
with small domestic markets, have long been experienced in multicountry trade. Their traders know 
the culture-related preferences of their foreign customers, and are experienced in tailo r ing 
products to a variety of submarkets. Moreover, they are more likely than Americans to be able to 
talk trade in the customers' language. 
Trade circles abound with horror stories of U.S. mistakes and lost trade opportunities. Some 
critics say that the United States has not even been a "residual trader" but a residual "order 
taker." If we are to move beyond simply filling orders when the world needs our farm products, we 
must become more sophisticated in our knowledge of markets and foreign customers' needs and 
preferences, and more astute in our trading (and trade negotiation) skills. Some of that will 
come with experience. But we also need to work at it consciously. 
We Need to Add More Value to Our Exports 
Almost two-fifths of the farm products traded in the world now originate in the United 
States, compared with one-fifth in 1970. Measured in value terms, however, the U.S. share of 
world agricultural exports stagnated at about one-sixth. The EC, by contrast, had a growth rate 
in market share that was 27 percent higher than the U.S. rate, in value terms. The reason is that 
the EC was more successful than we were in selling products that had been further processed, 
including converted livestock products. The further processing of crop products and conversion of 
grains and oilseeds to livestock not only adds substantial value to products but also creates more 
jobs and secondary economic activity than primary crop production. Thus the Europeans, Japanese, 
<;1nd others have been very successful in buying our primary agricultural products, getting the 
benefits of job creation and added value, and selling these further processed (high-va l ue) 
products to third party countries. 
One ERS study estimates that if the U.S. share of the high-val ue export market could i ncrease by 
only 5 percent, an additional $15 billion in export sales would be generated and one mill i on new 
jobs would be created. Achieving progress in this area will not be easy because many count ries 
are anxious to add value and create new jobs; hence there will be little incentive for other s to 
buy our further processed products rather than our basic commodities. Nevertheless, even small 
progress in expanding value-added exports would offer large benefits. 
It is in our Enlightened Self-Interest to Support a Healthy Global Economy 
A healthy economy in the rest of the world is vitally important to expanded agricultural 
exports. This is more than a matter of others having the wherewitha 1 to buy f rom us. Trade 
liberalization, so vital to expanded trade, comes earlier when economies are growi ng. It is 
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always easier to get countries to reduce trade barriers when the overall pie is growing. 
overall trade pie is shrinking, countries act to protect their market shares, f!Jrther 
the pie. Economic growth is also important for political stability in the world, a important for orderly trade growth (as well as for our national survival). 
When the 
shrinking 
condition 
Two implications for our national policy: we must be sensitive to how our domestic economic policies and trade policies aid or hinder economic growth in other countries; and we have a strong 
national interest in seeing the countries with serious debt problems successfully resolve those problems. 
Farmers Must be Better Informed on Economic and Policy Matters 
In this regard, two points are germane. First, most farmers know a lot more about production 
technology than they know about the policy and market forces that are dictating their well being. Those of us in the USDA-Land Grant system bear much of the responsibility for the unbalanced knowledge. It is one of our most grievous failures. Public policy education is difficult but 
equally as essential to the long-term well being of farmers as is education on technical matters. We in the system must give top priority to this task, and farmers and taxpayers must not let us 
off the hook. 
Second, we hear a lot about the inability of the Congress or Washington generally to come to grips in any disciplined way with the difficult problems of our day. An observation is that those folks do have a lot of information at their disposal, and often do understand the consequences of 
alternative courses of action. But they take the course of action they believe their 
constituencies will support. Thus, the burden of developing policy directions consistent with the 1 ong-term health of the economy and a sound, competitive agriculture for the future depends on 
commitment of citizens including farmer-citizens. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, let me restate my theme. We have little choice but to expand our involvement in world agricultural markets. But those markets offer difficult challenges. The setting is one 
of uncertainty and in all probability, fierce competition. Domestic food and economic policies of 
other nations, and of the United States too, will work against expansion of exports. To make progress in this setting requires more enlightened and consistent economic, trade, and farm policies; more sophisticated trading; and the national will to make the tough adjustments and bear 
the costs necessary to realize the substantial benefits that can be realized from intelligent 
expansion of our agricultural trade. 
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MONEY GROWTH, EXCHANGE RATES, 
AND AGRICULTURAL TRADE 
* Dallas S. Batten and Michael T. Belongia, Economists 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
During the 1970s foreign trade became increasingly more important to agriculture. 
Furthermore, exchange rates were allowed to float in 1973 and international capital markets have 
become more integrated. Monetary policies have become less coordinated across countries, exchange 
rates (and consequently, traded-goods prices) have been more variable, and international capital 
has moved more freely among countries. As a result, agricultural policy discussions can no longer 
be conducted in a closed economy, commodity market context. Instead, such discussions must 
contain macroeconomic linkages that relate monetary factors to commodity markets within and across 
countries. 
The purpose of this paper is to establish a framework within which these macroeconomic 
linkages can be developed. In particular, a general characterization of the asset-market view of 
exchange rates is presented first. This is followed by the development of a simple conceptual 
framework linking exchange rate movements to money growth. Next, the attempts to include 
macroeconomic linkages in agricultural models are evaluated in general. Finally, we conclude by 
evaluating possible policy responses to the problems arising from . international and/or 
macroeconomic origins. 
The Asset Market View of Exchange Rates 
An exchange rate is simply the relative price of two assets--one country's currency in terms 
of another's--which is determined in relatively efficient markets in the same manner as are the 
prices of other assets, such as stocks, bonds, or real estate. In contrast to the prices of 
services or nondurable goods, asset prices are influenced comparatively little by current events 
except insofar as such events are surprises. Thus, for example, daily fluctuations in the flow 
of buyers to farmers' markets have a great impact on the prices of vegetables sold there but 
almost no impact on the price of the farms producing those vegetables; instead, the value of farms 
is governed by longer term expectations about demands and supplies of vegetables. Similarly, the 
values of national currencies do not rise or fall with contemporaneous exports or imports of goods 
and services but rather with the long term expectations of their countries' economic prospects. 
Given the dominance of this long term perspective in exchange rate determination several 
characteristics of the modern theory of asset price determination are of both theoreti ca 1 and 
empirical relevance. Five of these features especially salient to agricultural trade are 
described below. 
First, empirical evidence has indicated that asset price movements are irregular and 
unpredictable; that is, they behave as a random walk in the short run. Since the current price 
already reflects the expected futu2e value of assets, this observed unpredictability can only 
reflect unexpected events or "news." 
This feature can be summarized by the following reduced form model. 3 Let the logarithm of 
the spot exchange rate (S) in period t be represented as 
* The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis or the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
1This sketch of the asset market view of exchange rates follows that of Batten and Ott 
(1983). 
2For a more detailed analysis, see Frenkel (1981b). 
3This representation is similar to that presented in Frenkel and Mussa (1980). 
form can be derived from several structural models of exchange rate determination. 
models may differ in the composition of Z, they all share a common general 
determination of exchange rates. 
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This reduced 
Whi 1 e these 
view of the 
(1) 1n St = (1-a)Zt + aEt(1nSt+l-1nSt), 
where Et(ln St+1-1nSt) is the expected percentage change in the exchange rate between t and t+1, 
based on info~mation available in t, and Z summarizes the influences of other factors in t (e.g., 
foreign and domestic money supplies, inco~es, etc.). By repeated substitution, equation (1) can be rewritten as 
1-a ~ a . 
(2) 1nS =- Z + ~ (-)J Et(Zt+j). 
t 1+a t j=1 l+a 
In other words, the current exchange rate reflects not only current market conditions, but also an 
exponentially weighted average of expected future conditions as well. 
Second, exchange rates reflect the anticipated relative inflation rates following from the 
expected future monetary and fiscal policies of the countries whose currencies ' are valued in the 
exchange rate. Therefore, currencies of countries with relatively lower expected inflation rates 
will be cheaper to hold over time and would be in greater demand at the same price than those with 
higher expected inflation rates. Consequently, high inflation currencies will tend to depreciate 
relative to lower inflation currencies. 
Third, spot (current) and forward exchange rates will tend to move together since only new 
information causes any change and wi 11 cause both to move. The difference between spot and 
forward exchange rates is determined by the relative cost of holding the currencies and reflects 
the difference in nominal interest rates. 
Fourth, in the long run, exchange rates move to maintain purchasing power parity (PPP); PPP 
means that a dollar's worth of the foreign currency (at the current exchange rate) will buy the 
same amount of goods in the foreign country as a dollar will buy in the United States. If so, the 
ratio of the U. S. price level to that of the foreign country will equal the exchange rate. 
Nonetheless, short-run departures from this condition are observed frequently due to interest rate 
movements. Also, over long periods relative scarcities and comparative labor productivities in 
different countries may change at different rates, altering the equilibrium absolute purchasing 
power parity. Therefore, a somewhat weaker form of the condition, relative purchasing power 
parity (RPPP), which asserts that changes in the exchange rate will equal changes in the ratio of 
U.S. to foreign price levels, is a more reliable short-run guide. 
Fifth, paralleling PPP is a condition called interest rate parity (IRP); IRP means that the 
real yield--net of expected inflation and expected exchange rate changes--obtained by investing in 
securities in any given currency will be roughly equal to the yield obtained from securities in 
any other currency. For example, IRP implies that a German investor would obtain the same return 
from buying a short-term Bundesbank security and then se 11 i ng it 3 months 1 ater as he caul d 
alternatively obtain from selling Deutsche marks to get dollars, using the dollars to buy a U.S. 
T-bill, selling it 3 months later, and then using the dollar proceeds to buy Deutsche marks. 
These five elements of exchange rate determination operate simultaneously so that exchange 
rate movements can seldom, if ever, be attributed to a single causal force. All of these 
elements can be understood to result from the aggressive interactions of well-informed, 
profit-seeking traders transacting in well-organized international currency markets. Any trader 
who by his possession of some new information sees an opportunity for profit makes transactions 
which tend to move exchange rates to both reflect that new information and to foreclose the 
opportunity for further profit. This tendency for market prices of assets, such as exchange 
rates, to reflect quickly all relevant new information is the primary characteristic of an 
"efficient market." 
The Determination of Prices and the Exchange Rate: A Long-Run View 
As it is the relative price of two currencies, the exchange rate reflects, inter alia, the 
relative inflation rates of the two economies. In particular, the rate of domesti~lat1on and 
changes in the exchange rate are determined jointly by the rate of domestic money growth relative 
to the growth of the amount that individuals, domestic and foreign, desire to hold. 
A country's money supply essentially is determined by its monetary authority; the demand for 
money (i.e., an individual's desire to hold a portion of his wealth in the form of money) is 
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determined primarily by income, real interest rates, prices, and price expectations in that 
country. The equilibrium rate of inflation is the one at which the growth rate of the money 
supply equals the growth rate of individuals' desired money holdings. Any other inflation rate 
motivates individuals to alter their spending rate, thereby attempting to change their money 
holdings at a rate more than or less than the rate at which the money supply is growing. 
Changes in the rate of consumer spending affect not only domestically produced goods and 
services but also those produced abroad. Altered demands for foreign goods and services, in turn, 
produce changes in U.S. demand for foreign currencies and as a consequence, changes in the foreign 
exchange value of the dollar, all other things equal. That is, a monetary disequilibrium, through 
its impact on the rate of aggregate spending, induces simultaneously a change in the rate of 
domestic inflation and the foreign exchange rate. Furthermore, in the long run, the change in the 
foreign exchange rate will exactly offset the change in the rate of domestic inflation, all other 
things equal. 
Consider, for example, a situation in which the money supply in the United States is growing 
at a rate less than that of the desired money holdings of individuals. In such an instance, both 
an excess demand for money and an excess supply of goods, services, and securities exist at the 
current rate of inflation. Inan attempt to increase the rate of growth of their money holdings 
to the desired rate, individuals decrease their spending rate for~ goods and services, placing 
downward pressure on the rate of domestic inflation and, simultaneously, upward pressure on the 
foreign exchange value of the dollar. In the long run, the decline in the domestic rate of 
inflation will exactly offset the rise in the foreign exchange value of the dollar. Consequently, 
monetary disequilibria should have no long-run effects on either the foreign currency price of 
U.S. exports or the competitive positions of U.S. exporters in foreign markets. 
These relationships can be seen quite clearly in charts 1 and 2. Chart 1 displays (a) the 
trade-weighted exchange value of the dollar and (b) the difference between the U.S. rate of 
inflation (measured by the CPR) and the trade-weighted 4ate of inflation of the Group of Ten 
countries (excluding the United States) plus Switzerland. It is apparent from the chart that, 
when the rate of U.S. inflation falls relative to ~hat of its major trading partners, the foreign 
exchange value of the dollar rises and vice versa. Chart 2 contains the year-over-year rates of 
growth of the producer price index for farm products, food1and feeds (adjusted for relative price 
changes), the GNP price deflator, and the export price deflator for the United States. Even 
though movements of the growth rate of the producer price index for farm products are relatively 
more noisy than movements of the growth rgtes of the other two indexes, it is clear that, in 
general, all three of these move together. Consequently, since the exchange rate and relative 
inflation rates move in opposite directions, yet agricultural prices move, in general, with the 
overall price level, monetary policy does not exhibit any substantive impact (either positive or 
negative) on the competitive positions of U.S. exporters over time. 
Domestic Prices and the Exchange Rate: A Short Run View 
In a short-run adjustment to a monetary disequilibrium, however, producers are not likely to 
discern immediately whether the resulting change in aggregate demand (spending) is permanent or 
4The trade-weighted exchange rate is a geometric average of the value of the U.S. dollar 
against 10 other currencies, weighted by each country's trade share with the U.S., relative to a 
base of 100 in March 1973. The countries included are Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The trade-weighted inflation 
differential is the difference between the rate of growth of the U.S. CPI and the rate of growth 
of the trade-weighted CPI for the same countries using the same weights as above. 
5The simple correlation coefficient between the trade-weighted exchange rate and the 
trade-weighted inflation differential over the period from I/1975 to II/1983 was -0.77; the 
correlation coefficient between changes in the two series was -0.50. Each is statistically 
significant. 
6The correlation coefficient between the rates of growth of the GNP deflator and the rates of 
growth of the producer price index for farm products and the export price deflator are 0.54 and 
0.62, respectively. Each is statistically significant. 
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merely temporary. Thus, they respond initially by changing their rate of production. That is, a 
short-run change in the rate of money growth results in a deviation of real economic activity from its 11 normal 11 rate. Only when this change in spending is recognized as permanent will producers 
change their prices and attempt to return their production to its normal rate. Hence, the impact 
of the monetary disequilibrium on output eventually vanishes, leaving only the rate of inflation permanently affected. These long-run adjustments, however, are not realized immediately. 
On the other hand, the exchange rate resp9nds to a monetary disequilibrium much more rapidly 
than do the prices of domestic commodities. This more rapid adjustment occurs because the 
exchange rate is the relative price of two assets and, unlike commodity prices, is determined in highly organized, internationally integrated markets that quickly and efficiently assimilate new information. Consequently, the exchange rate will change before commodity prices change 
sufficiently to regain a domestic monetary equilibrium. 
During the interim period, then,8 a currency will be over- or undervalued in the sense that the PPP condition will be violated. For exporters this means that they will face either a 
temporarily deteriorating or temporarily improving competitive position in foreign markets as the foreign currency prices of their products will be rising more rapidly or more slowly than those of domestically produced products because the exchange value of the dollar has changed before the 
rate of domestic inflation has fully adjusted to the monetary disequilibrium. This situation, however, cannot persist in the long un. 
Previous Attempts to Estimate the Effects of Exchange Rate Movements on Farm Prices and Income 
The points ra.ised in the foregoing discussion are not merely textbook exercises 1 imited to 
academic discussions. Instead, the success or failure of attempts to formulate policy will hinge 
on the degree to which these conceptual linkages are captured in econometric models. The existing 
empirical literature on the effects of monetary policy on exchange rates and agricultural 
trade--although smaller than many other areas of policy research--is widely quoted in policy discussions. But are the empirical estimates reported in this literature based on the simple principles of monetary trade theory discussed above? Our survey of the literature suggests that 
the models developed have not reflected these basic theoretical principles and, as a result, their 
results are not useful to policy debates. 
Although our purpose in this paper is not to provide a detailed discussion of the existing literature, two of its deficiencies seem particularly important to future research in this area. First, let us recall that the earlier discussion indicated a simultaneous determination of three price variables: commodity prices, the general price level, and the exchange rate. In our reading 
of existing studies, this has never been done. Analysts regress prices on the exchange rate or 
rate of money growth individually but never is there developed a model in which all three 
variables are jointly determined. But since a given change in the domestic rate of money growth 
wi 11 affect commodity prices and the exchange rate in opposite direction s--and with different lags--estimation of these simultaneous changes seems particularly important to our understanding 
of monetary pol icy• s effect on agriculture. To our knowledge, estimates of this process do not yet exist. 
The closest the profession has come to modeling this simultaneous determination of commodity prices, domestic inflation, and exchange rates is found in the work of Chambers and Just (1982). Even in this work, however, there is no linkage between the U.S. money supply and commodity prices 
nor between foreign money supplies and the exchange rate. The only monetary link lies in their inclusion of the U.S. money supply as a determinant of the exchange rate and then,the exchange 
rate as a determinant of agricultural exports. 
Furthermore, their work illustrates our second concern over the policy relevance of the 
existing agricultural trade literature. After estimating a quite detailed model of the 
7see Mussa (1979). 
8Even though the PPP condition has been violated frequently in the short run during the 1970s, there is no evidence that its usefulness as a condition of long-run equilibrium has been 
mitigated. See Frenkel (1981a). 
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agricultural sector and its links to monetary variables, Chambers and Just simulate the effects on 
prices and trade from a reduction in the level of M2. However, changes in the growth rates of 
monetary aggregates--more specifically, growth rates of domestic monetary aggregates relative to 
the growth rates of foreign monetary aggregates--are more closely related to c~anges in nominal 
commodity prices, the rate of inflation1 and the changes in the exchange rate. Based on these 
simulatisns, they conclude that monetary policy has quite dramatic effects on agricultural 
prices. Gardner (1981), however, has labeled the price changes estimated by Chambers and Just 
as 11 implausible. 11 Although Gardner provides no firm explanation for his judgment, his intuition 
is quite correct: the Chambers and Just estimates are based on a change in monetary policy 
equivalent to the credit reduction of the Great Depression. Their estimates are implausible 
because their simulation of a reduced level of M2 is implausible. Yet, our apparent professional 
misunderstanding of the importance of monetary growth rates--and not levels--to policy discussions 
has let the Chambers and Just error go by with little question. 
What Can Monetary Policy Do For Agricultural Trade? 
The dramatic decline in the dollar value of U.S. agricultural exports the past two years has 
led many agricultural policymakers to call for changes in the Federal Reserve's comparatively 
tight monetary policy. Their argument claims that relatively slower U.S. money growth has created 
and supported an ''overvalued 11 dollar that has made U.S. exports relatively more expensive in world 
markets. Because these analysts expect U.S. exports to be at a competitive disadvantage until the 
Federal Reserve increases the rate of money growth in the United States, they have called for a 
number of policies to promote U.S. agriculturalexports and maintain, if not increase, our share of 
the world market. Export subsidies frequently appear at the top of lists of actions recommended 
to offset the perceived negative effects of recent efforts to reduce the domestic rate of money 
growth. 
What these discussions fail to recognize, however, is that monetary policy is a macro policy 
that is essentially neutral in the long run. A number of studies have shown thflt ffilong run 
effects will be on nominal magnitudes with few meaningful impacts on real values. In contrast, 
micro policies--like export subsidies and other recommendations to promote agricultural 
exports--are directed at individual markets and products with their primary effects necessarily 
reflected in real · values. This distinction between macro and micro policies, then, begs two 
fundamental questions: 
Can monetary policy be changed to improve the long-run competitive position of 
agricultural exports? 
Can micro policies--such as an export subsidy--successfully offset the short run real 
effects of a change in monetary policy? 
9This analysis could be conducted in terms of levels of the relevant variables. However, in 
the context of a steady-state equilibrium, the growth rates of these variables are more closely 
related. Furthermore, the policy discussions follow much more readily when the analysis is 
couched in growth rates. For example, a tightening of monetary policy typically means a reduction 
in the growth of t~e money stock, not a decline in its level as Chambers and Just suggest. 
10 rn fact, Chambers and Just find that a sustained 10 percent reduction in U.S. domestic 
credit (M2) would evoke, in the long run, a 20 percent decrease in wheat exports, a 22 percent 
decrease in corn exports, and a 10 percent decrease in soybean exports. They fail to note, 
however, that such a reduction in M2, which is currently growing at a 10 percent annual rate, 
would also generate a massive recession in the United States. Consequently, the impact of this 
abrupt change in monetary policy on the U.S. agricultural sector would be of only minor 
significance. Furthermore, on the margin, their analysis indicates that for the recent decline 
in agricultural exports to have been monetarily induced, we should have been experiencing declines 
in the level of M2 (i.e., negative M2 growth). During the last five years, however, the level of 
M2 has declined in only one quarter--a fact which further discredits the Chambers and Just 
results. ----
11For example, see Friedman (1968). 
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We would argue that the answer to both questions is "no.'' 
Monetary Po 1 icy 
Consider first the potential role of monetary policy. Again with reference to the preceding 
theoretical points, monetary policy could provide some short term support for agricultural trade 
if the rate of domestic money growth were accelerated to the point that it exceeded that of our 
major trading partners. Because the exchange rate would fall more rapidly than U.S. commodity 
prices would rise (at least in the short run), our agricultural products would be priced 
temporarily below the export prices of foreign competitors. But after commodity prices were given 
sufficient time to adjust to this monetary shock, the only long term effects would be a higher 
rate of domestic inflation. 
As the rate of domestic inflation rises, so do expectations of future inflation rates. Since 
the stream of services from physical assets is totally unaffected by inflation, individuals prefer 
to hold less of their wealth in the form of money and more in the form of physical assets. (That 
is, physical asset holdings are increased as an inflation hedge.) Consequently, the prices of 
these assets rise faster than the general rate of inflation. Farmers who owned assets prior to 
this change in monetary policy would realize real wealth gains as their assets--especially 
land--appreciated in value. Conversely, young farmers attempting to enter the industry would be 
affected adversely as asset prices and higher nominal interest rates moved the start-up costs of 
farming to higher levels. So monetary policy could provide some short-run stimulus to U.S. 
agricultural exports. This stimulus, however, wo~ave the undesirable side-effects of higher 
domestic inflation and higher barriers to new farmers attempting to enter the industry. 
Domestic Micro Policies 
At the outset, one thing should be made clear: the United States has pursued domestic 
agricultural policies for some time that serve, in practice, as very effective export subsidies. 
The dairy program that combines price supports to induce excess production and export subsidies to 
dispose of the surplus is the most glaring example of predatory trade practices by the United 
States. Less variable, but still against the spirit of GATT principles, is our system of target 
prices that, again, stimulate12excess production which, until only recently, could be sold at a discount in the world market. To blame current declines in the value of U.S. exports on the 
predatory trade practices of the European Community, for example, is an exercise in hypocrisy. 
Two effects can come from further micro interventions in agricultural trade such as the 
"blended credit" export subsidy adopted last year. The first effect will be a further 
restructuring of relative prices in the agricultural sector; specifically, the relative prices of 
exported goods and the resources used as inputs to their production would be expected to rise as 
they were protected further from market fluctuations. As with so many other domestic agricultural 
programs, however, the primary long-run effect from such intervention will be to increase the 
wealth of those farmers already producing commodities for export. 
The second effect of further government intervention in export markets will be an increased 
cost to taxpayers of government price support programs. To the extent that marginal resources are 
given an incentive not to adjust out of agricultural production, surpluses will continue to be 
produced and the cost of maintaining prices at support levels will increase. We have heard that 
the cost of European Conmunity farm subsidies has escalated to the point where formerly passive 
consumer ifterests have called for changes in policies that would reduce the cost of food to 
consumers. From our reading of current farm policy debates, the $20 billion-plus cost of this 
year's price support effort--not to mention the off-budget cost of PIK--has pushed the cost of 
12To compare the magnitudes of competing export subsidies, European countries spent $12.8 
billion on farm subsidies in 1981, a four percent increase over 1980 figure. In the fiscal year 
ended September 1982, the Commodity Credit Corporation spent $15.4 billion on price supports and 
other grants, an increase of 127 percent since 1980. "Europe's Farm Policies Clash with American 
Export Goals," New York Times, February 22, 1983. 
(Footnote Continued) 
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farm programs to the politically-tolerable limit. Not only would further U.S. attempts to 
subsidize agricultural exports be unwise in terms of their economic impacts but, at this point in 
time, they appear to be an unacceptable additional budgetary burden. 
Conclusions 
Our review of economic theory indicates that monetary policy can have short-run effects that 
will reduce the value of U.S. agricultural exports. In the long-run, however, after prices, 
exchange rates, and the domestic rate of inflation adjust fully to the trend rate of money growth, 
monetary policy is neutral with respect to agricultural trade in this era of floating exchange 
rates. Despite the incorrect arguments that the dollar is "overvalued" and that monetary policy 
must be more expansionary to reduce the dollar's value, our analysis shows that monetary policy is 
incapable of having any long-run effect on agricultural trade. We also find that micro policies 
designed to offset the short-run real effects of exchange rate fluctuations will have permanent 
effects on the wealth positions of some farmers but, again, will not contribute to the long-run 
status of agricultural trade. Instead, our response to the current position of agricultural trade 
is to let nominal commodity prices, inflation, and the exchange rate find new equilibrium values 
without further interference in agricultural markets. Because export subsidies are harmful to all 
trading partners and market resolutions of political conflicts are not feasible, our 
recommendation for the long-run health of exports and agriculture is a cooperative dismantling of 
domestic agricultural policies that, by design or accident, serve as export subsidies. Any other 
approach surely will result in an inefficient allocation of resources and an increasingly costly 
transfer of wealth from taxpayers to farmers. 
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THE GROWING SENSITIVITY OF U.S. AGRICULTURE TO 
WORLD EVENTS 
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Introduction 
For about a decade following the end of the Second World War the United States continued to 
function as a largely self-contained economy. It was characterized by an industrial and 
agricultural leadership that could with some validity regard the domestic market as a private 
property, open for exploitation from within and relatively insulated against foreign encroachment. 
The forces that were to change this business climate were in motion in the 1960s but perceptions 
of impending change were submerged. It required the phenomenal increase in agricultural exports 
after 1972 and the energy crisis of 1973 to generate public awareness of the fact that a basic 
change in the structure of markets was under way. 
The suddenness with which this recognition was forced upon the total business community was 
its dominant feature. It is largely responsible for the excesses in response and expectations 
that shaped the U.S. economy of the 1970s and created the adjustment problems facing it in the 
1980s. 
From 1950 to 1970 the gross value of U.S. merchandise trade (imports plus exports) averaged 
less than seven percent of GNP (Table 1). By this measure, U.S. dependence on world trade in the 
1950s and 1960s was the smallest of any of the developed countries. This was transformed after 
1970 by an order of magnitude. As a percent of GNP, U.S. merchandise trade (imports plus exports) 
doubled from 1960 to 1976, and increased by an additional 27 percent from 1976 to 1980. The 
United States entered the 1980s more than twice as dependent on foreign trade as it had been in 
1970. 
Tab 1 e 1. 
Year 
1940 
1945 
1950 
1955 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
11946 data. 
Importance of Merchandise Trade to the United States 
Merchandise trade 
Exports + 
GNP Exports 
---------------billion d~1Y~~~=-----:~~~:::_ 
100 
11.81 5.11 16.81 212 
286 10.2 9.1 19.3 
400 14.4 11.5 26.0 
506 19.6 14.8 34.4 
691 26.5 21.5 48.0 
993 42.5 39.9 82.3 
1,549 107.1 98.0 205.1 
1, 718 114.7 124.1 238.8 
1,918 120.8 151.7 272.5 
2,164 142.1 175.8 317.9 
2,418 184.5 211.8 396.3 
2,633 224.2 249.6 473.8 
2,938 236.3 264.1 500.4 
3,058 217.9 249.9 467.9 
Merchandise trade as % GNP 
Exports + 
Ex~orts Im~orts Imeorts 
--------------percent------------
5.54 2.39 7.93 
3.56 3.17 6.73 
3.61 2.88 6.49 
3.88 2.91 6.79 
3.83 3.11 6.94 
4.28 4.02 8.30 
6.91 6.33 13.24 
6.68 7.22 13.90 
6.30 7.91 14.21 
6.56 8.12 14.69 
7.63 8.76 16.39 
8.52 9.48 17.99 
8.04 8.99 17.03 
7.13 8.17 15.30 
Taken from Economic Report of the President, Jan. 1981; Feb. 1983, Table B-1, p. 163, Table 103, 
p. 279. 
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For agriculture, the expanded significance of foreign trade is similarly striking. The 
dollar value of U.S. agricultural exports totaled $7.3 billion in 1970; by 1980 this had increased 
to $41.2 billion and it peaked at $43.3 billion in 1981. In volume, agricultural exports rose 
from 64 million metric tons (mmt) in 1970 to a peak of 163 mmt reached in both 1980 and 1981. 
The impact of this suddenly expanded exposure to foreign markets was especially heavy in 
grain producing areas. Exports of wheat and coarse grains in 1969/70 accounted for only 17.6 
percent of production. By 1980/81 they had increazed to 42 percent and (due to reduced output in 
1983) is projected to reach 46 percent in 1983/84. 
Our greater involvement in foreign trade in agricultural products has generated an emotional 
reaction on the part of U.S. agriculture that is a reverse image of the reaction of U.S. industry 
to greater foreign penetration of U.S. markets. Industry is tempted to identify the cause of its 
problems as increased imports of foreign manufactured goods. Farmers, in reverse, are tempted to 
seek salvation from problems of overproduction in expanded foreign markets. Both reactions 
originate from the same basic shift in the position of the United States in the world economy. 
The following sections will examine some of the major consequences for agriculture of this 
enlarged sensitivity to events that condition world trade. 
The Problem of Over-Valued Land 
One consequence of the sudden expansion of foreign agricultural markets was that economic 
forces and public policies interacted to create powerful pressures for enlargement of farm size. 
When coupled with the explosive growth in agricultural export demand and sustained general 
inflation in the 1970s, this generated a belief that farmland prices could only rise. This was 
widely echoed by farm investment counselors, extension workers, and credit agencies. The result 
was a boom in land prices comparable to a 100-year flood, and unlike anything experienced since 
the days of railroad building in the nineteenth century. 
Nationwide, farm real estate values increased four-fold from 1970 to 1981; 
grain-producing areas of the corn and wheat belts, the increase was nearly five-fold. 
for inflation, the real value more than doubled. 
in major 
Adjusted 
One aspect of this phenomenal increase merits emphasis. The purchasers who lifted land 
values to these heights were predominantly neighboring farmers. In the major grain-producing 
states, over half of the lands purchased at the end of the boom were tenant-operated at the time 
of purchase. In Minnesota, the only state for which time-series data in this detail are 
available, from 80 to 90 percent of the crop lands were added to farmland already owned. 
The picture that emerges is that of a land market in the principal crop-farming areas that 
was dominated by farm-expansion buyers. These have been buyers whose lands had appreciated 
sharply in value since acquisition, whose debt-to-asset ratios were low, and who could devote the 
income-generating capacity of existing holdings to the repayment of any debt involved in their 
purchase of additional land. The dominant buyers in the market, in short, were those who received 
windfall gains through land value appreciation. 
This source of demand for farmland is unstable. It depends on the expectation of a 
continuing rise in land values. Any interruption in the rise reduces land purchase decisions to 
the calculation of net income from farm operation as a base for bid prices, rather than the 
expectation of continued capital gains . 
This interruption occurred in 1981-83, with declines in nominal land values in the Corn Belt 
of 10 to 25 percent and in rea 1 terms of 20 to 35 percent, or more. Is this interrupti on 
transitory? Major differences of opinion exist within the agricultural community regarding the 
long-run prospect for farmland values, focused primarily on the prospects for future export demand 
for grains and soybeans. This can be termed the external demand component. Its magnitude is 
1Economic Report of the President, Washington, Feb. 1983, p. 273. 
2 U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Foreign Agriculture Circular, Grains, FG-31-83, October 14, 1983, 
p. 22. 
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capable of wide fluctuation, and cannot be estimated with precision. 
A different complex of economic forces surrounds the internal component of farmland demand. 
This is based on the potential for further economies of size to be achieved by a continuing trend 
toward farm size enlargement. It is at least possible that the major force of this aspect of the 
demand for farmland has been spent, at least for the near term, and perhaps for a decade or more. 
The average size of farm in many grain-crop areas is now approaching the level at which 
further economies of size are small, and require substantial additional investment. USDA studies 
show clearly that the modal farms in corn, soybean, and wheat areas can now command 90 percent or 
more of any production economies that can be achieved through increases in farm size. 
Passage of time guarantees a decline in the number of farmland owners who acquired land at 
low cost before 1972 and who used their high-equity position to buy more land in the land boom of 
the 1970s. This source of demand will disappear. When coupled with diminishing opportunities for 
further economies of size through farm enlargement, this suggests that bidding for farmland in 
years ahead will include a steadily declining number of buyers who can use the earning capacity of 
three or four acres to pay for the purchase of an additiona 1 acre. The interna 1 component of 
farmland demand seems likely to return to a more normal calculation of costs and returns. 
Arthur L. Wright has pointed out that from 1970 to 1980 the average owner-occupied, 
non-condominium home in Texas appreciated $225 per month. Many home owners hajl virtually 11 free 11 
housing, in that appreciation exceeded monthly payments for much of the decade. 
The same statement could be made about farmland in many parts of the country. The average 
estimated value of Minnesota farmland increased from $232 per acre in 1970 to $1310 per acre in 
1981, an average increase of $108 per acre per year. This was far above the average imputed 
rental rate plus property taxes for each of the ten years. 
By 1981 Minnesota land-owning farmers, together with those in most of the rest of the Middle 
West, had had ten years of experience of farming with 11 free lands, 11 in terms of asset values. In 
many areas, the land was more than free, in that the appreciation in land values was virtually 
double the amount of imputed rent plus property taxes for the decade. 
In financial terms the experience was demoralizing. The net worth statement overshadowed 
cash flow in financial planning, leading many farmers to use credit supported by land value 
appreciation to purchase farm equipment or additional land at prices that could not be justified 
by net cash income. Using this definition, 11 free land 11 was a trap into which many farmers and 
their creditors fell. 
The sensitivity of U.S. agriculture to world events is in large part a result of the 
irrational expectations of inexhaustible export ·market demand that characterized the 1970s, and 
that was immediately capitalized into land values. As a consequence, we have a population of farm 
expansion buyers from the land boom of the 1970s that holds over-priced land. It is probable that 
this is the group of farmers that feels compelled to use land to its ultimate capacity, to the 
exclusion of long-run production and conservation goals. 
The Impact of Demographic Change 
The farm population was 30.5 million in 1930 and 30.5 million in 1940. It declined to 23.0 
million in 1950, to 15.6 million in 1960, to 9.7 million in 1970, and to 6.9 million in 1981, 
using the old Census definition of a farm (changed in 1978). Using the new definition of a farm, 
the farm population was 5,790,000 in 1981. 
On the assumption that most of this off-farm migration involved individuals under 25 years of 
age, this means that the reduction in the farm population of 23 million between 1940 and 1981 
involved primarily individuals born after 1915. The oldest members of the generation that 
contributed to this heavy off-farm migration would thus be under 68 in 1983 and, with normal life 
expectancy, perhaps 80 to 90 percent of them are still living. 
3Ti=rra Grande, Texas Real Estate Research Center, College Station, Texas, issue 22, 1983, p. 2. 
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This means that we have a population of people with farm backgrounds who are no longer in 
farming that is at least double and perhaps more nearly triple the size of the farm population as 
currently defined. 
If we use the post-1978 Census definition of a farm and of the farm population, it is roughly 
true to say that for every person now on a farm there are three persons in the non-farm population 
whose roots were in farming. 
This farm-rooted portion of the non-farm population is now at a peak, and will decline 
gradually to 2000 or 2010, and then precipitously. For the remainder of this century we can 
reckon with a population that includes a large number of non-farm people who have at least 
emotional or sentimental identification with agriculture. 
The significance of this observation for the structure of agriculture is that many of them, 
and perhaps a majority, have more than sentimental ties. They are the heirs or prospective heirs 
of farmland owners. As a result of a massive off-farm migration concentrated in little more than 
25 years, much of the beneficial ownership of farmland has moved out of agriculture. 
We lack the data that would be needed to quantify this trend, but its results can be read in 
many indirect ways. Much of the increase in professional farm management services is accounted 
for by the growth in the number of inheritors of farmland who do not want to sell. Much of the 
increase in cash renting to part-owner operators is the result of the same demographic and 
motivational forces. The introduction in agricultural universities of extension-type courses on 
the problems of non-farm landlords is a measure of the demand for this type of information. 
These trends were accelerated by the land boom of the 1970s. From 1972 through 1981 real 
capital gains in land values made farmland almost the only performing "growth stock 11 available to 
investors. Thus, a monumental financial incentive was added to sentimental reasons, to explain 
why off-farm migrants may have wanted to retain an ownership interest in farmland. 
The consequence is a structure of farmland ownership that is probably more fragmented today 
than at any time in our history. Professional farm managers recount instances in which they have 
assembled ownership tracts from a dozen to 50 or 60 landlords for rental to a single large tenant. 
Part-owner operators renting from half a dozen land owners are becoming commonplace. 
The implications of this trend for agricultural policy can only be surmised. It raises the 
distinct possibility that any agricultural support measures that are ultimately capitalized into 
land values will benefit a small number of large owner-operators and a large number of non-farm 
owners of relatively small tracts. 
There is a growing concern about the extent to which the benefits of farm commodity price 
support programs flow to a small number of large farmers, an unknown fraction of whose lands are 
owned by non-farmers. We can anticipate that this concern will increase. A statistic that we do 
not have and will not obtain from any current data would report the extent to which the ultimate 
beneficiaries of these programs are non-farm land owners. The possibility remains that a 
disaggregated analysis would show that the majority of the benefits from commodity price support 
programs now flow ultimately to non-farmers. 
While these changes in the macro climate facing American agriculture were underway in the 
past decade, related major changes were occurring in the structure of control over agricultural 
resources. One of the most portentous changes has been the increase in the area of rented land in 
some of the most productive and erodible cropping areas of the country. The existence of sharply 
differentiated attitudes towards soil and water conservation on the part of land owners and 
tenants of farmland has long been documented. A recent study by David E. Ervin (Journal of Soil 
and Water Conservation, Sept.-Oct. 1982) has provided an up-to-date survey of the literature of 
this touchy subject. The suspicion that a rise in the proportion of farmland operated under 
tenant contracts will be associated with a decline in interest in conservation is now approaching 
certainty. 
This state of affairs is also an outgrowth of the shift from profit-seeking to rent-seeking 
on the part of farmland owners. Much of the increase in rented land in the recent past has been 
explained by the desire of heirs of former farmland owners to retain their inheritance, in the 
hope of a capital gain. In a previous generation many of the heirs of deceased farmers eventually 
sold out, and their holdings were recombined into new farm units. The prospect of rapid capital 
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gains in farmland in the past decade has narrowed the farmland market substantially, as more 
owners who in an earlier era would have sold out now emerge as landlords, often of rel at i vely 
small tracts of land. This results in a motive for landholding tha t is rooted in capi t al gain 
expectations rather than efficient farm management. When combi ned with the tendency for the s ize 
of ownership tracts to decline, this constitutes a major barrier to the efficient promotion of 
conservation farming. A much larger population of landowners must now be convinced of the desirability of conservation. Their motives for landholding do not ma ke them receptive to 
arguments based on the possibility of sustained or increased profits f rom farm operat ion over a planning horizon stretching into several decades or beyond. 
The implications for farm policy are clear. A sustained effort is needed to promote 
conservation goals among the land owning population, which is not the same as the population of farm operators . The clientele for much of the information provided by land grant universities, 
experiment stations, extension services, and conservation agencies is i ncreasingly non-farm in 
outlook. A different mix of ef fort will be required for successful farm programs in the future. 
The Embargo on Grain Sales to the USSR 
The reaction to the embargo of January 4, 1980 on sales of grain above contract guarantees to 
the USSR provides a dramatic illustration of the extent to which U.S. agr iculture has i dent i fied its well-being with a continued expansion of grain exports. The embargo was widely denounced as a disaster for grain farmers. A massive reduction in gra i n exports was predicted and the i ssue quickly became the subject of intensely partisan political debate. A promise to repeal the 
embargo was a prominent part of the campaign of Ronald Reagan in the election of 1980, and was 
credited with having a significant influence on the vote in key farm states of the Midwest. 
In retrospect, it is difficult to discover any negative effect of the embargo on U.S. grain 
exports. As shown in Figure 1, U.S. exports of wheat and coarse grains reached an all - time record level of 110.7 million metric tons in the marketing year 1980/81. This reflected decis ions to import by foreign customers made almost wholly within the period during which the embargo was in 
effect (Jan. 4, 1980 to April 24, 1981). 
Figure 1. u. S. Exports of Wheat and Coarse Grains 
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World trade in wheat and coarse grains also reached an all-time high of 201.1 mmt in the 
trade year 1980/81, as shown in Figure 2. USSR net imports in July-June 1980/81 were 33.5 mmt, 
and climbed to 44.5 mmt in 1981/82, as shown in Figure 3. In summary, in the trade year affected 
most directly by the embargo, the United States exported a record amount of grain, world trade in 
grain reached record levels, and the USSR made import decisions that led to successive record 
imports in 1980/81 and 1981/82. 
The most plausible interpretation of these data is that grain remains a highly fungible 
commodity, and that the USSR over-insured. Events in Poland in the summer of 1980 must have had 
an unsettling effect on grain import decisions in Moscow. If the USSR had occupied Poland, it 
would have incurred major responsibilities for sustaining a Polish food supply. This prospect 
remained real throughout 1981. When coupled with the sharp drop in domestic production, from 179 
mmt in 1980/81 to 152 mmt in 1981/82, it is easy to understand the Soviet decision to import 
record quantities of grain in the year following the U.S. embargo. 
From the standpoint of U~S. agriculture, one of the most damaging effects of the embargo may 
have been the artificial stimulus it gave to world trade in grains. Instead of a cut-back in 
exports, U.S. farmers may have been misled into a belief that the potentials for grain exports 
were greater than in fact they were. 
In any case, the significance of the Soviet market to U.S. agriculture has consistently been 
inflated. In dollar volume, exports to the USSR were 3.6 percent of the total value of U.S. 
agricultural exports4 in 1980. Exports to Canada were 4.5 percent, to China 4.8 percent, and to 
Japan 14.3 percent. In recent years, the Japanese market has averaged about four times the 
size of the Soviet market for U.S. agricultural exports. 
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the monolithic nature of the Soviet market has 
led to exaggerated faith in its potential as an outlet for U.S. agricultural surpluses. It has 
certainly distorted the foreign policy posture of the United States. In the months in which 
relations with our European allies were severely strained by U.S. attempts to prohibit the sale of 
gas pipeline equipment to the USSR, strenuous efforts were being made by the U.S. government to 
conclude a new Soviet grain agreement. The irony is compounded by the probability that it may 
actually be in the long-run best interest of U.S. agriculture to be weaned away from an excessive 
emotional attachment to a Soviet market that is potentially capable of extreme political 
gyrations. 
One aspect of the preoccupation with the promotion of grain sa 1 es to the USSR deserves 
further emphasis. A guarantee that the United States will be a reliable supplier in world 
agricultural markets has enormous implications for domestic price policy. In the past, countries 
that have been heavily dependent on agricultural export markets, Denmark and the Netherlands, for 
example, have sometimes been willing to tolerate domestic price levels that led to reduced 
domestic use of the exported products. It is not at all clear that the United States will accept 
price increases for animal products that will cut back on domestic consumption in order to meet 
grain export commitments. 
Assurance that the United States will be a reliable supplier to foreign customers is easy to 
give in a period characterized by grain surpluses. It will be much more difficult to sustain this 
assurance if meat and milk prices begin to rise. The policy commitment contained in these 
assurances extends far beyond the area of agricultural policy. 
There is little evidence that the implications of "reliable supplier" promises have been 
understood by the non-farm community. There has been almost no discussion of these implications 
in policy-making circles, nor in the Congress. The "no embargo" guarantee contained in the recent 
US-USSR long-term grain agreement represents a surrender of policy options that will almost 
certainly haunt any future grain export trade negotiations. This administration has tied its 
hands, and the hands of the administration to follow. 
The 1980 Soviet grain embargo, and the nature of its repeal, illustrate the high hazard 
4Mark Drabenstott, "The 1980's: A Turning Point for U.S. Agricultural Exports?", Economic 
Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, April 1983, p. 5. 
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created by the temptation to use foreign policy to serve narrow and short-run domestic political goals. The other side of this coin is the temptation to distort the domestic political discussion 
of policy issues that have both domestic and foreign trade significance. An example is the use of interest rate policy to combat inflation in the United States, with little regard to its impact 
abroad, or to its differential impact on our own agricultural sector. 
Combatting inflation with interest rate policy throws the burden of adjustment on: 
a. slow pay-out activities, of which agriculture is a leading example; 
b. activities that export a high proportion of their output -- again, agriculture is a 
leading example. 
The burden is greatest on those activities that are both slow-payout and export-oriented. Thus the 11 world events 11 to which U.S. agriculture has become increasingly sensitive are to a high degree the result of domestic U.S. policies. It has been appropriate to argue that the United States has been adopting policies to solve domestic problems with little regard to their effect on 
the rest of the world. To this must be added the fact that adoption of these policies has shown little regard for their differential effect within the United States. 
Sources of Risk in U.S. Feedgrain Markets 
It has been a part of the conventional wisdom of the past decade to assume that price instability for U.S. farm products would result increasingly from forces originating outside our 
country. This belief was reinforced by the unexpectedly large grain purchases by the USSR in 1972-73, by the OPEC oil embargo of 1973 and related oil price increases, and by fears of world food shortages. These events supported a belief in a continuing increase in demand for U.S. 
agricultural exports, associated with greater price uncertainty in world markets. 
Given this mind-set, it comes as a surprise to acknowledge that much of the instability in U.S. agricultural markets of the past five years is explained by events and trends within the United States. This is especially noticeable with feed grains. 
Table 2. 
Year 
1979/80 
1980/81 
1981/82 
1982/831 
1983/84 
1Forecast. 
U.S. Production of Coarse Grains 
Production 
mmt 
238.7 
198.4 
249.0 
255.5 
142.8 
Change from preceding year 
mmt percent 
- 40.3 
+ 50.6 
+ 6.5 
-112.7 
-16.9 
+25.5 
+ 2.6 
-44.1 
Taken from USDA, Foreign Agriculture Circular, Grains, FG-28-83, Sept. 15, 1983, p. 10. 
Some sense of the magnitude of these changes in U.S. production is found in the fact that the 1983/84 reduction of 112.7 million metric tons in coarse grain production (mid-harvest estimate) is greater than the estimated total coarse grain production in 1983/84 of the USSR (103 mmt), of 
all of western Europe (85.4 mmt), or of China (85.0 mmt). 
A second surprise is provided by the fact that the big declines of 1980/81 and 1983/84 were due primarily to production short-falls in the heart of the Corn Belt. In the past five years the 
most productive lands have made the greatest contribution to variations in output and hence to price fluctuations. The big variations in feed grain output have not been due to production 
swings at the rainfall or temperature margins of feedgrain production. 
Part of the explanation for this shift in the sources of variability in feed grain production from the periphery to the core is provided by the rise of irrigation in the western fringes of the Corn Belt and in the Great Plains. This reversed the regional impact of drouth on feedgrain 
output in 1983/84. 
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Another part of the explanation is provided by the rise of a duo-culture of corn and soybeans 
in the heart of the Corn Belt. In spite of the rise of irrigation in the Great Plains states, 
Table 3 shows that the production of corn has become more heavily concentrated in the traditional 
Corn Belt counties. This rain-fed area can be highly productive in years of favorable weather, 
but it also is highly sensitive to pests, plant diseases, and drouth. The triumph of high 
technology in corn production and its concentration in the traditional Corn Belt counties has 
apparently increased the prospect of wide swings in feedgrain output. On the evidence of the past 
five years, the risk factor in feedgrain production has increased in our most productive rain-fed 
regions. 
Table 3. Shift in Regional Concentration of U.S. Production of Corn for Grain, Leading Corn 
Belt States, 1950-59 and 1980-82 
State 
Iowa 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Total (average) 
Nebraska 
Minnesota 
Ohio 
Total (average) 
6-state total (average) 
U.S. total (average) 
Iowa, Illinois, Indiana 
Nebraska, Minnesota, Ohio 
6 states 
Production average 
1950-59 1980-82 
---------thous. bu.----------
569,737 
511,252 
254,326 
1,335,315 
207,142 
244,672 
187,624 
639,438 
1,974,753 
3,013,797 
Percent 
44.3 
21.2 
65.5 
of U.S. 
1,604,362 
1,348,260 
690,720 
3,643,342 
721,680 
696,443 
425,240 
1,843,363 
5,486,705 
7,747,924 
total 
47.0 
23.8 
70.8 
Increase 
1950-59 to 1980-82 
-------percent----
281.6 
263.} 
271.5 
272.8 
348.4 
284.6 
226.6 
288.3 
277.8 
257.1 
Data taken from Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1962, p. 659, and current reports of 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
The Proper Components of U.S. Farm Policy 
in an Integrated World Economy 
One consequence of the increased exposure of American agriculture to foreign markets is the 
emphasis it places on the integration of agriculture into the world economy. The essential 
elements in American farm policy are no longer revealed by a study of commodity price support 
programs. Perhaps the clearest example is provided by recent proposals for 11 local content 11 or 
11 domestic content 11 legislation in industry. 
Efforts of this kind to insulate the American market against import competition from 
automotive vehicles, electronic equipment, textiles, or machine tools are aimed directly at the 
American farmer. If we do not buy from Japan, South Korea, or less developed countries, we cannot 
expect to sell to them. If Detroit succeeds in its current drive for domestic content minimums 
for automobiles, the jobs saved in industry will be at the expense of markets, and hence jobs, 
lost in agriculture. 
For this to make economic sense it must be argued that relative efficiency in the use of 
capital and labor is greater in industry than in agriculture. The marginal capital/output ratio (the value of the additional capital required to achieve a specified increase in the value of 
output) is lower in agriculture than in all but a very few industries, and marginal labor 
productivity is higher. American agriculture uses capital and labor very efficiently and its rate 
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of productivity gain has been above that of industry in most of the years of the past three 
decades. 
There is a net gain to the United States by paying for our automobiles with soybeans, corn, 
and wheat. If we rule out this advantage, the principal effect will be to levy the equivalent of 
a tax on U.S. consumers to support higher levels of employment and wages in automotive and other 
protected industries than would otherwise be necessary. This is the sense in which it must be 
argued that farm policy is now inextricably embedded in industrial and fore i gn trade pol i cy. It 
is distressing to note that farm policy debates have largely neglected this issue. It is even 
more distressing to note that very little of the recent professional literature or research in 
agricultural economics has addressed this problem. 
U.S. FOOD POLICY IN AN IMPERFECT WORLD GRAIN MARKET 
Paul L. Kelley 
Professor of Agricultural Economics 
Kansas State University 
D. Gale Johnson in his classic work of 1974 argued that world 
(see references). In 1983, world agriculture is still in disarray. 
interacting with current U.S. agricultural policy have resulted in 
many U.S. farmers and for taxpayers. 
agriculture was in disarray 
Internati ona 1 food pol i cies 
disastrous consequences for 
U.S. farm policies of the 1930s and up to the mid-1960s were designed to enhance farm income 
in a closed U.S. economy containing surplus labor resources, and in a world of fixed exchange 
rates and of a limited international capital market. The transformation of U.S. agriculture has 
left the excess labor problem behind us. But our agricultural policies since the mid-1960s have 
only partially adjusted to a new reality of world markets and to an essential ly full integration 
of agriculture into the domestic economy. 
World food and agricultural policy issues associated with the internationalization of the 
world food system constitute a broad agenda. I propose, however, to limit my discussion to policy 
issues related to price discovery in the ~nternational grains market, since these concerns are 
related so strongly to current U.S. policy. 
For analytical purposes it is useful, though difficult, to direct attention to two major 
price discovery features of the world food system: 
1. determinants of long term drifts in real world food prices; 
2. determinants of the large year-to-year variability of prices about the long term trend. 
With regard to a long term drift in real world food prices, it matters whether the trend is 
upward, flat, or decreasing. As a general rule, the direction is determined primarily by the 
state of economic development in nations and regions of the world. The food price trend is 
tempered but not affected strongly by national or multi-national agricultural food prices. 
In the United States prior to the mid-1960s, domestic economic factors and policies largely 
shaped prices for foodstuffs. International impacts on our agriculture were explained by fixed 
monetary exchange rates, and effects on the general business cycle and employment, which in turn 
influenced mobility of labor transfers out of agriculture. 
1I emphasize world trading in grains as they are the dominant commodit ies linking national 
agricultural sectors in the world food system. For broad policy purposes, I treat grains as a 
homogeneous aggregate, although for specific policy actions the wheat market appears to differ 
substantially from the coarse grains market, structurally. 
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Starting in the mid-1960s, U.S. real food prices came undett more inf luence from the strong 
linkage of grains to international markets, from the switch f rom fixed to floating rates, and from 
the emergence of a highly integrated international capital market. Today, worldwide events have 
much to do with trends in food and feed grain prices. Prospects for the future are framed in the 
world setting, turning in part on forces driving human capital development with i t s subsequent 
impact on agricultural producti vity. 
Analytical tools .(and their limitations) to appraise these global issues have been summarized 
by Sch~h (1981). It 1~ pruden~ to 11 mode~ 11 worldwide food balances along -current li nes, but more 
attent1on should be g1ven to 1ncorporat1ng human capital theory in predi cting product ivity and 
other features of the world food economy. 
. In spite of these .cavea~s, where does this leave the po l icy maker or t he interested voter?, 
W1ll .real world food pr1ces .t1lt upward, move in a flat trajectory, or tilt downward in the 1980s? 
~11 1s not ~ost~ T~eeten 1n a recent study is more daring than most and gi ves us some targets: 
.•.. any proJectlon 1s hazardous but the best guess is that supply and demand are likely to 
1ncrease at somew~at compa~able rates from 1982 to 2000. 11 He adds that the trend will 
nevertheless be h1ghly var1able from yea r to year. 
The most fundamental concl usion concerning the broad drift in real world food price outcomes 
is that no single nation or small group of nations can do much about it in the short run. The 
practical policy conclusion is this: individuals and nations should plan their l ong-term 
investment decisions based on income and survival strategies that ta ke into account t he most 
likely long-term trend. 
Personally, I opt for the flat or decreasing trend at the moment. 
The second set of concerns about world food prospects and policy centers around the issue of 
extremely large year-to-year price variability. By this we mean not normal variations t hat occur 
in a reasonably 11 efficient" ma r ket but those arising from unpredictable sources such as weather, 
political upheavals, and policy actions. 
A large body of literature deals with t~is subject and particularly with the distri butive 
effects as to who are the gainers and losers. There are effects on efficiency and on income of 
producers in devJloped nations, and on treasuries of nations that import substantial quantities of 
food and fiber. For these reasons and many others, wide price va ri abi 1 ity in worl d f ood and 
fiber markets i s not a mute policy issue, even if it is ha rd to say what is so wide as to be 
unacceptable. 
I 
i 
There is considerable agreement that world food prices will conti nue to \exhibi t more 
year-to-year variability henceforth than in the three decades preceding the 1970s. However, 
opinions differ as to causes. Schools of thought "explai ning" above-normal world food price 
instability cluster into two major groups, (1) the market structure group, and (2) t he exchange 
rate, international capital market school. 
Conventional wisdom of the market structure group holds that pr ice i nsulating pol i cies of 
major importing nations of the world contribute greatly to instability in markets of t he residual 
suppliers such as the United States. The market structure group admits that instability is made 
worse by fluctuations in exchange rate markets. The capital market school, by contrast, argues 
that large movements in exchange rates are the primary source of instability in export markets. 
(See Cochrane and Spitze, and Schuh (1974).) 
Again, it matters for public and private decision strategies whether structural impact s are 
more important than monetary impacts -- or, generally, the relative importance of each. 
See Kelley (1982), Wadekin, and McCalla et al in references. 
3The effects of risk and uncertainty need more study. 
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How competitive are world grain markets? Research has not provided a consensus in answering 
the question. Viewpoints range from calling markets competitive when adjusted for trade barriers, 
to oligopolistic-oligopsonistic structures -- the latter sometimes seller dominated, other times 
buyer dominated. 
In spite of our limited knowledge of the true state of affairs, I propose that U.S. export 
policy is best served by leaning on the side of an imperfect market, which at the moment is 
largely buyer dominated. Further, apparently the structure of the market has been altered 
substantially since the initiation of the Soviet grain embargo in 1980. If this is the case, U.S. 
interests would likely be served best by making more serious efforts to get coordination among 
major grain exporters. This would imply a strategy that minimizes price cutting, and possibly 
looks toward cooperative agreements on market shares and export growth targets (see Groenewegen). 
Special consideration could even be given to minimizing any damaging effect such an action would 
have on Third World countries. Finally, if the cooperative arrangements were strong enough, 
serious consideration could be given to strategies to counteract variable import levies and 
similar devices of the EC, and the selective buying strategies of the Soviet Union. Various 
instruments might be used including export tariffs. 
Some will argue that this is a naive view of what is politically possible in the world today 
-- and that is probably true. Further, it is argued that such collusive arrangements are 
ultimately unstable. However, it is equally naive, in my view, to adopt strategies of price 
cutting and subsidies in a world import market dominated by powers such as the EC, Japan, and the 
USSR without considering the potential reaction among other exporters and importers. 
Just as there are disagreements among structural versus monetary explanations for 
instability, there are conflicts between a structural and a "pure" monetary solution. Some 
persons have argued that because of structural considerations, producer and consumer prices in 
many countries are to large degree insulated from monetary influences. But if monetary impacts 
are dominant in generating price instability, and if the United States and the world community are 
serious about reducing instability, some form of a new international bank or world monetary 
authority is needed. 
A United States Policy 
Given the expected future state of competition in international grain markets, what macro 
policies that the United States might pursue are most likely to accommodate a viable long-term 
food and fiber policy -- which, not incidentally, would offer hope that efficient firms would be 
able to survive in the short run? 
It is my view that in defining the most prudent U.S. grains strategy, one must make the 
following assumptions: 
1. Real food and fiber prices over the next decade or more will, at best, have a flat trend 
but are more likely to continue their secular decline. 
2. The current buyer-dominated structure of world grain markets will continue. Large 
centrally planned economies will stay with their selective buying practices. 
3. Collusive action among major grain exporters is not a viable political option in the 
near future. 
4. Dampening of exchange rate markets by new institutional arrangements is not likely in 
the near future. 
5. U.S. commodity policies will continue their historical pattern and will have little 
major impact on the drift in real world food prices. Nor will they reduce the high 
annual price variability, largely traceable to importers• actions and to exchange rates. 
6. The United States will continue to have a farm program. 
7. The export demand facing the United States may be becoming more elastic. 
If these assumptions are reasonably sound, and if the United States wishes to dampen price 
variability, the possible courses of policy action are highly constrained. 
It appears that a solution must be sought by developing new institutions within the context 
of the major economic philosophies that exist in world grain markets today. For historical 
reasons the United States has held recently that an unconstrained "market oriented" philosophy 
confronting a "market managed" philosophy of most of the other major importers and exporters of 
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the world is the. way to .go .. While there is much to be said for the rationale of tilting U.S. 
export strategy 1n the d1rect1on of market orientation, such a strategy must be consistent, and 
must take account of the great destabilizing effects of world recession inflation and the 
11 market managed" orientation of much of the rest of the world. ' ' 
I~ may .be possib.le for many of our very large farms to survive, in the existing market 
situat1on, w1thout maJor U.S. government intervention of any kind. But a strong political case 
will be made, on behalf of many producers and some consumers, that some moderation of price 
variability is socially desirable. 
If an attempt is made to ada~t U.S. food and fiber policy to emerging world conditions, it 
appears that a totally new set of 1nstitutional arrangements will be required. 
Massive institutional changes involving government intervention in U.S. agricultural 
commodity markets were set in place by the New Deal legislation of the 1930s. The changes were 
made in response to the perceived needs of the day. New institutional changes in agricultural 
commodity markets will be required unless we want to see a repeat of PIK type scenarios. 
The objective of U.S. strategy should be to be sufficiently competitive in international 
markets to clear what are defined as market stocks each year. The better choice may be to stay 
with trading, but using a governmental arm in price stabilization and activities to enhance export 
sales. This would seem to offer more in the long run than to turn to a centralized price setting 
bureaucracy that would meet other state traders and central purchasing groups head on. 
I am not proposing a full-blown marketing board, but there is much that the United States 
could learn and perhaps borrow from the Canadian Wheat Board and at the same time stay within our 
political philosophies (see Schmitz and McCalla). A true stabilization authority could act as 
buffer to remove export-induced peaks and valleys in prices, yet still adapt to long term trends 
in world food prices. A quota mechanism with a cap would be required. 
The Canadian system's mandatory participation obviously has an advantage but it is not likely 
to be possible in the United States. We could only achieve a comparable outcome by a 11 Carrot" 
technique. Canadian quota strategy, in effect, extends world market processes and market forces 
to decisions (actions) by individual producers. Canadian stocks strategy seems somewhat more 
rational than U.S. stocks strategy, as a result. Whether we should pursue the Canadian two-price 
technique is debatable. 
An effective U.S. stabilization authority would need to be 11 depoliticized 11 and substantially 
insulated from the day-to-day political arena that creates so much uncertainty for producers in 
our present commodity programs. Such an authority could be modeled in a manner similar to our 
Federal Reserve Board of Governors. To set it up would be one of the first steps toward 
developing a long-term, practicable, farm program that is sensitive to world market forces, yet 
offers some possibility of reducing day-to-day, politically-induced, price variability at home and 
abroad. Difficulties of turf would obviously arise in setting such an authority in place. The 
concept wou 1 d be resisted by entrenched committees, the Secretary of Agriculture, and other 
bureaucrats. 
An effective 11 quasi-independent 11 stabilization authority may be too big a leap to take all at 
once. If that be the case, at least we ought to consider appointing a National Food and Fiber 
Policy Commission composed of highly respected and competent citizens that would propose serious 
alternatives to our current state of affairs. 
Other institutional changes that need addressing include: (1) a new international monetary 
authority; (2) an effective survival insurance program for efficient producers; (3) a new export 
financing facility; and (4) a national food and fiber research institute. 
A National Food and Fiber Commission 
U.S. farmers are correct when they say they have little input in formulating either national 
or international food and fiber policy. This is a paradox in a world in which those farmers are 
touted as the most efficient. The EC and Japan, whose farmers are obviously less efficient than 
their U.S. counterparts, are much more sensitive to domestic and international concerns of their 
farmers. What can be done about this dilemma? 
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I start from the practical premise that U.S. farmers will have an effective input to national 
and international food and fiber policy only if they are a part of a national coalition strategy 
of reason and persuasion. Such a strategy will not likely be effective if it runs up against 
entrenched institutions. A blue ribbon permanent commission representing farmers, agribusiness, 
finance, labor, and urban interests could have an enormous impact in developing proposals and 
dialog for a more rational food and fiber policy. Elements of this concept are being discussed 
seriously by the National Agricultural Forum sponsored by the Agriculture Council of America. 
Other groups such as Governor Carlin's Kansas Working4Group on Agricultural Policy are exploring 
possible new directions in U.S. food and fiber policy. 
As a concept, these "neutra 1" groups deserve the support of all agriculture. For reasons we 
all understand, commodity groups, general farm organizations, and cooperatives find it difficult, 
if not impossible, to take the lead in formulating new directions in national food policy. These 
latter groups can, however, be powerful instruments in implementing a consensus that emerges from 
the dialog of a highly respected coalition commission. Witness the outcome of the recent National 
Commission on Social Security. 
A national food and fiber policy commission as suggested could have informal links to 
permanent state commissions formed for producing "grass roots" inputs into the national dialog. 
Cooperation in a New International Monetary Authority 
It is sometimes said that only a new form of international monetary authority will bring 
stability in international exchange rates (see Schuh, 1982). Another viewpoint is that a very 
large share of U.S. export markets is insensitive to exchange rates because buyers insulate their 
internal prices. This is a complicated issue and needs careful appraisal. 
Firm Survival Insurance Authority 
I believe a case can be made for protecting "efficient" farms against severe price 
instability, on either welfare grounds or to avoid a wholesale exit of those farms. 
The tremendous escalation of the cost of capital has caused cash flow difficulties, loss of 
capital assets, and even exit of many farm firms that are normally considered "efficient." We 
should explore the possibility of a new financial institution to provide risk insurance. Payments 
would be made to farms in periods of depressed prices, enabling them to survive the cycle for a 
better day. Market interest rates might even be subsidized as a supplement to such a plan. 
Repayments -- premiums --would be paid in better times. 
Export Sales Financing Authority 
In 1929 a macro marketing plan, the Federal Farm Board, was set up. It failed for reasons 
now well known. Residual assets of what was essentially a national domestic marketing plan for 
agriculture were transferred to what we now know as the Federal Farm Credit system. That system 
for 50 years has focused primarily on providing competitive credit for the production and 
marketing of agricultural products for the U.S. domestic market. Would it not be reasonable to 
consider a new Farm Credit type of financial authority, in one central self-sustaining agency, 
addressed to the problem of expansion and stability of U.S. agricultural exports? Such an agency 
could focus on export assistance as well as making infrastructure loans to extend the export 
marketing arm of U.S. agriculture. 
We now address such matters in an array of financial institutions such as the World Bank, 
International Monetary Fund, and the :flended credit program of the USDA where coordinated 
agricultural export interests are muted. 
4Executive Order, October 1982, Governor John Carlin, establishing authority for Kansas Working 
Group on Agricultural Policy. 
5such a possibility could be coordinated in the proposal of President Reagan to create a new 
Department of Trade. See "New Trade Department Proposal," Kansas City Times, April 26, 1983, p. 
1. 
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A National Food and Fiber Policy Research Institute 
It is a cliche' that everyone is entitled to his value judgments but no one should be 
entitled to his own set of facts. If a national blue ribbon commission were in place, it would 
need access to a highly respected source of research output. After working in a Land Grant 
institution for more than three decades and knowing something about the federal research 
bureaucracy, I think I can flatly assert that there is a major depression, not recession, in the 
funding and output of national food and fiber policy research. A new mechanism is needed to 
assist those areas of excellence where productive research is underway and to bridge the 
institutional rigidities now in place (see Kelley, 1980). That can come, however, only by a 
massive leap forward, that is, by creating a new institution that does not confront the stone gods 
now in place. This proposition cannot be discussed fully here. Certainly a policy research. 
center recently announced for the University of Missouri and Iowa State . University is a step in 
the right direction and can complement and even extend the efforts of a national center. 
Summary 
I have tried to make a case for the proposition that a viable U.S. food and agricultural 
policy for the 1980s must take into account the major determinants of long term drifts in real 
world food prices -- that is to say, causes of policy-induced year-to-year instability in 
international grain prices and flows. We could be handicapped for some time by staying with a 
''market oriented" philosophy, in the face of a market managed philosophy that prevails in the rest 
of the world. 
There appears to be a hope that some of the "best of both worlds" might be captured by 
creating new U.S. and international institutions to buffer international price instability, yet 
allow basic trends in prices of farm products and food to be expressed. One proposal is to 
establish an authority isolated from day to day political pressures similar to our Federal Reserve 
Board. If properly implemented, it could serve as a buffering mechanism and thereby bring some 
longer term stability to U.S. farm commodity policy. Other institutional changes could be 
pursued, such as an international monetary authority for stabilizing exchange rates. 
The biggest challenge facing all of us probably arises not in analysis of international 
markets but in our lack of understanding of the process of institutional change. If we wish our 
government to respond to, or counterbalance, the policies adopted in many parts of the world, how 
do we do it? Seminars such as this one help us increase our understanding in this most important 
area. 
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POLICY EVALUATION: LONGER TERM OBJECTIVE 
Abner W. Womack 
Professor of Agricultural Economics, UMC 
The departments of agricultural economics at the University of Missouri and economics at Iowa 
State University have jointly established a Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute. The 
University of Missouri portion will be a Center for National Food and Agricultural Policy. A 
Center for Trade and Agricultural Policy will be located at Iowa State University. The centers 
will assist in the development and evaluation of U. S. agricultural and food policies. Specific 
attention will be given to food consumption and prices, farm income, government cost, and foreign 
agricultural trade. 
The Institute's broad goal is to maintain a comprehensive modeling system of the U. S. food 
and agricultural industry that can be used to evaluate the near and longer term economic 
implications of alternative farm and food programs. The modeling system will be used to evaluate 
program options at least twice each year. Evaluations will be provided early enough to be useful 
in decision-making for wheat programs in the spring, and for feed grain, cotton, and rice programs 
in the fall of each year. 
In addition, the modeling system will be available to be used during the critical periods 
when future farm bills are being debated. Studies will reflect what might happen under major 
proposals for programs or modifications of existing programs. Requests for these evaluations will 
be handled based on priorities determined by the Institute. 
Reasons for an Institute 
The growing interdependence between U. S. agricultural markets and (1) macroeconomic policies 
in the U.S. and (2) international economies has made quantitative modeling more urgent. As 
information of this kind is not currently available, various governmental agencies and farm 
organizations have been turning to forecasting services that typically focus on the U. S. economy 
but give at most only secondary attention to agriculture. Moreover, little has been done to 
develop, outside the USDA, a capacity for the kind of studies the Institute is planning. 
There also appears to be a gap in the education-research process of universities. Graduate 
students often are not involved in comprehensive and integrated research. By necessity they focus 
on a particular problem and employ a particular analytical tool. Yet graduate students could 
develop models that would be valuable in contributing to a larger integrated modeling system. The 
institutional framework that now exists does not support the long-term commitment needed for 
economic research of that kind-- for an economic research laboratory .. 
The opportunity also exists for more effective integrating of extension and research. The 
Institute's modeling could respond to extension requests involving broad areas of policy analysis, 
marketing, outlook, and farm management. 
Agricultural and food policy research requires a long-term commitment. Without it, 
significant contributions to the economics as well as political considerations in program design 
are not possible. Furthermore, the analytical system must extend to each major commodity. 
Detailed current data banks are required. Quantitative studies must include relationships across 
commodities, and with the general economy and international markets. Food-nutritional 
implications for the consumer cannot be omitted. 
As an example of longer term analysis, to study acreage set-aside decisions requires 
projections of two to five years. If a feed grain set-aside is decided on in the fall of a given 
year, supply and demand estimates must be projected not just for the current year but future ones 
too. The system must therefore have the capability to anticipate the supply in the coming crop 
year, the direction of adjustment in livestock, and foreign demand (including the ramifications of 
exchange rates and foreign government policies), all with allowance for weather uncertainties. 
The system must also take account of the particular provisions of government programs. 
Institute Organization 
The chart presents the proposed organization of the Food and Agricultural Policy Research 
Institute (FAPRI). The Institute directors will be at the College of Agriculture level, with one 
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advisory committee. The advisory committee will focus on the continual support for the Institute 
and will be concerned for the research issues associated with food, farm, and international trade 
policy. Committee membership will b,e composed of leaders of major agricultural organizations as 
well as technical personnel who have had experience with research on farm policy and programs. 
Two research centers are proposed. As stated above, the center at Missouri will concentrate 
on food and agricultural policy. That at Iowa State will have an international trade orientation. 
Each center will have a project leader who will be responsible for four major areas, policy 
analysis, model development, data base management, and state analysis. 
Organizational Chart for FAPRI 
Food and Agricultural Policy 
Advisory Committee; 
Research Institute (FAPRI) 
Assistant Directors 
Ag. Experiment Station 
Center for National Center for Trade 
Food and Ag Policy and Ag Policy 
(CNFAP) (CTAP) 
Project Leader Project Leader 
I L I I I I I I 
Policy Model Data Base r State State t Pol icy Model J1Data Base J Analysis Development Management Analysis Analysis Analysis Development Management 
Institute Operation 
The chart below shows operational organization. Included are provisions for four major 
activities each calendar year. First, a two-day policy conference will be held in the spring. It 
will have a dual focus. Activity of the first day will be devoted to an intermediate and longer 
term perspective on policy issues. It will include a presentation of a ten-year baseline for the 
agriculture sector, with implications for export trade, changes in the general economy, and farm 
program activity for each major commodity. The second day of the conference will concentrate on 
farm policy options and consequences for each major commodity. Two other activities are devoted 
to farm program analysis-- wheat programs in the summer, and feed grain, cotton, and rice 
programs in the fall. Alternative program options will be evaluated. Evaluations will include 
food supply and utilization data, prices, farm income, food consumption and price, and government 
costs. 
The fourth activity will involve special analyses relative to major policy issues. These 
studies will be done as determined by Center or Institute leadership or on a contractual 
arrangement with sponsoring organizations. 
53 
Operational Chart for FAPRI 
Food and Ag Policy Research Institute 
FAPRI 
I 
l I 
Center for National Food and Ag Policy Center for Trade and Ag Policy 
CNFAP CTAP 
I 1 
I _i_ l 
Res. Economist Data Bank Models Res. Economist Data Bank Model s 
Ext. Economist 
1 
Spring Conference 
10 year 
[ 
-Issues and prospects 
(public) 
-Policy analysis 
(public) 
-Special working 
group 
Software 
I 
l 
July Analys i s 
-Special working 
group 
Ext. Economist 
L 
-Special working 
group 
Farm Program Evaluation for the 1984/85 Program 
Software 
J 
_L__ 
Special Analysis 
-Internal 
decision 
-Contract 
arrangement 
The type of analysis that will be conducted by the Institute is reflected in the table below, 
applied to the 1984/85 wheat program. Although the program has been announced, several possible 
changes are under consideration. 
The Administration's program, denoted USDA, previously announced, provides for a 30 percent 
mandatory acreage reduction with an option a 1 10-20 percent PI K at a 75 percent payback 1 eve 1. 
Target and loan prices are $4.45 per bushel and $3.30 per bushel, respectively. 
Marlenee's program modification includes a 25 percent mandatory acreage reduction and an 
optional PIK of 10-25 percent at an 85 percent payback rate, with target and loan prices at $4.30 
per bushel and $3.30 per bushel. In addition to these features, the plan is also aimed at 
strengthening exports with a certificate program. 
Dole and Foley program options contain a 30 percent reduction in acreage made up of a 20 
percent mandatory reduction and a 10 percent paid diversion. A 10-20 percent PIK program is 
included at a payback rate of 85 percent. Both the Dole and Foley programs have a $3.30 per 
bushel loan rate. The Dole target price is $4.35 per bushel, and the Foley, $4.38 per bushel. 
Daschle's program options contain the strongest set of incentives for participation with 15 
percent ARP, a 15 percent paid diversion, and a 10-20 percent PIK option with an 85 percent 
payback. The Daschle program calls for targets and loan prices at $4.45 per bushel and $3.30 per 
bus he 1. 
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Estimated Results 
The table presents estimates of impacts, as estimated via the use of an annual econometric 
model of the U. S. agricultural industry developed at the University of Missouri. 
The following observations or conclusions can be drawn from the results. 
Supply and Utilization 
Program participation moves up gradually as the ARP is relaxed, PIK payback percentages are 
increased, and diversion payments are added. Participation in the announced program is not likely 
to exceed 40 percent because of the very strong ARP component. If the estimate is accurate, 
ending stocks will likely increase, with farm prices dropping to or very near the loan rate. 
The Marlenee program contains a modification on the ARP side that may result in a slight 
increase in participation, but use of export certificates could increase total utilization, 
resulting in a reduction in ending stocks to around 1350 million bushels, that is, to 1983/84 
levels. 
The Dole and Foley option also reduces total carryover, primarily through stronger program 
incentives for participation. Farmer Held Reserves (FMHR) and CCC stocks will remain high, 
sustaining wheat prices about 9-10 cents per bushel over the loan rate. 
The Daschle proposal contains the strongest program incentives, resulting in the highest 
participation with corresponding price strength and the lowest stock levels. 
Government Costs 
Total program costs for all options are high, indicating the very strong supply potential 
relative to expected domestic and foreign demand. The difference in cost between the 
Administration's option and the Dole/Foley option is about $400 million. The difference in net 
returns to the producer is about $740 million. Obviously, farmers would be better off under these 
options. However, short-run budget cost is greater. It should be noted, though, that the 
Dole/Foley option may contain less cost to government in the longer run, because government 
controlled stocks will be smaller. Under the USDA plan FMHR and CCC stocks would be 100 million 
bushels higher than under the Dole/Foley plan (50 million more in FMHR category, 50 million more 
under CCC control). In the announced USDA program, if the FMHR stocks are maintained and start to 
build, storage costs will accrue and interest will be waived on the second and third year of 
loans. If it becomes necessary to PIK the wheat out, loan rates averaging $3.50 per bushel will 
not be recovered. A similar case prevails if the grain is defaulted to the CCC and is PIK'ed out 
after three years. So there is additional budget exposure or risk in the announced program 
compared with Dole/Foley. 
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Summary of Program Options for Wheat, 1984-85 
Price terms 
Parti- mi • 
Loan Target cipa- Prod 1 Net Program rate erice tion Planted erice Free CCC rev. cost rev. 
USDA $3.30 $4.45 40% 81.7 71.9 $3.34 288 375 775 $10238 $7199 $3039 
Marlenee 3.30 4.30 45 80.7 71.0 3.35 286 340 725 10194 7163 3031 
Dole/Foley 3.30 4.35/ 60 78.0 68.6 3.39 286 325 725 10782/ 7016 3766/ 
4.38 10820 3804 
Daschle 3.30 4.45 75 76.0 66.9 3.42 286 275 725 11702 6925 4777 
Cost to government ( mi 1. ) 
PIK 
Deficiency Diversion Grain Storage Grain Export 
Other2 Program eatments eatments cost cost released subsidt Tota 1 
USDA $1202 $166 $ 7 $ 47 $1475 $2850 
Marlenee 912 493 22 141 $614 1116 3157 
Dole/Foley 1324/ $389 429 19 123 1065 3226/ 
1362 3264 
Daschle 1830 793 536 23 153 879 4061 
1variable production costs: assumed at $85/acre for harvested acres, and $20 for conserving use 
acres. 
2rncludes storage payments, foregone interest, and expenditures by CCC for 1 oan defaults. 
USDA program as announced: 30% ARP, 10-20% PI K with 75% payback. 
Marlenee: 25% ARP, 10-20% PIK with 85% payback. 
Dole/Foley: 20% ARP, 10-20% PIK with 85% payback, 10% paid diversion. A paid diversion payment 
rate of $2.70/bu. is assumed. 
Daschle: 15% ARP, 10-20% PIK with 85% payback, 15% paid diversion. A paid diversion payment rate 
of $2.70/bu. is assumed. 
Summary and Conclusion 
The objective of the Institute is to provide, as a public service, support to policy 
decision makers relative to the design and operation of farm programs. The Institute will 
encourage interaction with other researchers, academic institutions, government agencies, and 
agricultural leaders. A net incidental outcome will be to aid the education and training of 
current and future leaders in agricultural policy. 
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HOW AN INTERNATIONALLY ORIENTED FARMER COOPERATIVE 
VIEWS THE FUTURE 
Michael L. Cook 
President, Farmland World Trade and 
Execut i ve Director, Market Research, Far-Mar-Co 
My remarks will address two related questions. The first is the assigned topic. The second 
is almost an inversion. It is whether and how the agricultura l and trade policy of our nation can 
assist the single-origin exporter to improve its scale-economics dilemma--that is, to be active in 
export trade even though not of giant size. 
An international orientation for an exporting corporation is a matter of corporate strategy, 
of the same genre as mergers, acquisitions, and diversification. Like them, the long-run bottom 
line--profitability--is ordinarilly the principal criterion to which it is subject. 
Any corporate decision of strategic nature is based on the following considerations: 
* 
* 
The firm's goals, capabilities, and strategies already i n place. 
A set of assumptions about (1) future agribusiness environment and (2) expected 
export magnitudes. 
I will review assumptions first, then continue with the factors necessary for an 
internationally oriented firm to be successful in the trading arena. Finally, I will go into the 
matter of how agricultural and trade policy affects the success outcome for a trading f i rm. 
Assumptions 
Future Agribusiness Management 
The Council for Agricultural Science and Technology (CAST) recently issued a report on the 
"emerging economics of agriculture" during the 1980s. It noted three features of agricultural 
demand and supply that bear on prospects for agribusiness participants. These included: 
* 
* 
* 
Demand for farm output is becoming more responsive to price. 
Supply of farm output in the aggregate is becoming more responsive to the prices 
farmers receive for their products and pay for their inputs. 
Productivity advances have enhanced the capability of U.S. agriculture to compete 
in world markets. 
The CAST study also identified the following as among the most dynamic problems that 
agriculture will face during the coming decade: 
* Greater instability of farm income. 
* Greater instability in the economic environment surrounding agriculture. 
* Cash flow problems for commercial farmers. 
Had the CAST study explored the "emergi ng economics of agribusiness" it would likely have 
reached the same conclusions regarding the expected outlook for agribusiness as it did for the 
production sector. That is to say, agribusiness would be challenged by the same changing 
conditions, namely, increasing demand and supply elasticities and productivity advances that help 
to maintain comparative advantage for the United States. 
Also, the same problems would have been identified. Agribusiness too is subject to greater 
income instability. The business environment is less certain than previously. And agribusiness 
has cash flow problems. Whether each of these is of the same magnitude in agribusiness as i n farm 
production is a question to be saved for another conference. 
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The key point here is that no "emerging economics of agribusinesS 11 study has been 
commissioned. Therefore we can only hypothesize that the results would be similiar to the CAST 
conclusions about agriculture. Our research suggests that the correlation is close, at l east 
currently and for the near future. 
Export Projections 
We at Far-Mar-Co have made estimates of what may lie ahead in world util i zation and trade in 
major crops such as wheat and coarse (feed) grains. Our data are presented in the table below. 
It will be noted that our 4-year projections (average for years 1983-84 to 1987-88) are made on 
three different assumptions as to world economic growth. Our use of average data for several 
years avoids the problem of year-to-year fluctuations attributed to weather. But world economic 
trends are more lasting, and the level of confidence presupposed as to the world economy has a 
bearing on prospects for commodities. 
For the world as a whole we foresee faster growth rates, in both utilization and trade, for 
wheat than for coarse grains. 
Our estimates for the United States give a somewhat different picture. The state of the 
world economy would have much to do with likely trends. We think good world economic growth would 
stimulate U.S. exports of both wheat and coarse grains, so much so in fact as to reduce domestic 
utilization. Coarse grain exports particularly would surge if the world were to enter a period of 
strong growth. 
Projected World and U.S. Utilization and Trade in Wheat and Coarse Grains 
Utilization Export Trade 
Worla Onitea States Worl a Onitea States 
Commodity guantitl ann. guantitl ann. guantitl ann. guantit,l ann. 
and item bi • % bi . % bi • % bi 1. % 
mmt bu. i ncr. 111Tlt bu. incr. mmt bu. incr. mmt bu. i ncr. 
Wheat 
1980/81-
1982/83 av. 447.7 16.4 22.6 0.8 98.0 3.6 43.9 1.6 
Projection: 
1983/84-
1987/88 av. 
at economic 
growth rate 
Poor 476.5 17.5 1.6 23.4 0.9 0.9 108.7 4.0 2.6 48.0 1.8 2.6 
Average 483.5 17.8 1.9 23.1 0.8 0.5 113.4 4.2 3.7 49.4 1.8 3.0 
Good 489.2 18.0 2.2 22.9 0.8 0.3 118.4 4.4 4.8 51.5 1.9 4.1 
Coarse grains 
1980/81-
1982/83 av. 738.9 29.6 152.2 6.1 99.7 4.0 62.9 2.5 
Projection 
1983/84-
1987/88 av. 
at economic 
growth rate 
Poor 768.1 30.7 1.0 158.7 6.4 1.0 108.9 4.4 2.2 66.7 2.7 1.5 
Average 774.9 31.0 1.2 158.2 6.3 1.0 113.8 4.6 3.4 72.8 2.9 3.7 
Good 779.5 31.2 1.3 157.7 6.3 0.9 117.1 4.7 4.1 76.0 3.0 4.8 
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Economic Factors for Success in Trading 
The two factors that have most to do with the success of an international trading company are 
its ability to attain scale economies in --
* 
* 
international market intelligence 
risk spreading 
Whether or not these scale economies can be achieved depends to large degree on whether an 
exporting firm is single-origin or multiple-origin. A single-origin exporter is an exporting 
entity that obtains its export commodity from a single country. There are varying degrees or 
levels of single-origin exporters such as single or multiple port, regional or national source of 
origination, and single or multiple commodity. 
Multiple-origin exporters get their commodities from more than one country. 
International market information management involves the following: 
* Information acquisition 
* Information processing 
* Validation 
* Analysis 
* Dispersion or utilization of the knowledge developed 
In the processing and analysis of information, single-origin and multiple-origin exporters 
are alike constrained only by volume. But in acquisition and validation, and in capacity to act 
on information developed, the multiple- origin firm has an advantage. Not only can it get more and 
better information but it has a better opportunity to use the knowledge that is generated. 
Considerations in spreading the risk in international trading divide into: 
* credit 
* currency 
* price 
* logistics 
* execution 
The ability to achieve scale economies in each of these is complex and far from uniform among 
firms. Almost always, though, the multiple-origin firm is in a position to achieve scale 
economies in risk-bearing faster and better than a single-origin exporter. 
Can Agricultural and Trade Policies Help? 
To a farmer marketing cooperative, an important question is whether national agricultural and 
trade policies can assist the single-origin exporter-- in this case, a farmer cooperative-- in 
improving its scale-economy dilemma. 
As a general principle, both multiple- and single-origin exporters would benefit from a more 
market-oriented agricultural policy. 
With regard to trade and export market development, it is possible to classify various U.S. 
government policies or actions as "pro" or "con" the efforts of a single-origin exporter to attain 
scale economies. Five specific policies will be reviewed. 
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Export controls 
Exercise of export controls and their detrimental impact on the reputation of an exporting 
nation as a "reliable supplier" can impinge even more heavily, in both the short and long run, on 
the single-origin exporter than the multiple-origin one. Among other reasons, in a 
multiple-origin company the firm's own capital and human resources can prove mobile in the event 
of damage to national export prospects. They can flow to other exporting nations. A 
single-origin firm does not have that option. 
Bilateral Agreements 
A bilateral agreement that involves the country of its origination is more valuable to a 
single-origin exporter than a multiple-origin one. 
Not only do bilateral agreements assure a minimum level of trade flows. They also contribute 
to a sense of stability that encourages capital investment, including long run investment in 
market development. 
When a single-origin exporter can take advantage of a bilateral agreement it is spared the 
need for an arbitrage specialist and function, a mark of the multiple-origin exporting firm. 
Export Credits 
In the setting of the present world environment and U.S. agricultural policy, direct and 
guaranteed credit programs are particularly important to single-origin exporters. 
If domestic agricultural programs act as a hindrance to exports, and if a substantial number 
of importers have 1 iquidity or solvency problems that give an advantage to an exporter who can 
offer credit, the conclusion follows that the single-origin exporter will particularly be helped 
by a well designed, internationally competitive, government credit program. 
Market development credits such as P.L. 480 also assist the single-origin exporter. They not 
only add to total export demand, but enable the less-internationally-experienced, risk-averse 
exporter to place its name in front of importers. 
International Market Information 
I mentioned above the major place of international intelligence as an influence on the 
success of a firm engaged in international trading. I noted also that in some respects the 
multiple-origin firm has an advantage in getting and acting on information. 
It follows that a public input to generating and disseminating international market 
information has a special meaning to the single-origin firm. Information services now carried on 
are helpful. But in any listing of U.S. governmental policies, the intelligence vector must be 
included; and it is definitely "pro" to the single-origin firm. 
National Agricultural Trade Policy 
Development of a well planned, consistent, long term national agricultural trade policy would 
be even more beneficial to the single- than the multiple-origin exporter. Well chosen national 
policy can facilitate immeasurably the capital investment and market development planning of an 
export firm. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Farmer cooperatives can become successful in international trade if--
* They recognize and understand the factors that lead to achieving scale economies in 
risk spreading and international market information. 
* They develop corporate strategies to attain the scale economies 
Cooperatives most likely to succeed internationally are those that are--
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
multiple commodity--multiple product 
currently well financed 
well positioned from an asset base 
prepared to invest in a good international staff 
most comfortable with risk management 
Agricultural policies have an impact on whether or not cooperatives can become successful 
exporters and trade policies will have a special impact on the future success of single-origin 
cooperative exporters. 
MINIMIZING THE MANAGEMENT OF TRADE 
* John K. Hosemann 
Senior Economist 
American Farm Bureau Federation 
My assigned topic is timely. The proliferation of agricultural trade agreements and calls 
for more trade protection are a source of concern to economists and policymakers who know that 
freer trade improves living standards and welfare generally. Why then the topic? Why is defense 
of an old economic truth necessary? Are we asking the right questions? I have a suspicion that 
we are not. "Where from here?" dominates most farm program discussions today. This question 
implies that we know where we are. Do we? It seems fundamental to find agreement among 
economists first as to where we are. The following is my view. 
The U.S. economy, including the farm economy, is in the midst of profound adjustments. The 
alternatives of actual deflation or hyperinflation are not politically palatable. The most likely 
path is one where inflation will be beaten back over and over through monetary policy regardless 
of the economic adjustment inflicted on the farm sector and other sectors dependent on credit. 
How long this policy approach can be effective is open to debate. 
Federal fiscal restraint has not yet become a popular national goal but businesses and 
households are adjusting from the world of speculative economic activity to real economic 
activity. Likewise, the shift from speculative demand to real demand -- at home and abroad -- for 
farm and food products is imposing substantial adjustments on U.S. agriculture. Similar 
adjustments were made following the inflations of World Wars I and II. 
As cruel as it may seem, there are some advantages to "high" interest rates. One is to 
discourage speculative economic behavior. For those concerned about farm size and structure, 
higher interest rates are an important deterrent to further farm consolidations through equity 
borrowing based on ever-inflating land values. 
* These views are those of the author, not the American Farm Bureau Federation. 
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Adjustments are underway in housing where homeowners, chasing ever higher inflated home 
prices and tax advantages, became accustomed to moving to bigger homes every few years regardless 
of the need for "real" shelter. Around Chicago, I am told, land speculators are trying to peddle 
1 and back to the farmers they bought it from. Leapfrogging is over for a while. To bring the 
point still closer to home, one farmer told me to be careful how fast we brought interest rates 
down because the only money he made last year was on his COs! We can't have it both ways. 
Further interference with farm and nonfarm trade through inappropriate policies will send the 
wrong adjustment signal and prolong the adjustment process. Resources will be further 
misallocated, incomes will decline, and living standards will continue to erode. 
We cannot have relief from inflation and adopt policies for agriculture and other special 
interest groups that exempt them from the pain of adjustment to long-term economic recovery. Put 
another way, if farm program expenditures were the only federal entitlement program, taxes would 
have to be raised to pay for them. Higher taxes mean reduced savings and investment and slower 
economic growth. As Harold Breimyer said at Purdue back in early August, "We cannot have relief 
and recovery at the same time." 
Past inflationary fiscal and monetary policies literally destroyed the saving and investment 
functions in favor of current consumption. Long-term savings and finance for real production took 
a back seat to "live for today •.• tomorrow will never come ••. " As a result, U.S. productivity 
declined. We were literally eating our seed corn. Reckless fiscal and monetary policies brought 
on the problems. Trade problems were a natural result. There is no easy way out but policymakers 
will be tempted to pursue the painless remedies. 
Figure 1 illustrates the impact of past inflationary periods (1890-1980) on prices of wheat, 
corn, and cotton, commodities that have been widely traded throughout the world since 1890. Their 
price movements are associated with the overall price level. 
Figure 1. Season Average u.s. Price of Wheat, Corn, and Cotton 
dollars perr~b~u~·--------------------------------~~~c•e•n-,ts per lb. 
4.00 
3.00 
1900 1920 1940 1960 
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After each inflationary period, agricultural commodity prices collapsed. Those prices are 
extremely supply-and-demand-sensitive and each of the inflationary periods was associated with 
food shortage, real or imagined, and an almost unlimited supply of money and credit. 
As World War I I began to wind down, some economists began looking ahead to the postwar 
period. One economist to do so was Professor Theodore W. Schultz, who wrote a book released in 
1945 called Agriculture In An Unstable Economy. In this work, Professor Schultz studied what 
needed to be done after the war to avoid a repetition of the farm programs of the 1930s. While 
many of his findings related to wheat, the major export crop, they apply in many ways to most 
major crops today. 
Schultz wrote, in part: 
The nub of the wheat problem does not lie in the volume produced, it lies in the price. The 
advances made in wheat-growing technology have cut costs. 
The answer to the post war wheat situation will be found chiefly in the decisions on these 
questions: 
1. Are we willing A) to enlarge the market for wheat by using it both for feed and food, 
and not for food so exclusively as we were prone to do prior to the war, and B) to 
accomplish this by pricing wheat so that it may flow into both feed and food channels? 
2. Are we prepared to re-enter foreign markets actively on the supposition that we have a 
comparative advantage in this product in world commerce because of the advance that has 
been made in our wheat-producing technology and, if we are, will international trade 
arrangements permit us to do so? 
3. Or will we try once more to solve the wheat problem by programs designed to curtail 
acreage and by price measures wedded to a 1910-1914 parity formula? 
Schultz saw that the supply/demand situation had to be solved from the price side. Cutting 
production in this country to force up world prices would do little good. World consumers would 
cut back their use in response to the higher prices, or other countries would take advantage of 
the higher prices by increasing production. Schultz argued that U.S. policymakers must deal with 
the market realities of the day and forget any price expectations that were not consistent with 
market price realities in the face of lower inflation and reduced demand. Government management 
of trade could not be a replacement for sound economic policies. 
To be successful after the war, U.S. agriculture had to enter the world market with the 
belief that the new wheat-growing technology had given it a comparative advantage. Schultz saw 
that the parity formula was as inappropriate for agricultural policy in 1945 as talk of loan rates 
at "cost of production" is in 1983. 
The purpose of this digression is to make the point that if the United States wants to pursue 
economic policies to control inflation, i.e., to walk the tightrope between actual deflation and 
hyperinflation, and at the same time pursue policies that encourage savings and investment, higher 
productivity and greater economic growth, then policies that minimize government management of 
trade are essential. As such, federal farm programs that minimize the interference with trade are 
an economic imperative. Current farm programs are out of harmony with these overall economic 
policy objectives. Rather than face economic realities, management of trade has become a 
convenient hiding place for a growing number of politicians. 
In each of the major periods of declining inflation, policies were pursued to prevent the 
adjustment to market price reality. The same has been true for major farm commodities since the 
1976 presidential campaign when the wheat loan rate was raised without economic justification. 
Figure 2 illustrates the target, loan, and market price relationships for wheat, corn, and 
cotton. These policy responses were based on the idea that inflation would continue and world 
demand would keep expanding so as to take "all the United States could produce." The widening 
gaps between non-U.S. production and consumption reinforced the perpetual shortage outlook and 
the justification to raise support prices regardless of the impact on supply and demand. 
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Figure 2. Target, Loan, and Market Price, Wheat, Corn, Cotton 
dollars per bu. cents er lb. 
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The higher target prices and loan rates were the political responses to inflated production 
costs based on the popular appeal that " •.. farmers are entitled to at least cover production 
costs ... " This thrust to farm programs totally disregards the fact that market prices bear little 
relation to production costs in the short run. Cost-of-production based prices go the wrong way if minimizing the management of trade is the goal. Under free competition, the world market price 
would be established at a level that would just cover the cost of production of the highest cost producer whose output was still needed to meet the demands. 
Thus, years of short run policies that guaranteed all variable costs and some portion of fixed co~s to producers were certain to produce stock problems as production increased, 
utilization decreased, and substitute products developed. Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between real variable costs and real support prices for wheat, corn, and cotton. Variable production costs used are those determined by USDA and reported each year to the House and Senate Agriculture Committees. The variable production costs and loan rates have been deflated by prices paid by farmers for production items. The trends are significant. 
From an economic standpoint, if the policy objective was to help producers through short-term difficulties by covering "out of pocket" costs, the reality was something very different. 
64 
Figure 3. Real Support Price and Real variable Cost, Wheat, Corn, Cotton 
dollars per bu. cents per lb. 
1.20 
1.00 
1.00 
.4 
1974 
Wheat 
-----.... real variable cost 
............. ,---~----,, , 
..... , ..," 
........... ____ .,, 
Corn 
price 
~ real variable cost -... ______ , ~ ........ 
................ ," ........ _____ _ 
... _ ,. 
.......... _,~~' 
Cotton 
real support price 
-,. ' , ' 
.., ... -- ," ', " 
....... ., ., ......... , ........ , 
~ real variable cost 
1978 1982 
20 
15 
10 
The real wheat loan rate was increased sharply in 1976 and has remained well above real 
variable costs. The real corn loan followed wheat. The gap between the real loan rates and real 
variable costs are widening. Cotton more nearly reflects the relationship that is needed from an 
economic standpoint. The cotton loan rate is, by law, tied to estimated world cotton market 
prices and cotton does not have a farmer-held reserve to distort market signals. 
While the market was signaling adjustment, little regard was given by policymakers to the 
signal that would be sent to efficient producers to produce more and for consumers to use less at 
home and abroad. The adjustment problem was further aggravated by the administration of the 
federal farmer-held reserve. In an effort to minimize federal outlays for income transfers, the 
reserve was operated to buoy market prices close to target prices. As a result, major shocks were 
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sent through the livestock and export markets. After fouling up the supply side and the demand 
side by inappropriate farm policy, the next likely place for politicians to "help" is to foul up 
trade policy by more government intervention. 
Up to this point I have tried to give my perception of "where we are" from the standpoint of 
adjustments in the overall economy and what the response has been in the farm sector. In my view, 
it is important to have done so. Trade policy cannot be viewed in a vacuum. Trade policy, if it 
does not recognize the major external forces impacting on agriculture, and the instability caused 
by these forces, will fail in its long-term objectives. To borrow again from Professor Schultz's 
1945 work: 
..• the instability of farm income appears to have its origin primarily in the fluctuations of 
modern business. 
Agriculture and industry are of different temperaments; one is slow and sluggish in its 
movements and the other sensitive and erratic. The quick rises and falls in industrial 
output are well known, but a factor in our economy that is little recognized is that the 
production effort in farming and the resulting output of food, feed, and fiber seldom change 
substantially from one year to another (when we take agricultural production as a whole). 
Even during the unprecendented droughts of 1934 and 1936 agricultural production did not fall 
off 10 percent. Nor do bumper crops bring large bulges in total output. In considering the 
future of American agriculture, awareness of this behavior is essential. 
Let me now turn to some observations about the importance of the export market to farmers. 
The numbers and general relationships are well known. I can add little with regard to the 
economic significance of U.S. farm exports. Farm prices, and thus farm economic well-being, 
follow export demand. Exports are basic to the economic future of U.S. agriculture. 
Over the last 10 years, total agricultural production in the United States increased about 30 
percent. Domestic demand for agricultural products was, at best, growing very slowly or, at 
worst, basically flat. Virtually all of the additional production had to move to international 
markets, or U.S. farm resources would have had to be reduced substantially--as was done with PIK. 
Over the next 10 years, domestic demand for agricultural products will, at best, grow very 
slowly or, at worst, remain basically flat. Any increase in yield per acre or per animal unit, or 
any increase in total acres or total animals produced, must be accompanied by increased exports or 
consequences will follow of declining agricultural prices or mounting government stocks and supply 
restrictions will be necessary. 
In any case, one must be careful about generalizations regarding U.S. farm exports. In 
certain locations and circumstances, 100 percent of the farm production of a commodity may be 
exported. In fact, in 1981, 102 percent of the 1981 sunflower crop of 1.727 mmt was exported. 
U.S. agriculture has been changed fundamentally by technology and fiscal and monetary policy. 
For good or ill, U.S. agriculture, in the main, has shifted from a predominantly domestic supplier 
to a sector that depends heavily on the world market. At the same time, the world market has 
changed. The United States remains the principal, but not the only, player. 
Price competitiveness must now enter the first phase, not the last, of national farm program 
discussions. Price will become more important in signaling production and consumption adjustments 
worldwide. In accordance with Professor Schultz's 1945 advice on wheat, a lower loan rate would 
be in order. In terms of world trade, lower U.S. loan rates would be the most constructive action 
the United States could take against the EC and other wheat-producing nations that are tempted to 
subsidize exports. Such an action would leave the EC little recourse. 
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If I can add anything further to the discussion in this regard, it would be that policymakers 
should awaken from the dream that our major challenge will be to keep pace with booming world food 
demand and that we can export food to our friends and embargo it to our enemies. 
United States exports are facing increased competition. If we have learned anything about 
farm economic policy, it is that farmers (worldwide) respond to incentives. Consider this 
headline and excerpt from THE ECONOMIST, October 29, 1983: 
Sow Petrodollars, Reap Wheat •... Saudi Arabia is poised to join the ranks of wheat exporters. 
Its farmers hope to harvest 850,000 tonnes in 1984 - 30 times the 1975 wheat crop and enough 
to feed the country with some to spare ..• The Saudi wheatfields are man-made oases dotted 
along a strip of sandy soil running down the middle of the peninsula. Wheat grows because 
600 metres underground there is enough water to irrigate all the fields the country needs to 
feed itself for a hundred years ... The fields look like 150-acre sewage treatment plants ..• 
The crop costs about $600 a tonne to produce. The state marketing board ... pays farmers 
$1,000 for each tonne of wheat they grow, compared with a world market price of around $150 a 
tonne. Why are the Saudis paying seven times more to grow wheat than it would cost to import 
it? They say they have good reasons: to guarantee stability of supplies, both for themselves 
and their friends in the Gulf, and to reverse the flight of smallholders to the cities .•. 
Foreign food production will continue on an upward trend in the future. Technology is 
pushing farmers, with more on the way. Commercialization of hybrid wheat is a good example. 
Dairy production fueled by embryo transplants, computer feeding, and biotechnical developments 
ensure rapid changes on the output side, while marketing developments mean more changes in dairy 
product utilization. In order to remain competitive internationally, the United States must 
continue to improve farm productivity in order to lower per unit production costs. There is still 
room for adjustment in land rents, equipment utilization, and tillage practices, for example. 
While the United States cannot do much about world instability, world weather, EC and Japan, 
Soviet behavior and the like, we can do something about pricing, quality, and reliability of U.S. 
farm products. If our economic policy is sound, trade policy will be self-guided by competitive 
advantage. 
Put it another way. The cumulative impact of federal farm programs over the years has 
created a substantial expectation for ever-higher incomes needed to sustain inflated farm asset 
values that will be difficult to sustain longer even if export earnings are maximized. 
Middle-class taxpayers are apparently at the limit at which politicians are willing to tax 
directly and there are not enough rich "left to soak" to honor the economic promises made to 
farmers and other groups. 
Given that U.S. farmers must export, and do so at a high level, it then follows that the U.S. 
economy as a whole must import farm and nonfarm products at high levels. Policies that cause 
friction for imports and exports will lead to less economic efficiency, higher costs, lower 
incomes, and lower living standards generally. As Tweeten and Scearce point out, "To visualize 
the benefits from trade, consider the low standard of living each of us would have if we traded 
with no one. If each person supplied his or her own food, clothing, shelter, transportation, 
entertainment, and so forth, lifestyles would be primitive indeed!" 
Before the temptation to cartelize U.S. exports is considered seriously, one must remember 
that the fundamental purpose of cartels is to ensure members higher profits than would be possible 
without agreement. The means used, by one device or another, is to limit competition. One only 
needs to reflect on what has happened to OPEC -- the carte 1 of a nonrenewab 1 e resource -- to see 
what is in the cards for those who propose cartels for renewable resources. When subjected to the 
rigors of market competition, these arrangements will consistently fail. Hindsight analysis 
suggests that the success of OPEC was linked closely with U.S. policies to cheapen the dollar and 
redistribute the wealth. Failed domestic economic policies will always result in trade 
difficulties and call for more trade management and protection. 
Minimizing the management of trade will require that we answer a few critical questions: 
1. Where is the source of instability in agriculture? Is it within agriculture or does it come 
from outside the farm sector? Can economists reach agreement on this basic point? 
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2. Are farm policies in harmony or at odds with general economic policy objectives, including 
the objectives of freer world trade, increased economic growth, and higher living standards? 
3. Have farm program policies precipitated instability in the U.S. and world livestock 
economies? 
4. What has been the net economic impact over time of various federal farm programs on U.S. farm 
exports? Are domestic price and income supports at cross purposes with federal policies to 
expand farm export sales? Where has the government failed? What might the U.S. share of the 
world food and feed market be had the government not failed? 
5. What has been the impact on demand of various policy initiatives? Minimizing the management 
of trade means a closer examination of the demand effects of various policy initiatives. 
6. Will the impact of any proposed policy become capitalized into farm asset values and cost of 
production, thus contributing to a further erosion of the competitive position of efficient 
U.S. farmers in the world food and feed markets and leading to calls for more government 
intervention in trade? 
7. How can farm price and income supports be administered under budget constraints to minimize 
trade interference? 
All countries, including the United States, impose policies that distort trade. Domestic 
policy objectives tend to dominate, as the trade component in most economies is significantly 
smaller than the domestic component. Domestic agricultural policies that support farm prices 
above world market clearing prices require restrictions on imports and export subsidies. 
No doubt the United States is caught in the cycle where more and more of the world's grain 
and livestock is consumed in countries that have programs to "stabilize" internal prices and 
consumption; adjustment to changing supply/demand conditions is shifted to the open market 
economies; exaggerated price movements produce more domestic policies to stabilize .•• and so on. 
Arguing about which countries are the worst is not productive. 
Two basic choices confront the United States. They are to move toward more trade protection, 
or to continue to advocate 1 iberal ization of trade in farm and nonfarm products and a higher 
standard of living for those who wish to accept the benefits of international trade. From an 
economic standpoint, there is really only one choice if the goal is more economic freedom and 
higher living standards worldwide. 
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Only recently has trade been of prime importance to U.S. agriculture; hence the debate over 
how to deal with the export sector from a policy perspective. It is difficult, if not imRossible, 
to separate domestic policy instruments (e.g., price supports) from trade policy tools (e.g., 
export subsidies) since, in essence, both impact on the trade sector. In addition, the question 
as to the impact of various policies on the "gains from trade" has to be addressed explicitly. 
For example, policies that maximize total export revenue do not necessarily increase the gains to 
the United States from its agricultural trade. 
Growth in U.S . Agricultural Trade 
Table 1 shows the growth in U.S. agricultural exports and those of Canada since the early 
1950s. Over the 30-year period (1950-80), U. S. exports grew from roughly 12 percent of total 
world agricultural exports to 18 percent. On the other hand, Canada's share declined from 3.7 
percent to below 3 percent. In terms of imports, the percentage share of the United States 
declined from 16 percent of the world total to 8 percent, while Canada's percentage has remained 
virtually unchanged. 
Table 1. World, United States, and Canadian Trade in Agricultural Products, 1951-80 
Exeorts Imports 
Export value Percent of Imeort value Percent of 
United world total United world total 
Period World States Canada u.s. Canada States Canada u.s. Canada 
~-bil. $Canadian------- -bil. $Canadian--
1951-
55 av. 26.7 3.3 1.0 12.4 3.7 4.4 0.5 16.4 1.9 
1956-
60 av. 30.6 4.3 1.0 14.1 3.3 4.5 0.7 14.7 2.3 
1961-
65 av. 41.1 6.2 1.4 15.1 3.4 5.1 1.0 12.4 2.4 
1966-
70 av. 51.0 7.2 1.5 14.1 2.9 7.2 1.1 14.1 2.2 
1971-
75 av. 96.1 16.1 3.0 16.8 3.1 8.7 2.1 9.1 2.2 
1976 129.7 23.4 4.0 18.0 3.1 11.6 3.1 8.9 2.4 
1977 161.4 26.4 4.3 16.4 2.7 15.1 3.6 9.4 2.2 
1978 194.7 34.9 4.9 17.9 2.5 18.0 4.0 9.2 2.1 
1979 233.5 42.4 6.1 18.2 2.6 20.9 4.7 9.0 2.0 
1980 266.2 49.7 7.8 18.7 2.9 21.6 5.1 8.1 1.9 
Taken from F.A.O. Trade Yearbook; U.N. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics; U.N. Quantita-
tive Dimensions 
Products. 
of Agricultural Trade; Agriculture Canada, Canada's Trade in Agricultural 
Trade in agricultural products often focuses on wheat, coarse grains, and oil crops. U.S. 
wheat exports in 1981-82 were 50 percent above those in 1972-73, while Canada experienced a growth 
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of less than 25 percent (Table 2). Total world exports rose by half. In coarse grains, for the 
same period, U.S. exports rose roughly 75 percent. (They doubled if the crop year 1980-81 were 
used rather than 1981-82.) For canada the percentage increase was similar. World trade increased 
much faster for feed grains than for wheat--roughly 70 percent. For soybeans and meal, U.S. 
exports more than doubled. However Brazil's exports more than tripled. Exports, world wide, rose 
by more than 150 percent. Total world trade in wheat, coarse grains and soybeans rose from 145.5 
tons to 253.0 million tons (a 75 percent rise), as U.S. exports of these crops increased from 83.1 
million tons to 143.7 million tons (also roughly 75 percent). In summary the U.S. exports of 
grains have expanded as fast as world trade. However, the largest percentage increase in U.S. 
exports has been in soybeans and meal; coarse grains and wheat follow in that order. 
Table 2. Export Volume, Selected Products and Countries, 1972-83 
Wheat 
United States 
Canada 
Australia 
Argentina 
EC 
World 
Coarse Grains 
United States 
Canada 
Australia 
Argentina 
South Africa 
World 
Soybean and Meal 
(Bean Equivalent) 
United States 
Brazil 
Argentina 
Paraguay 
World 
Total of above 
products 
United States 
World 
1Projected. 
'72-73 '73-74 '74-75 '75-76 '76-77 '77-78 '78-79 '79-80 '80-81 '81-82 '82-831 
---------------------------------mil. metric tons------------------------------
31.8 
15.6 
5.6 
3.4 . 
6.8 
67.4 
35.6 
4.2 
1.6 
4.2 
3.3 
59.4 
15.7 
3.0 
18.7 
31.1 
11.5 
5.4 
1.1 
5.8 
62.6 
44.5 
2.9 
1.9 
8.4 
0.5 
70.8 
18.4 
4.4 
0.1 
0.1 
22.9 
28.0 
11.2 
8.2 
2.2 
8.2 
63.8 
34.3 
2.8 
2.9 
8.5 
3.5 
63.7 
21.0 
7.1 
0.1 
0.1 
28.2 
31.5 
12.1 
7.9 
3.2 
9.5 
66.3 
46.5 
4.9 
3.2 
5.3 
3.4 
76.5 
16.3 
8.9 
0.2 
0.1 
25.6 
26.1 
12.9 
8.5 
5.6 
5.1 
63.3 
50.6 
4.6 
3.3 
9.5 
1.4 
82.7 
20.9 
9.6 
0.3 
0.2 
31.1 
31.5 
15.9 
11.1 
2.6 
5.0 
72.8 
52.1 
3.7 
2.0 
11.0 
2.9 
84.0 
20.5 
11.1 
1.0 
0.2 
32.8 
32.3 
13.5 
6.7 
3.3 
8.8 
72.0 
56.9 
3.9 
2.6 
11.5 
2.9 
90.2 
27.6 
7.4 
3.3 
0.2 
38.7 
37.2 
15.0 
14.9 
4.8 
10.4 
86.0 
71.6 
4.8 
4.1 
6.6 
2.9 
100.9 
32.8 
8.1 
2.8 
0.4 
44.1 
41.9 
17.0 
10.6 
3.9 
14.7 
94.3 
72.4 
4.6 
2.2 
9.9 
3.6 
105.5 
27.4 
12.5 
3.3 
0.5 
43.7 
49.1 
17.8 
11.0 
4.3 
15.5 
101.9 
61.4 
7.6 
3.1 
13.6 
5.0 
103.7 
33.2 
10.7 
3.0 
0.6 
47.4 
45.0 
19.5 
7.5 
5.5 
16.5 
100.0 
61.5 
7.0 
1.8 
12.0 
4.1 
98.8 
35.0 
10.8 
3.9 
0.6 
50.2 
83.1 94.0 83.3 94.3 97.6 104.1 116.8 141.6 141.7 143.7 141.5 
145.5 156.3 155.7 168.4 177.1 189.6 200.9 231.0 243.5 253.0 249.0 
Data from USDA. Data may not add due to rounding. 
The growth in U.S. exports was also accompanied by a vast expansion in acreage (Table 3). In 
1972/73, U.S. wheat acreage was 47.6 million but by 1981/82 the acreage had expanded to 80.9 
million. On the other hand, Canada's growth was less significant (21.3 million acres to 30.2 
million). For both countries the increase in coarse grain acreage was smaller. Accompanying this 
acreage increase was a large expansion in output. In wheat, between 1968/69 and 1981/82 output 
increased by 38.5 percent in Canada and 77.2 percent in the United States. For the same period 
Canada's output of feedgrains increased 71.3 percent, that of the United States 60.3 percent. 
Appendix Figures 1 and 2 show the widening gap between U.S. domestic consumption of grains 
and production. Domestic consumption of U.S. grains grew until 1970/71, then fell sharply in 
1973/74 but increased again in 1975/76 - 1982/83. However, domestic consumption in the early 
1980s was no greater than in the peak period of the 1970s (1971/72). However grain production 
increased from roughly 180 million metric tons in 1970/71 to 330 million metric tons in 1982/83. 
In essence, domestic consumption did not increase significantly during the 1970s and early 1980s, 
while production almost doubled. This increase in production found its way to the export market 
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Table 3. Acreage of Wheat and Coarse Grains, Canada and United States, 1968-81 
Wheat Coarse grains Wheat and coarse grains 
Canada Canada Onitea States 
Western United All coarse All coarse 
Year Provinces Total States Barley grains Corn grains Canada United States 
----------------------------------million acres---------------------------------------
1968-69 29.0 29.4 54.8 8.9 17.9 56.0 98.3 47.3 153.1 
1969-70 24.5 25.0 47.1 9.4 18.5 54.6 96 .• 8 43.5 143.9 
1970-71 12.1 12.6 43.6 9.9 20.8 57.4 98.1 33.4 141.7 
1971-72 19.0 19.5 47.6 14.0 25.2 64.1 107.0 44.7 154.6 
1972-73 20.9 21.3 47.3 12.5 22.6 57.5 94.1 43.9 141.4 
1973-74 23.2 23.7 54.1 11.9 22.6 62.1 102.5 46.3 156.6 
1974-75 21.6 22.0 65.4 11.8 22.1 65.4 100.8 44.1 166.2 
1975-76 22.9 23.5 69.5 11.0 21.2 67 . 6 105.3 44.7 174.8 
. 1976-77 27.2 27.9 70.9 10.8 20.7 71.5 107.0 48.6 177.9 
1977-78 24.3 25.0 66.7 11.7 21.0 70.6 109.2 46.0 175.9 
1978-79 25.7 26.2 56.6 10.5 19.3 71.9 106.7 45.5 163.3 
1979-80 25.3 25.9 62.5 9.2 17.5 72.4 103.3 43.4 165.8 
1980-81 26.8 27.4 71.0 11.5 19.8 73.0 102.1 47.2 173.1 
1981-82 29.6 30.2 80.9 13.7 24.1 74.6 107.5 54.3 188.4 
13-year 
increase 
total 0.6 0.8 26.1 4.8 6.2 18.6 9.2 7.0 35.3 
per year 0.05 0.06 2.0 0.4 0.5 1.4 0.7 0.5 2.7 
Taken from USDA, various Foreign Agriculture Circulars on Grains; Statistics Canada, Field Crop 
Reporting Series; and Canada Grains Council, Canadian Grains Industry Statistical Handbooks. 
and into a buildup of domestic stocks. Had there been a rapid expansion in the U.S. livestock 
sector, this would not have been the case. As the gap between production and domestic consumption 
widened, the U.S. agricultural economy became more and more an "open economy." 
United States Market Shares and Grain Stocks 
The U.S. market share of world exports of selected crops is shown in Figure 1. As a total 
for soybeans, coarse grains, and wheat, the United States has well over 50 percent of the world 
export share. The U.S. market share peaked in the 1979/80 crop year. 
For individual crops, market share patterns differ. The market share for soybeans declined 
dramatically from 1972/73 to 1975/76, rose in 1978/79 and then declined. The 1972/73 share was 
never regained. The market share in coarse grains peaked in 1979/80 at roughly 70 percent of the 
world export market. The wheat market share reached highs in 1973/74 and 1981/82. As Figure 1 
shows, the U.S. market share of grain exports is declining relative to the growth it experienced 
at times in the 1970s. 
Declines in market shares can be due to many factors including production shortfalls. 
However, for the United States production held up or increased. For example, U.S. production of 
wheat rose 16.6 percent from 1980/81 to 1981/82, the highest production increase of any major 
exporter (e.g., Canada had a 5.4 percent increase in production and Australia a 3.6 percent gain). 
As the market share for the United States declined, stocks built up relative to other trading 
nations. As Figure 2 shows, the build up of world stocks the last couple of years is attributable 
mainly to a build up in the United States, particularly for coarse grains. 
71 
Figure 1. u. s. Share of World Exports, 6 Crops 
percent 
80 
70 
60 
Coars\ grains 
~,.- '" 
'.... ,."" 
'v" ~,_------~--~ 
6-crop averagl' 50 __ , 
- ~.... ....... .....---Wheat ,_,...- ', ----- __ ,,. , ___ -- .................. 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0'L---~----L---~--~----~--~----~--~----~--~ 
1972-73 1976-77 1980-81 
from Robbin Johnson, "World Markets," Cargill Bulletin, 
January 1983, p. 8. 
Figure 2. Ending Stocks of Wheat and Coarse Grains, United states and World 
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It has been argued that the decline in market share for the United States has been due in 
part to U.S. grain embargoes. In talking about U.S. trade in the 1970s Robbin Johnson of Cargill, 
Inc., notes: "World demand for soybean products--meal and oil--continued to expand at a healthy 
rate throughout the decade. Unfortunately, the ill-conceived 1973 soybean embargo damaged 
America's reputation as a reliable supplier and provided an opportunity for Brazilian--and later 
Argentine--soybean production and exports to grow." Also, "the 1980 Soviet grain embargo has an 
effect on U.S. feed grain exports similar to the 1973 embargo's effect on soybean shipments. The 
U.S. share of world coarse grain trade fell back to about 60 percent as other 
exporters--especially Argentina and Canada--seized this opportunity" (p.9). 
In terms of the wheat trade, EC (European Community) subsidies also have played a role . As 
Johnson notes: 
Beginning in 1979-80, world wheat trade began an unprecedented expansion. In just three 
years it grew 30 million tons, or more than 40 percent. U.S. wheat exports in the same 
period jumped 17 million tons. By capturing nearly 60 percent of this increase in total 
world wheat imports, the United States built its share of the wheat market to nearly 50 
percent. 
World wheat imports in total will slip back modestly in the current (1982-83) marketing 
year. U.S. exports will fall more sharply, dropping the U.S. share of the market back to its 
pre-1979 level of about 45 percent. One other interesting feature of the wheat marketing 
pattern has been the rapid growth in EC exports, aided by substantial subsidies. EC wheat 
exports have tripled since 1977-78, and its share of world wheat trade has risen from 7-8 
percent in the early 1970s to 15-16 percent today." (p.8) 
The Movement from a Closed to An Open Economy 
As U.S. production expanded and a larger percentage was exported, forces external to the 
United States became important. The larger the percentage of production exported the greater is 
the impact of the international trading community on the domestic economy. Many external factors 
shape the structural dimensions of U.S. agriculture. Immediately apparent are protectionist and 
explicit buying policies by importers and movements in exchange rates. 
Importers' Protectionist and Buying Policies 
Major importers such as Japan and the EC protect their producers by means of quotas and 
tariffs, which are adjusted to maintain stability internally. Thus in periods of abundant world 
supplies the tariff levels are high relative to a time of tight supplies. Buyers' protectionism 
forces exporters to make a 11 the adjustment to world conditions. Importers experience price 
stability and exporters, price instability. Carter and Schmitz have shown that importers achieve 
economic gains from their tariff policies. They tested the ''optimum tariff" hypothesis and found 
that importers gain since the tariff revenue they collect plus the producer gain from protection 
is greater than the loss to consumers from higher prices. 
Most trading nations other than the United States state-trade in grain. Schmitz et al argue 
that for this reason and because buyers have multiple sources of supply, countries such as the 
USSR and Peoples Republic of China can ''manufacture" price instability. That is, they can create 
false price signals ' for producers by driving the price up, turning on the production tap in the 
United St1tes and other exporting countries. Then when production is high they curtail 
purchases. This type of buying behavior essentially creates a misallocation of resources for 
exporters as their producers respond to false price signals. Only two years ago we were told to 
pursue all-out production as markets were unlimited. What happened to these markets? 
Movements in Exchange Rates 
Once a nation's agriculture is highly dependent on exports, movements in exchange rates 
1rmporters can also quickly shift their buying patterns, creating uncertainty for exporters. 
In recent years th2 Peoples Republic and USSR have shifted more to Canada and Australia for 
supplies than previously. This shift has been discussed by Bain. 
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Table 4. Parity Price Ratio and Selected Farm Program Data, 1952-1978 
Year 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
Parity 
ratio 
100 
92 
89 
84 
83 
82 
85 
81 
80 
79 
80 
78 
76 
77 
80 
74 
73 
74 
72 
70 
74 
91 
85 
76 
72 
66 
70 
Taken from USDA, Agricultural 
U.S. Agriculture," Amer. 
Acres 
diverted 
Farm program operations 
Direct govern-
ment payments 
Value of 
CCC stocks 
---------------------------millions--------------------
275 946 
213 2,415 
257 3,951 
229 5,604 
13.6 554 5,323 
27.8 1,016 4,791 
27.1 1,089 4,692 
22.5 682 6,408 
28.7 702 6,079 
53.7 1,493 5,248 
64.7 1,747 5,271 
56.1 1,696 5,023 
55.5 2,181 4,611 
57.4 2,463 4,110 
63.3 3, 277 2,340 
40 .8 3,079 1,005 
49 . 3 3,462 1,064 
58 . 0 3,794 1,784 
57.1 3,717 1,594 
37.6 3,145 1,118 
62 . 0 3,961 830 
19 .6 2,607 394 
2. 7 531 188 
2.4 809 402 
2.1 734 634 
1.0 1,819 1,104 
18.2 3,030 1,186 
Statistics (various issues); and Schuh, G. E., 11 The Exchange Rate and 
Jour. of Agricultural Economics, Feb. 1974. 
become important. Schuh has contended that those movements have had a significant impact on U.S. 
exports. Table 4 presents data on Schuh's argument that the farm problem in the 1950s and 1960s 
was partly due to an overvalued dollar. From 1952 to 1973 the parity ratio generally declined, indicating a loss of purchasing power by farmers. The value of CCC (Commod i ty Credit Corporation) 
stocks increased during the 1960s, as did acreage diversion. Also, government support payments increased rapidly during the 1960s. Schuh contends that price supports, etc., responded to an 
overvalued dollar. Many persons called the U.S. dollar overvalued in the fall of 1983 and said it had been responsible in part for lower U.S. prices and a build up of stocks. 
The Cost of Production Question 
With the rapid expansion of U.S. agricultural export trade, a question arises as to the cost 
of export expansion. For example, if it costs the United States more to produce the product than 
what it can be sold for in the export market, why should the United States be proud of its trade 
expansion? Prices for wheat are shown in Figure 3. The price received by farmers during the period shown was below $4.00 per bushel. What do production costs loo k like? Study by Doering et 
al calculated the 11 full cost 11 of U.S. farm exports. The private cost for corn was roughly $2.40 per bushel and for wheat, $3.95 per bushel (Table 5). However, once social costs were added (e.g., research, soil erosion, etc.) the cost of producing corn ranged from $3.65 to $4.05 per 
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Figure 3. Loan, Target, and Market Prices for Wheat, 1980-81 to date 
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bushel and for wheat from $5.17 to $5.96. However, land was valued at acquisition cost (i.e., 
cash rental rates) which is far below the actual purchase price. If the actual purchase price 
were used, production costs would be much higher than the above. In view of these numbers, it is 
clear is that the "full cost" of farm exports is well above the value of export sales. 
One often reads that centrally planned economies such as the Soviet Union have relatively low 
yields because of lack of incentives on their state owned farms. I do not quarrel with this 
propositi on except to note that perhaps there is more to this debate than the soci a 1 contro 1 
issue. For example, if costs of production in the Soviet Union are similar to those in North 
America, why shouldn't they import part of their needs since they can't produce it as cheaply as 
what they can import it for? As stated earlier, because of their shrewd buying practices they can 
often buy grain from abroad at a price far below their costs of production. In addition, to 
argue, as is often done, that the Soviet Union needs credit to buy grain when it has the financing 
to explore outer space is like trying to defend a statement that the United States has never been 
at war. 
Trade Expansion and Land Values 
Accompanying the trade expansion of the 1970s was a substantial rise in the real value of 
farmland. Shalit and Schmitz state that U.S. farmland was valued in 1979 at over one-half of a 
trillion dollars, at least 50 percent more than in 1969. No one would argue that all of this rise 
was due to trade; general inflation also caused land values to increase, as land is viewed as a 
hedge against inflation. However, trade contributed. Note Figure 4. S~pose ATC and MC are the 
industry's average total cost curve and marginal cost curve respectively. If total demand is 01 , 
and domestic demand is D, then price will be P1, Q? will be produced, and QJQ?. will be exportea. Now suppose that th1_ demand for U.S. exports grows such that the new tota r «remand curve is 02. 
Price increases to P , domestic consumption contracts from Q1 to Q1 , and exports expand from Qtq? 
to Q Q • However, an additional effect from trade expansion is the rise in economic rent. he incr~ase in rent is the cross-hatched area. It is the return to the fixed production factors, one 
of which is farmland. 
2In a dynamic context clearly ATC and MC would be shifting due to technological change. In 
this case they would be hybrid functions. However, rents still have a meaning in this case (See 
Just, Hueth, and Schmitz). 
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Table 5: Estimated Total Costs of Production and Farm Level 
Prices of Corn and Wheat, Average 1978-80 
Item Corn Wheat 
-- dollars per bushel 
Private costs 
(land at acquisition) 
Input subsidies: transportation 
research 
Social costs of erosion 
Tax advantage: profitable period 
unprofitable period 
Program costs: surplus purchases 
managing reserves 
Total costs 
Assuming profitable period and 
managing reserves 
Assuming unprofitable period 
and surplus purchases 
Assuming high costs region1 
producing unprofitably with 
surplus purchases 
Farm level prices 
2.39 
.03 
.002 
.10 
.60-.90 
.15-.25 
.26-.52 
.04 
3.16-3.46 
2.93-3.29 
3.68-4.04 
2.68 
3.94 
.03 
.03 
.14 
.30-.50 
.07-.12 
.61-1.35 
.06 
4.48-4.68 
4.80-5.59 
5.17-5.96 
3.57 
1Three year (1978-1980) price for region(s) producing 9 percent of U.S. corn and 14 percent of U.S. 
wheat. 
Taken from Otto Doering, Andrew Schmitz, and John Miranowski, 11 The Full Costs of Farm Exports, 11 University of California, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Giannini Foundation Working Paper No. 206, Berkeley, 1982. 
Several points in Figure 4 can be stressed: 
( 1) The steeper the MC curve the greater wi 11 be the effect of trade expansion on the factors of production in inelastic supply. Given the excess capacity in agriculture in the 1960s (e.g., acreage set-asides), U.S. agriculture likely operated on the declining or flat part of the industry cost curve. The expansion of trade after this period brought a full 
utilization of resources; hence, U.S. agriculture in the 1970s operated in the rising portion 
of the marginal cost curve. 
(2) Should land values be incorporated as a production cost? Note that in the previous table, land use was valued at a rental rate, not at full cost. The magnitude of price 
supports based on a cost of production formula critically depends on how land is incorporated 
as a production factor. 
(3) Because of the export instability, should price supports be set at P1 (the high export demand price) so that the economic rent represented by the cross-hat~hed area can be 
maintained if demand drops from D2 to D1, as it has done in recent years? 
(4) The effect of trade on land values critically depends on how steep the cost curve is in the range where export demand expansion takes place. If trade expands rapidly in a very 
steep portion of the cost curve, land rents will soar. This wealth phenomenon has tremendous 
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Figure 4. Trade Expansion and Land Rents 
Price and 
per unit 
cost 
Q output 
multiplier effects. Likewise, when export demand drops off, unless government intervenes the 
negative multiplier effects also become apparent. Thus, given that the foreign demand for 
U.S. exports is highly unstable, how this instability affects the U.S. economy depends in 
part on how land values are affected. It should be noted that U.S. land values from World 
War II to the 1970s remained relatively stable in real terms. It is more than a coincidence 
that U.S~ land values rose dramatically in the 1970s in conjunction with U.S. trade 
expansion. 
(5) It is clear why farm foreclosures are common. Young farmers who bought farmland at a 
price corresponding to the demand for their crops D7 cannot remain financially solvent with a 
reduced demand of D • The U.S. price support needed to justify land values that existed in 
the late 1970s woul~ have to be at least twice the current market price for wheat and corn. 
As Figure 4 shows, a small change in export demand can have a major impact on land values. 
The Gains from Trade 
The earlier tables related to export expansion and the U.S. share. But in economic terms one 
cannot look at quantity of exports alone as a good indicator of the economic benefit from trade. 
At the moment, exports are being sold below the cost of production (see Table 5), reducing the 
benefits from our trade. 
We have stressed in our export cartel book that substantial barriers to trade exist and if 
these were removed, U.S. grain prices would easily rise by 40 percent. The United States is 
currently not deriving the "free trade" gains from trade because of trade barriers. To make 
matters worse, we respond to these barriers by using export subsidies, price supports, input 
subsidies, and the like. It can be shown easily that because of the existing trade barriers and 
the method by which the United States responds to them, the economic gains even from a high volume 
of trade can be small or zero. Because of the importance of this issue a single model is given in 
Figure 5. The excess demand is ED and the excess supply is ES. The free trade price is P and Q 
is exported. Given the trade barriers, the excess demand curve shifts to ED. The Unitea State~ 
responds by methods such as subsidy of inputs (see Table 5), shifting the excess supply curve to 
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Figure 5. Gains from Trade under Tariff and Price Distortions 
p 
c 
QF 
(Free market) 
(Subsidized) 
ED (Free market) 
(Tariff ridden) 
Q 
ES1 • At price P exports are still the same as in the free trade case. However, the country is 
no better off w1th trade1 than if it did not trade at a 11 • Under free trade the gain was P fee. However, with ES and ED the gains from trade are zero since P be = bef. What is interesting 
about Figure 5 is that it doesn't take a very large leftward sffift in the excess demand curve (caused by tariff and nontariff barriers) and a rightward shift of the excess supply curve (caused 
by subsidies, etc.) before the gains from trade are zero. The type of U.S. policies pursued 
explains, in part, why the gains from trade are eroded. Subsidies and the like are "passive" 
policies. Also, these policies adversely affect the U.S. livestock sector because of the 
uncertainty they create in the feedgrain markets. They also cause the U.S. excess supply function 
to shift rightward. 
Exporters as Price Takers 
In their cartel book Schmitz et al contend that grain exporters, of which the United States 
is the largest, are price takers and that major importers set prices and dictate the terms of 
trade. Several related comments follow. (1) The situation is facilitated by importers' state 
trading. The EC and Japan, as already mentioned, generate instability for exporters and achieve 
an economic gain by tariff policies designed for the purpose. (2) Most of the world stocks are 
held by the United States. In a world of uncertainty importers would hold part of these stocks if 
the United States were a price setter rather than a price taker. ( 3) Passive po 1 i ci es of price 
supports, input subsidies, and the like give importers buying power. (4) Importers create false 
price signals for exporters. 
Other reasons and observations support the hypothesis that exporters are price takers. If 
this is the case, what can we do about it? It seems somewhat paradoxical to be selling goods 
abroad below the cost of production when the United States possesses such large market shares (see 
Figure 3). Our current policies are passive in that they do not get at the basic problem which is 
that the United States cannot achieve large gains from trade unless importers give up some of 
their price setting power. In the concluding section below I give the essence of our cartel 
proposal, which, unlike the present passive policies, is a retaliatory or "active" policy. It is 
only through such a policy that the United States can hope to achieve its true gains from trade --
not producer gains that are heavily subsidized by the U.S. government. 
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Conclusions 
My premise is that the United States is currently pursuing a passive economic policy for 
agriculture which, coupled with the high tariff and nontariff barriers, yields little economic 
gains from trade. This paper has focused on the relationship between policy and its effect on the 
"gains from trade" -- the latter is the key yardstick of success. Why not try an active pol icy 
which falls within the realm of a cartel (i.e., export cooperation strategy)? Because of the 
large market share the United States has in coarse grains, and the large combined share that the 
United States, Canada, and Australia have in wheat, why not raise price instead of lowering it? · 
This is especially an interesting question for feed grains since the growth in export demand is by 
high-income countries. 
For wheat, where the greatest growth is by the less-developed countries, we propose a 
two-price system. The idea of charging a lower price to poor countries is not new--witness P.~. 
480 shipments. One doesn't need a U.S. marketing board, but only an implicit export tax which, in 
essence, would price grain to the EC somehat close to its threshold level. Such a price would 
essentially eliminate the tariff revenue the EC now collects. It would create problems for the EC 
as that revenue is needed to run the EC agricultural policy. 
In addition, it is known that import demand by the Japanese is price inelastic. Also, there 
is no a priori reason why countries such as the Soviet Union and China would drastically increase 
production, in view of production costs. It is my feeling that by setting a price below which 
importers cannot buy, the major grain exporters could increase both price and quantity. This is 
because at the moment the grain economy is well below the free trade level. By imposing the price 
floor, importers would have to remove some of their trade barriers. This removal of barriers 
would result in both a price rise and an increase in output by exporters. Part of the instability 
would be borne by importers also and net ·only by exporters as currently. Internal stability of 
grain prices would also contribute to a much-needed expansion in the livestock industry in North 
America. Currently, the sector is contracting, forcing the United States and Canada to rely more 
on the export market for their grain sales. The situation adds to instability and uncertainty. 
The above suggestion is clearly not in the current administration's thinking on trade 
matters. As already mentioned, the United States is pursuing passive and not active policies. As 
one farmer stated at a recent meeting in Houston, Texas (National Association of Wheat Growers), 
why not try the cartel proposal -- surely things can't get any worse than they aready are! 
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SIGNIFICANCE OF TRADE POLICY TO U.S. FARM POLICY 
V. James Rhodes 
Professor of Agricultural Economics, UMC 
In reaction to the spiraling budgetary costs of PIK and declining U.S. farm exports, the 
Reagan Administration is reportedly pressing to reduce the level of support prices for farm 
products. 
The economics of support prices gets more attention in an era of large exports. Any policy of 
relatively high supports comes under more criticism. Our international competitors reap the same 
benefits from them as we do, while leaving us with the fiscal cost of the program. So long as our 
price supports are effective, we remain the residual supplier. While there is merit in having 
some inventory if one is to be a reliable supplier, U.S. stocks have frequently become burdensome 
surpluses. Program burdens have not been shared--borne--in any significant way by either the rich 
importers or our international competitors. 
Table 1 represents an attempt to summarize the effects of alternative farm programs. The 
comparisons are short-term--usua 11 y for a crop year. Admittedly, 1 ong term effects are often 
different. However, politicians making decisions on farm programs typically have a short term 
perspective. It should come as no surprise that each program has both benefits and costs. Each 
effective program eventually carries a cost to the U.S. taxpayer. For our purposes, it is 
important that deficiency payments (alone) and export subsidies (alone) do not benefit our 
competitors and do not insure that the United States hold world surpluses. 
Table 1. Short Term Effects of Farm Programs Compared to No Programs 
Program 
Price supports high 
enough to be effec-
tive 
Production controls 
and price supports 
Deficiency payments 
Export subsidies alone 
with price supports 
U.S. bank "loans" of 
1970s to LDCs (re-
cycled oil money) 
Volume of 
world 
exports 
1 ewers 
lowers 
raises 
raises 
no tJ. 
raises 
U.S. farm 
incomes 
raises 
raises 
raises 
raises(?) 
raises 
raises 
Competing 
exporters' 
incomes 
raises 
more 
raises 
more 
1 owers 
1 owers 
no tJ. 
raises 
Cost to U.S. 
consumers 
expensive 
expensive 
no effect 
small expense 
expensive 
expensive 
Cost to 
u.s. 
Treasury 
expensive 
expensive 
expensive 
expensive 
doubly ex-
pensive 
is expen-
sive later 
Who holds 
world 
surpluses 
u.s. 
u.s. 
everyone 
everyone 
u.s. 
everyone 
U.S. bank loans to the LDCs in the 1970s were not an explicit farm policy, of course. 
However, their rapid expansion late in the decade was an important base for the expansion of our 
food sales abroad. The foreign debt of the LDCs rose 54 percent from 1979 to 1982. The abrupt 
ending of expansionary lending is clearly one of the reasons for the recent decline in our 
exports. The USDA's current increase in interest subsidies and loan guarantees as aid to trading 
is a partial replacement for those earlier bank loans. 
In preceding papers Mr. Hosemann and Mr. Schmitz discuss two alternative trade policies. As 
polar opposites, both differ considerably from the present makeshift policies. While we could 
probably characterize Hosemann's proposal as essentially no governmental involvement, it is more 
difficult to characterize the Schmitz proposal. Moreover, before seeing his paper I developed a 
proposal that I called a Marketing Board. My version of a marketing board is much in the spirit 
of Schmitz's approach but differs in various details. 
"Marketing Board" is not a politic term in the United States today, partly because it has 
been associated with various emotional slogans such as "a bushel of wheat for a barrel of oil." 
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I am not concerned for the name--our purpose is to develop ideas rather than try to sell a 
program. 
A marketing board is an institution that can serve various purposes. Generally, as used by 
Canada, Australia, and several other nations, marketing boards have had limited objectives, which 
do not usually extend to a grandiose attempt to exercise market power. The general objective 
given the board I will discuss is to develop a fairly sophisticated and coordinated pricing and 
marketing strategy abroad as contrasted with our present muddle of policies. Its purpose is to 
make us again a Yankee trader--a world-class competitor. 
Given the above general objective, the marketing board would have the following general 
characteristics. It would be the sole exporter of U.S. grains and soybeans. However, the actual 
mechanics of overseas movement would be handled by the usual private firms. The board would not 
make any domestic sales. The board would generally seek to clear the market each marketing year. 
It would not accumulate and hold 11 Surpluses 11 from one year to another. It would be desirable for 
the government to hold separately some reserves for international emergencies, but that would not 
be a marketing board responsibility. The marketing board would be free to vary price in order to 
compete effectively. Price discrimination would be an important tool. The marketing board would 
seek to capture for U.S. farmers much of the revenue the EC now captures for itself in variable 
levies. At the same time, it would price more cheaply to price-elastic markets in the LDCs. 
Most importing countries and some exporters in various ways have partially isolated 
themselves from the market. Their policies have worked because of the giant, partially free 
market in the United States. Their policies will not work as well for them given our Marketing 
Board. In fact, the Board might give us considerable economic leverage to make the protectionist 
policies of the EC and Japan more rational. · 
In short, a marketing board would change our presence in the game of trade. It could 
coordinate policies with other exporting countries in ways that private traders cannot. The 
marketing board might find it advantageous to form a grains and oilseeds cartel. Grain and 
oilseeds are not oil, and the cartel's power to affect prices would be far less than that of OPEC. 
However,as Schmitz remarks, a cartel has some economic muscle to achieve benefits so long as it is 
run intelligently. A lot of rhetoric has been heard about getting the world to share the burden 
of managing stocks, but a marketing board has the best chance of actually accomplishing that. 
Certainly the Board should develop long-term market development policies. It should be a 
reliable supplier. It should be market oriented and not dabble in East-West politics. If the 
U.S. government wants to support an LDC economy for political reasons, the government should 
provide the necessary subsidies. 
Two policy approaches to trade are presented in the two preceding papers. Table 2 may help 
in comparing them. Depending on one's value system and the relative weights each person gives, 
either minimal government or a marketing board may be picked as the better policy. There is room 
for discussion as to some of these effects. Note that many of the effects are the same for both 
policy alternatives. Some of the Marketing Board effects depend on how the Board is run, and the 
success of its strategies to counter retaliation by other countries. 
It seems highly likely that U.S. farmers would not be satisfied with either minimal trade 
policies or a marketing board as their sole farm program. Combining either with deficiency 
payments would provide more of a safety net without interfering with these trade policies. The 
Marketing Board may reasonably be expected to generate somewhat more total revenue than would the 
minimal trade policies. 
A marketing board likely has little political chance in the near future. Because it is 
unknown as a U.S. institution, all sorts of dire consequences will be predicted for it by 
skeptics. Nevertheless, anyone who is dissatisfied with our world market position and our 
burdensome surpluses needs to examine carefully the policies by which we might move away from 
those problems. It is clear that some major competitors, such as Canada with its marketing board, 
have found ways to solve these problems. 
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Table 2. Two Export Trade Policies Compared 
Compatibility with other farm programs 
Price supports 
Production controls 
Deficiency payments 
Export subsidies 
Encouragement of maximum value of exports 
Promotion of exports of high-value items 
Easing of day-to-day price fluctuations 
Help to competing exporters 
Making the U.S. a residual supplier 
Buffer to U.S . livestock industry 
Protection to U.S. farmers against 
suffering low prices 
Blocking U.S. farmers from enjoying 
high prices 
Compatibility with an export cartel 
Capacity to price products higher to 
EC and Japan 
Market uncertainties as to governmental 
actions 
Opportunity for "political" intervention 
Costly to U.S. Treasury 
Costly to U.S. consumers 
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Minimal governmental 
role 
no 
no 
yes(?) 
no(?) 
yes 
no 
no 
no 
no 
no 
no 
no 
no 
no 
no 
yes(?) 
no 
no 
Marketing Board 
no 
no 
yes 
yes 
yes, yes 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
a little 
no 
a 1 ittle 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
SUMMARY AND REVIEW 
Jerry G. West 
Professor of Agricultural Economics, UMC 
The ideas and concepts discussed in preceding papers are wide ranging and broad, as the title 
of the seminar implies. They vary from rather specific problems on individual farms to worldwide 
problems such as inflation, protectionism, recession, and the international monetary system. To 
provide a focus I summarize the points on which there is considerable agreement, identify some 
areas in which there is none, and describe briefly some of the policy issues that surfaced during 
the seminar. 
Several of the papers deal with various elements of the present situation. The points of 
general agreement include: 
1. The environment in which U.S. agriculture operates today is quite different from that of 
the 1960s and early 1970s. Professor Raup illustrates the change by comparing the level 
of trade (total of exports and imports) involving the United States with the level of 
GNP. We moved from 7 percent in the 1960s to 17 percent in the early 1980s. 
2. A number of factors affect the level of U.S. exports. Their importance varies among 
countries. In addition to production in other countries, there are factors such as 
level of economic activity, exchange rates, inflation, interest rates, and agricultural 
policies (those affecting domestic production and trade). 
3. The prospect of any significant improvement in farm prices in the near future is not too 
bright. Nothing on the horizon suggests that total demand will increase more than 
productivity. Professor Tweeten estimates that both rates of increase will be in the 
area of 1.5 percent per year. There is slack in the system in the form of excess 
resources and the export market is not going to be a panacea. Nearly one-half of the 
increase in exports from 1976 to 1981 was to developing countries, and those countries 
also accounted for about the same proportion of the recent decline. Dr. Cook's 
discussion of the solvency problem among developing countries dramatizes the problem. 
4. Variability in domestic production (induced by farm programs and by weather) along with 
fluctuations in export demand provide a continuing basis for instability. Professor 
Raup attributes much of the land price increase of the 1970s to an extrapolation of 
export trends that have since failed to materialize. The instability is an obvious 
problem for grain producers but is also important for the livestock industry. In fact, 
some persons argue that livestock producers are on the end of the whip and since they 
are not protected by government programs they suffer even more severe consequences than 
grain farmers. 
5. Use of voluntary programs to adjust to instability is becoming increasingly costly and 
ineffective. Breimyer stresses the difficulty associated with the "free rider" who does 
not participate in efforts to adjust production but who receives benefits from any price 
enhancement. 
6. A dualistic agriculture is developing in the United States in which we have a relatively 
few farms producing a large percentage of the output and a much larger number which 
produce relatively small quantities and depend on other sources of income. Professor 
Tweeten suggests it is the full-time, small-to-moderate size farm that is disappearing. 
Changes in size distribution also mean that the major benefits from government 
expenditures to support price go to a relatively small percentage of farms. Several 
speakers suggest this might affect political support for farm programs. 
7. There are no totally "free trade" countries and much of the trade is managed. 
8. Domestic macro policies designed to control inflation, stimulate investment, and 
increase employment have significant direct impacts on U.S. agriculture, and affect 
agriculture indirectly through their impact on the world economy. 
9. High interest rates present problems for a sizeable segment of farmers. Those who 
entered farming during the 1970s and who purchased 1 and at inflated prices or who 
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invested heavily in machinery or equipment are experiencing cash flow problems. As 
Professor Tweeten points out, returns are deferred while costs are current. 
10. Future farm programs are likely to emphasize stability and not increased returns. Such 
programs will not do much for the aforementioned cash flow problem. 
Although the areas of disagreement are somewhat fewer, some differences are obvious. Areas 
in which there is no clear agreement include the following questions or statements. 
1. How responsive is the quantity demanded to price in various export markets? For those 
commodities where export demand is important, this question becomes important. Tweeten, 
Lee, and Hosemann argue that demand is elastic, at least in the long run, and that 
programs which raise U.S. farm prices make it more difficult for us to compete in world 
markets. Womack suggests the responsiveness varies by commodity and by the country 
involved. Professors Schmitz and Raup question the responsiveness under certain 
circumstances such as those in Japan and the EC. 
2. The reaction of suppliers in other countries to our prices. This issue is in dispute. 
Some persons argue that our price umbre 11 a 1 eads to increased production. Professor 
Raup points to a backward bending supply relationship that seems to exist in some 
countries where exports vary inversely with price as attempts are made to meet foreign 
exchange needs. If we produce more and allow price to decline on the world market, 
those countries may be forced to allocate more to the export market. 
3. Is a market oriented agriculture appropriate in a 11 managed trade 11 world? Lee and 
Hosemann say, yes, it is, while Kelley and Rhodes say, no, and offer alternatives. 
Schmitz even questions the existence of gains from trade under such circumstances. 
4. There is disagreement on the relative importance of the factors responsible for past 
variability in exports. For example, Lee suggests that the strong dollar and its effect 
on the exchange rate cost us $6 bill ion worth of exports over the 1 ast two years. 
Batten and Belongia say the high interest rates may have had negative impacts but since 
the rate of inflation has declined the lower prices make us more competitive. Womack 
presents data to show how the impacts vary by commodity and by region. Breimyer admits 
the negative impact of the higher exchange rates and high interest rates, but argues 
that deteriorating economic conditions in importing countries have been more impprtant. 
5. The appropriate school of thought for thinking about trade is discussed by several 
speakers. Kelley points out that both the market structure school and the exchange 
rate-monetarist school have their advocates. Both were in evidence during the seminar .. 
In the opening paper Professor Breimyer uses a chart to portray how the domestic agriculture 
sector is related to farm programs and to world trade. Farm prices and income are separated from 
exports by various farm programs, buffer stocks, and other devices. The picture is quite complex 
and dynamic in the sense that it is continually changing. Many of our disagreements with respect 
to the situation are due to the difficulty of obtaining reliable empirical measures under these 
conditions. 
To some extent the essence of the seminar was the kinds of programs and institutions we want 
as shock absorbers between the international markets and our farmers. To what extent are free 
markets adequate or to what extent are these institutions and programs to be passive or active? 
On the domestic scene, the changing structure of agriculture leads to many calls for changes 
in domestic farm programs. A recent CAST report, quoted several times during the seminar, 
suggests that the larger farm) can compete effectively in world markets without the types of 
assistance previously provided. The need for assistance to the small and moderate size family 
farms remains an issue. Both Tweeten and Breimyer argue that agriculture no longer suffers from a 
large excess labor supply. While we may be closer than before to equilibrium in terms of quantity 
1 The Emerging Economics of Agriculture: Review and Policy Options. Council for Agricultural 
Science and Technology, Report No. 98, Ames, Iowa, pp. 7-8. 
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of resources, that is not necessarily so with respect to prices of factors. The land price issue 
cannot be ignored in considering the effects of programs and policies for the future. 
The recommended changes in trade policies and institutions necessary to implement those 
policies vary over a wide spectrum. The proposed options provide the basis for a lively exchange 
between Hosemann, who argues for mini mum government interference, and Schmitz and Rhodes, who 
suggest that attention be given to export marketing corporations or marketing boards. While some 
rather radical changes have been suggested, it is not likely that we will see drastic changes in 
the short run. It has been suggested that changes in our public policy typically come by 
increments and in fact might well be described as "disjointed incrementalism." Such is likely to 
be the case in trade policy, given the widely divergent views held as to the appropriate 
direction. 
Professor Breimyer suggested that the objective of the seminar was to provide sharper 
perceptions of questions. I think this was accomplished. I believe we are indebted to the 
speakers for their thought-provoking presentations and to Professor Breimyer for putting the 
seminar together. I look forward to future "Harold Breimyer Agricultural Policy Seminars." 
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